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ABSTRACT

Camera Creatures addresses the new media landscape in which cameras, in most
situations, outnumber pens. The dissertation argues that despite the accessibility
and power of imagemaking devices, there persists in the humanities and social
sciences a hesitation to engage the possibilities for composing with optical media.
A number of factors contributing to this trend are addressed, including the
preference for image analysis over imagemaking practices, persistent assumptions
of the camera’s mechanical objectivity, and a tendency to teach visual invention as
collage. As a counter-measure, a proposal is made for investment in the
mediation of light, or “photonic rhetorics.” To explore these effects in visual
communication and the possibility of bringing them into practice, three emerging
camera technologies are examined. The first, the photo app, focuses on the
controversy surrounding embedded journalists who use social networks and the
Hipstamatic camera phone application to relay stories of U.S. Marines deployed in
Afghanistan. The chapter argues that the filters and shooting styles of these
mobile apps encourage fluencies in the persuasive effects of light. The second
camera technology, the video clip, addresses the long take as the predominant
technique of everyday video-making. Film theory, video sharing trends, and
circadian science contribute to a discussion of the rhythms of long-take shooting
and its capability to expose both visual habits and the contingencies capable of
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disrupting them. The third site turns to video game “shooters” and the virtual
camera’s construction of “surrogate vision,” which the author argues is a critical
tool for understanding the future of mediated interactivity in both physical and
digital landscapes. The dissertation concludes with a pedagogical section devoted
to conscientious cheating. Alongside theories of deliberate practice, “cheating” is
repurposed for education, offering new ways of testing the “rules” of optical
composition while discovering opportunities to intervene in light’s constant
mediation of perception.
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For Donat and Rosina Rainey.
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...poor Io drank from muddy streams
and, when she tried to lift her arms to plead
with Argus, found she had no arms to stretch;
and when she tried to utter some lament,
nothing but lowings issued from her lips,
a sound that she was frightened to emit—
her own voice frightened her.

—Ovid, Metamorphoses

v

TALBE OF CONTENTS
Page
CAMERA CREATURES ........................................................................................ i	
  
ABSTRACT............................................................................................................ ii	
  
DEDICATION ....................................................................................................... iv
CHAPTERS	
  
1. FACE OF THE FOTOMAN.................................................................... 1
How the Digital Camera Lost Its Light
2. PHOTONIC RHETORICS .................................................................... 53	
  
Staging Compositions with Light	
  
3. PHOTO APP .......................................................................................... 99	
  
The Still Image and Machine Subjectivity
4. VIDEO CLIPS ..................................................................................... 137	
  
Long Takes and Embodied Rhythms
5. VIRTUAL CAMS................................................................................ 170	
  
Surrogate Vision and Third Nature
6. CAMERA TRICKS ............................................................................. 198
A Pedagogy of Cheating
BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................. 255

vi

CHAPTER 1

FACE OF THE FOTOMAN
HOW THE DIGITAL CAMERA LOST ITS LIGHT

Although the 1992 FotoMan heralded a revolution in imagemaking, it never quite
looked the part.1 Vertically oriented, minimally designed, and available in black or
white, the consumer market’s first digital camera resembled the size and shape of
the smartphones which would succeed it a decade later. Its most distinctive
features were its four outer camera components, arranged to suggest a face on the
FotoMan’s shell. The flash and the viewfinder comprised the eyes, one opaque the
other transparent, giving it a lopsided appearance.2 The lens and trigger formed
the circular nose and button mouth, together controlling the camera’s intake of
the world. The overall impression was a surprised wink, as if the FotoMan
himself had been frightened by what he had seen—only (wink), no need to worry:
everything had been saved.
The few mainstream publications that reviewed the FotoMan considered it
a high-end computer peripheral, and not without reason.3 Logitech, which had
purchased the device from the camera company DYCAM, had a reputation for
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manufacturing computer mice, not imaging equipment. In fact, the color options
for the FotoMan signaled less about the company’s regard for user choice than the
challenge of straddling two loosely connected submarkets in consumer
electronics. Computers were often packaged in “snow white” casings while the
audio-visual world preferred jet-black.4 The FotoMan, with its $799 price tag for
either color, was trying to appeal to both divisions. Yet neither market offered
much of a precedent for its visual design. Its mechanical “cuteness” was caught
somewhere between Fisher Price’s 1970s pocket cameras and Hanna Barbara’s
Rosie the Robot. As a result, its commercial clients and tech-savvy early adopters,
considered it more of a “weird gizmo” than a next-generation technology. 5
Perhaps anticipating these first impressions, Logitech’s president, Pierluigi
Zappacosta, indirectly defended the distinctive styling during its launch, declaring
that "FotoMan represents yet another step in 'humanizing the computer.'"6 The
comment plays up Logitech’s “_Man” line, a marketing campaign in the 1990s
that included items like CyberMan, PenMan, AudioMan, MouseMan, MusicMan,
and SoundMan—a product series sounds more like a team of second-rate male
superheroes than a line of computer peripherals.7 Logitech seemed to share the
joke. The scare quotes around “humanizing the computer” in the FotoMan’s
press release emphasized that this was not, literally, the company’s mission
statement. “Humanization” was simply a marketing buzzword, not to be
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confused with advancements towards artificial intelligence. These products,
despite their suffixes, were not more alive than their predecessors. The scare
quotes indicated that these new “_Men” had nothing to do with the night terrors
in popular culture, from Stanley Kubrick’s Hal to Rutger Hauer’s Roy Batty,
stories of technology becoming all too human.8
Additionally, by foregrounding the FotoMan’s “humanity,” Zappacosta
downplayed the device’s automatization of photography, specifically its
replacement of hands-on darkroom techniques with computer processes. If this is
an intrusion—the FotoMan said with the intimacy of a shared joke—then it is the
debut of a sidekick, still a little goofy and untested, who only desires to relieve you
of a few of the menial darkroom tasks which impede the more important work of
taking and sharing images. Promises of more speed, more convenience, and more
fun were leveraged on the hope that customers would remain sufficiently amused
to neglect the question: At what price?
In the years since the FotoMan’s launch, digital cameras have followed
through with these early promises. Today, they are one of the prime instruments
of new media communication. No longer restricted to making photographic
images, they have expanded into applications like video chat, augmented reality,
participatory journalism, and 3D gameworlds. Literally and figuratively, they are
intimate members of our social networks. From the cries of the hospital to those
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of the battlefield, cameras herald human life in real-time, mediate the struggle to
breathe, to move, to share the sights and sounds of individual experience.
The cameras offer to composition and communication, however, still
seems to be in the negotiation stages. Their place in the liberal arts—as well as the
status of all the optical media they generate—remains unsettled. Art historians
like James Elkins and Barbara Maria Stafford have explored images and
imagemaking as a tool for critical inquiry.9 Their strategies have often been to
join the economies of the fine arts and the hard sciences to advocate a crosscurriculum visual literacy.10 Following a similar logic, institutions have
restructured themselves to accommodate emerging visual technologies in the
humanities and social sciences. Initiatives have been welcomed under the banners
of New Media Studies, Multimedia Literacy, Digital Media, or Digital Humanities.
Despite the novelty of these divisions, a long-standing routine persists for
dealing with optical media in the humanities. Cameras and other optical devices
are often regarded as a new form of writing instrument: just as the pen extends an
individual’s language onto paper, the camera is thought to extend an individual’s
sight onto screen. The key agents that both are thought to share are operator and
apparatus. Their compositions are crafted between “author + tool.” The
problem with this model of communication is that it requires a very static
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approach to logos and language, one in which meaning is clearly apprehensible
and conforms predictably to the structures we use to express it.
The author-tool approach becomes even more problematic when applied
to optical compositions. It is a model that forces us to neglect the camera as a
meeting (or mediating) place. Camera, after all, literally refers to a “room.” Its
darkness organizes the interactions of a host of agencies, the most important of
which involve light. Traditionally, those interactions took the form of chemical
reactions (as when light strikes the silver grains of negative film). Those chemical
changes have given way to computational reactions (as can be seen when light
strikes a digital sensor). In either case, light’s behavior is the raw “material” of the
activity in these rooms. Whether analog and digital, the resulting images are
impressions—incomplete artifacts, translations—of the exchanges that occurred
in the camera. The temptation is to forget this room and its activities—forget that
the camera has “fixed” light for our viewing pleasure, that it has translated
dynamic phenomena into a static document. What falls out of view is the alterity
of light, sacrificed for the convenience of a single-user model: author + tool.
Interactivity can then be circumscribed in the interface between them. The
operator’s vision is captured; the play of light and its compression is forgotten.
As a result, the camera’s room is cordoned off, the aperture barred, the gate
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sealed, light-tight. Images and visual communication become a much more
straightforward affair.
If we recognize the tremendous gains in speed, accessibility, and sensitivity
of visual technologies, if we heed their call to reevaluate general education, then
there is a need to attend to the ulterior agencies that are at play in our extended
vision. New media’s role in unconcealing these assemblages has already been
interrogated by artists like Pipilotti Rist, Bill Viola, Doug Aitken and Joan
Fontcuberta. They each have questioned digital technology’s ability to re-present
our “intra-actions” with fields of light. Light has been a pathway for them to
explore the relationship between screens and embodiment, reflection and
perception, virtual living and landscapes.11 In this dissertation, I am concerned
with similar intra-actions, particularly the role of new camera practices in
bringing them into a “legible” and communicative space. My pathway, thus, has a
rhetorical bent, drifting often to questions about how we compose and are
inescapably composed by our correspondences in light. I draw these questions
respectively to still, moving, and virtual image technologies to pick at the camera’s
future in education and better examine what light might tell us about logos.
First, however there is the matter of the closed camera. An assessment is
needed of the habits in media theory that divert discussions away from light’s
agency and interactivity. These are the enclosures that seal media theory light-

6

tight. Three seem more obdurate than others. The first is the typecasting of
camera technology as a prosthetic double, an uncanny clone of human vision.
The second arises from the divide between analog and digital technologies, and
the old being threatened with erasure by the new. And the third can be found in
the continued preference of image “texts” over camera techne and practices. Only
in better examining these enclosures, in feeling for their edges, might we crack the
seals, let spill into the darkened chamber new “bodies,” and expose a more
dynamic interface—the co-compositional reactions among beings, image-making
apparatuses, and light.

Enclosure 1: Technology’s Uncanny Double
Ironically, one of the most significant obstructions to exploring the intra-activity
of light is our own preoccupation about the “humanness” of technology. This
self-reflecting gaze is the very one which the FotoMan’s sidekick-cute design tries
to turn into a marketing advantage. The stakes of Logitech’s stratagem and this
self-reflecting gaze are clarified in Barbara Johnson’s distinction between
anthropomorphism and personification. Reading Charles Baudelaire through
Paul de Man, Johnson asserts that anthropomorphism posits a given about human
nature. On the other hand, personification, she asserts, estranges that which we
assume to be essential about our nature; it makes uncanny what is most familiar.12
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As we have seen, the FotoMan riffs on this division. Its marketing and
design graft a cheerful disposition onto a plain container of technology, taking
advantage of anthropomorphism’s appeal. At the same time, the shell disguises a
personification at work in the innards of the apparatus. A device that stores
images with perfect recall and instantaneous calculations potentially threatens
human imagination. Logitech could safely market the amenities of digital
memory as long as that personification remained cloaked under the camera’s
campy features, which issued a chuckle at the thought that human memory might
need digital enhancement in the first place.
Another way to understand these two faces of the FotoMan is through
Marshal McLuhan’s discussion of extension and amputation. Although McLuhan
is best known for advocating technology’s complementary extension of mind and
body, he also cautions against its seduction—the temptation of seeing our own self
partly exteriorized in the environment, amputated from our bodies. In a chapter
of Understanding Media entitled “The Gadget Lover,” he develops these two ideas
by returning to the myth of Narcissus. McLuhan underscores how the “extension
of [Narcissus] by mirror numbed his perceptions until he became the
servomechanism of his own extended or repeated image.” Imaging technology
separates Narcissus from himself. He falls into a “narcosis,” or a “numbness,”
immobilized by the familiar but bizarrely foreign glint of life in his double’s eyes.
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He is fascinated by the same forbidden intelligence that Johnson sees in
Frankenstein’s monster.13 The cut of amputation severs him from his own
imagination and recasts his thinking as a not-entirely-other-being. It is an “autoamputation” or a self-estrangement which births an automaton.
In terms of technology, the creaturely double embodies a human
knowledge distended by the machinations of science, separate from but always
and forever a reflection of the human mind.14 The same holds true for the
FotoMan, which, as a rudimentary digital prosthetic for vision and memory,
encases a cold, android sensibility. It is distinct from yet constitutive of its
operator. Confronting it, users fall into an exchange loop with the apparatus, like
the visual relay between Narcissus and his quasi-doppelgänger.15 The camera
poses not an interface but an inner-face, a trap for our vision and imagination—a
perpetuating extension and amputation whose only product is a commentary on
our own immobilized state. The view of the water, the bottom of the pool, all of
our surroundings dissolve. Users are left enthralled and resentful of their
prosthetic double.
The biological and psychological effects of prosthetic apparatuses—such as
when we consider the camera an extension of our vision—become clear in the life
and work of Sigmund Freud. For Freud, the human doubling of the apparatus
creates more of a chronic discomfort. Freud himself suffered recurrent pain from
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a prosthetic replacing part of his mouth and jaw, which were excised over the
course of multiple cancer surgeries. The apparatus made eating and speaking an
exertion—“the monster,” he called it. After a visit, Arthur Koestler compared
Freud’s articulation to “children imitating the speech of their toothless elders in
cruel mockery.”16 Even as the psychoanalyst strained to demonstrate his abilities,
they never escaped, in Koestler’s view, an incongruity with their former powers.
Freud’s capacities had become estranged.
Is it just to compare Freud’s discussion of prosthetic technology with the
FotoMan’s distending of vision? Freud certainly applies the idea of prosthesis
liberally in his writing, often using visual metaphors to do so. He explains
prosthetic technology with the examples of glasses correcting vision, microscopes
replacing retinas, photographs substituting memories. Despite these visual
characterizations—each describing an optical device that can be picked up and
put down—Freud maintains a haptic connection, a link between the prosthesis
and the body. For example, in assessing the industrial advancements in 1929, he
writes, “Man has, as it were, become a kind of Prosthetic God. When he puts on
all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but those organs have not grown
on him, and they still give him much trouble at times.”17 The description parallels
the daily labor of Freud’s daughter, who assisted her father with the often painful
challenge of inserting and removing his prosthetic. Technological organs are put
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on, and taken off. The trouble they provoke is a matter of fit: how well they sit
within the body.18 No matter how externalized glasses, microscopes or cameras
might seem, they ultimately work their extensions from inside. The visual
apparatus is enclosed, like an organ, both materially and psychologically, within
the self. Other agencies and “bodies,” namely light, would not be important to
understanding the prosthesis’ re-fitting of vision.
This internal/external tension as well as the optical nature of the prosthetic
is further underscored in Freud’s understanding of the uncanny. Freud follows
the multiple etymologies of the German word, unheimlich, which he
conventionally translates as a feeling of not-being-at-home. Yet he also broadens
the word’s connotation to “something that was long familiar to the psyche and
was estranged from it only through being repressed.” The repressive urge, with its
ties to the unconscious, sets up a second etymology, one Freud reads through
Friedrich Schelling’s “definition of the uncanny as ‘something that should have
remained hidden and has come into the open.’”19 Here again Freud emphasizes
the visual nature of discomfort—a disturbance from within that erupts into view.
The prosthetic, which should fit with our body, does not, and, therefore, disturbs
our entire being.
Empirical research has begun to support Freud’s connections of prosthetic
technology and the uncanny to visual perception. A kinematics study requested
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that participants watch robots raising cups to their mouths and then watch other
humans raising cups to their mouths. Greater activity was found in the
participants’ parietal cortex when observing the robots’ cup raising. Because this
region of the brain is home to “mirror neurons,” which fire when a person
perceives human movement, researchers speculate that the extra brain activity
might be explained from the dissonance between how a thing looks and how it
moves.20 A follow-up study, organized at Indiana University, graphed emotional
responses to increasingly lifelike robots: the more lifelike the robot, the more
revolting the subjects found it. The research team proposes one likely cause:
human “disgust as an evolved mechanism for pathogen avoidance.”21
The findings corroborate Masahiro Mori’s theory of the uncanny valley—a
rise in familiarity when objects are human-looking (or anthropomorphized,
remembering Johnson’s use of the term), followed by a sharp decline when they
become too humanlike (or personified, again in Johnson’s use of the term). Mori
uses zombies and prosthetics to chart, respectively, the valley’s nadir (i.e. disgust)
and its incline back towards the pleasures of viewing a healthy human.22 These
studies insinuate that external cues provide a visual warning of altered internal
states. The uncanny gaze onto an other body is a look that tries to assess the
danger to one’s own health. Ernst Jentsch, a psychologist whose writings predate
Freud, contends that this disturbance, or uncanny sense of danger in the visual
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field, results from an equivocation between the living and the dead.23 Evidence of
this reaction lies in a history of shameful treatments of the infirm and a
fascination with tales of the undead. 24 The sick often limp, shudder, and move
about more languidly than a healthy person. Therefore, those who historically
had a more developed sensitivity to this estranged movement might have fared
better in times of plague and pestilence.
As we have seen with cup-raising robots, indistinction between living and
nonliving things can also apply to technology, as long as the apparatus sufficiently
mimics human capacities and intelligences. The term itself, “prosthetic,” sets up
this kind of identification—a hand, a limb, a nose that “passes.” When
“prosthetic” is deployed in media theory, it suggests that technology has become
this other body, one that passes for human. Such personification carries powerful
appeals: it capitalizes on the pull of the uncanny valley. In the case of the camera
as prosthetic, it breaches human eyesight and memory. It illustrates the limits of
biological sight and, in so doing, estranges it. Those who draw too close to its
digital optics are infected with augmentations. Shadows of their former selves,
they shamble forward as glaring examples of human obsolescence, wondrously
and dreadfully re-animated by technology.
To be fair, this uncanny mechanism is not always a negative force in media
theory. For example, uncanny prosthetics are famously repurposed in Donna
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Haraway’s “cyborg figure.” In her configuration of post-humanity, she argues “we
are all chimeras...hybrids of machine and organism.”25 With the cyborg, issues of
fit between body and technology are moot; the artificial has been enfleshed
without any marker of where technology begins or ends. By multiplying the
extensions and denying the amputations, Haraway brings the uncanny nature of
technology fully into view so that it might combat entrenched, essentialized
definitions of femininity and able bodies. In a similar tactic but for the purpose of
illustrating the advancements of optical communication, Friedrich Kittler labels
the telegraph and telephone substitute mouths and ears. They are pioneering
intrusions into the human body that should be celebrated; together they function
as “technological implementations of the central nervous system,” which have all
the “elegance of brain functions.”26 In both Haraway and Kittler the body
completely assimilates the apparatus and its forbidden knowledge. Freud’s
stretched grin becomes a sign of hybrid intelligence. Technology blends,
concealed but not fully repressed, like the heart transplant Jean-Luc Nancy depicts
as the intruder within, a strangeness whose rejection must be suppressed to
permit Nancy’s survival.27
The pitfall of focusing on technological prosthesis is that interactivity is
enclosed in the relationship between the apparatus and its human user.28 Any
look to technology becomes the look of Narcissus—self-reflecting and static. We
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gaze upon our mirrored imaginations because we have appropriated all
externalized views onto other bodies or materialities. Interactions and practices
fall away to questions regarding the wellness of our own flesh. The only subject
left to the technology is the Moebius strip, which Jean-François Lyotard details in
Libidinal Economy. The entire organ of the body is stretched out, “joined end to
end” with “no back to it.” We see a “great ephemeral skin” an “interminable
band...which interests us not because it is closed, but because it is one-sided...and
therefore neither exterior nor interior.”29 Without beginning or end, the Moebius
strip presents a ticker tape of our own humanity that forever circles back onto
itself. The mirrored view of ourselves in technology might be productive if,
following Lyotard, we examined the band for impacts of other materialities or,
following Nancy, we pondered its consubstantiality with other bodies. But if an
other lies in the band, it is our own false newness, doubled-back, masquerading as
an encounter with something foreign: a Janus figure stretched into a loop,
enclosed in an inner-face with the digital apparatus.

Enclosure 2: Old and New Erasures
By claiming prosthetic technology constructs an undead enclosure—a Narcissistic
internal/external exchange loop between operator and apparatus—I am
suggesting that this approach to digital media is essentially grounded in
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exclusionary logics. To situate technology as uncanny, it must reconfigure or
reanimate the human body in a substantial way, making its users, like the robots
raising cups, part of a recognizably different class, one that can be identified and
examined. Once identified, the re-animated class can be examined, biopsied, in a
sense, for living samples of digital media’s effects on previous capacities. All this
begins by investing enough in the operator-apparatus relationship that it
distinguishes a well-defined specimen.
The distinct specimens of prosthetic technology are particularly useful to
comparative media studies. The prosthetic camera, for instance, offers an area
which might be probed to gauge the amount of disruption digital optics have
caused within former norms of perception. To get measurements, modes of
seeing are contrasted—one past, one present. The readings produce either an
anxiety about loss or perhaps an enthusiasm for gain. The resulting nostalgia or
optimism only encourages further comparative tests to pinpoint the reasons for
change. This is the theoretical methodology that prevails in commentary on new
media. The nomenclature suggests as much. New media are assumed to have
overgrown the old, the digital atop the analog, the online over and across the
offline.
Kittler, for one, relies on this distinction between former and future modes
of inscription. He recognizes in digital technology the coming to fruition of an
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ambition that dates back to the earliest cave drawings. Optics now promise to
disrupt the pervasive “monopoly of writing” that has governed human
communication for millennia. In Kittler’s terms, textual composition is simply a
slow broadcast medium. 30 Optics and the image, whose apparatuses send and
receive across channels more indigenous to human vision, are the natural
usurpers of the written word. They advance communication along the path to
becoming more human.
While comparative methodologies are certainly helpful in establishing
histories, they often draw attention to an impact and erasure—an effacement in
the transition from one technology to another. The erasure is not limited to the
digital overtaking the analog; it runs through any technology that seems to upset
another one. Perhaps the most influential erasure for poststructuralism is that
which Jacques Derrida finds in the graphic mark’s substitution of the spoken
word, a displacement of orality also reviewed by McLuhan and his teacher, Walter
Ong.31 Other find the erasure in print technology’s eclipse of the written word,
such as in Martin Heidegger’s claim that the typewriter “tears writing from the
essential realm of the hand.”32 We have seen it recently in cinema studies, when
for example Garrett Stewart suggests that digital filmmakers demonstrate a postcelluloid discomfort with the “binary (com)mutations” of a “computer picture.”
The impact erases the very materiality of the medium itself, replacing celluloid
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with the “weightless easel” of pixels and bits.33 And, more popularly, the erasure
strikes commentary on networked life, like in Nicholas Negroponte’s Being
Digital, a book structured around the contrast between the atom and the digital
bit. Society has shifted from the former—material with weight and volume—to
the latter: a material-less sign or code which “has no color, size, or weight.”34
Despite their vast differences, all comparative media theories share an
interest in the fallout wrought between the shift from one compositional medium
to the next. Moreover, that fallout is usually contextualized in terms of what it
means to be “human.” Some offer a prognosis for “more human,” cyborg-like
living; others, like Stewart, bring a more sobering diagnosis of “eroded human
ontology.” He finds the once confident human imagination, decomposed by its
intercourses with the FotoMan’s new compositional technology.35
The theoretical grounds of this erasure in digital media come to light in a
disagreement between Derrida and Bernard Stiegler. Their positions reveal not
only why this erasure exists in any medium’s communication of meaning, but also
how the erasure is linked to the visual nature of digital technology and human
thought.
Like Haraway, Derrida redeploys the uncanny as a critique of essentialism.
He problematizes a Platonic notion of logocentrism, which denies the break
between sign and signified. Logocentrism upholds the text as a lossless
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transference of a speaker’s voice and thoughts. Derrida contends that any graphic
figure—be it the mark of a pencil, a brush, or a camera—confronts its onlooker
with the gap in the substitution of sign for thought, exterior graphic for interior
idea. 36 Writing, therefore, serves as a kind of prosthetic; it exteriorizes memory
and meaning from its original “presence.” Writing’s visual signs are amputated
from their ideas. In that breakdown, we confront the traces of those ideas and
meanings.
As much as he discusses writing, Derrida is reluctant to enumerate its
differences as a medium. He does not compare modes of transcription, like the
substitution in a typewriter’s imprint and the substitution in a pen’s stroke;
instead, he prefers to emphasize différance—the unbridgeable gap which attends
any mark’s substitution of meaning. It is to this point which Stiegler objects, and
it is here that the cognitive impacts of different media can be best observed. In his
interviews with Derrida and subsequent commentaries, Stiegler raises two
counterarguments. First, too much blends in the “arche-writing” that Derrida
presents as an alternative to logocentrism; Stiegler prefers more difference in his
différance. He believes prosthetics come in types, one simply not being a
supplement for another. Different media leave behind discrete forms of
transcription, what Stiegler calls “image objects,” and these image objects can be
sorted into a small taxonomy: there is the analog image, like a photograph
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developed in a darkroom; the digital image, or an entirely virtual object, like Toy
Story, a CGI feature film; and finally, the “analogico-digital” image, or the
combination of the previous two, like the pictures taken by the FotoMan.
Together these might crudely be called classes of visual différance—three types of
object images that cause separate configurations of light and, thus, distinct
experiences of time and movement.
Stiegler’s second point is that distinct “image objects” correspond to
different types of “mental images,” or types of mnemonic meaning-making.37
Watching a digital video of Buzz Lightyear will provoke different imaginative
responses than viewing a photograph of a Buzz Lightyear doll. The conclusion
corresponds to Stiegler’s work on the relationship between memory and
“technics” (techne). Technics appears in the use of tools—language, cooking,
carpentry, the camera—any means by which human beings write themselves into
the world and, in turn, write the world into their memories. Technics emerges in
“the play of interior and exterior milieus, articulating themselves onto one
another.”38 Naturally, then, if one changes the tool used to perceive an exterior
(image object), then one changes its articulation into the interior (mental image).
To some extent, the consequences of tool selection seem like an intuitive
deduction. Research even corroborates the idea that different media produce
different cognitive patterns. For example, studies have shown improved recall
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when people handwrite as opposed to when they type.39 What should not be
overlooked is the attention Stiegler gives to digital and analogico-digital media in
his critique. Because he claims digital photography is subject to Photoshop
alterations, because the direct inscription of light has “decomposed” in digital
images, because “photons” have “become pixels that are in turn reduced to zeroes
and ones on which discrete calculations can be performed,” Stiegler concludes
that a “deferred” time takes hold. This is the mental impact of the digital image.
He names it “the time of storage.” 40
Seen in this way, the FotoMan, cute as it might be, represents a breech in
the history of human experience with time. With the FotoMan, and all digital
cameras since, the image is subjected to a slumber, a storage unconscious that can
be awakened by the intelligence of this not-entirely-dead thing. Belying its hokey
design is the seemingly superhuman power to compose in a time outside of time,
to render the present into a past that is forever immediately retrievable. Time and
perception become thoroughly mediated.
As an uncanny prosthetic personified with these abilities, the digital
camera’s threat to the human imagination only intensifies. As we dwell on its
displacement of our mental processes, we lose track of its mediation of other
parties—the most obvious of which being light. Media practices are circumscribed
evermore around the inner-face between operator and apparatus
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This enclosure is reinforced most of all by the power attributed to the
analog and digital divide. As I have said before, studying the differences in use
and construction of digital tools certainly has its value (I will in fact do just that in
some of the chapters that follow). But the conversation of the digital shift too
often slides away from practice into verdicts on its role in cognition. Marc
Prensky, for example, famously coined the generational label “digital natives” to
describe those who have grown up imbricated in digital media and whose
thinking has radically diverged from that of their parents (or to plug in Stiegler’s
terms: the discrete difference in the way digital object images have correlated,
albeit brokenly, with the mental images of a new generation). The distance
separating the two is so vast, that the older generation (with their outdated analog
modes) must “immigrate” and take up the “process of learning a new language.”41
Concurrent with Stiegler’s other work, Prensky notes that this new mental
language is dominated by speed and heightened visual processing. 42
Such claims have awakened both the optimism and pessimism that follow
any discussion in which something so intangible and highly prized as imagination
or attention is at stake. No matter how many efforts recount the educational
possibilities of digital technology—like Ian Bogost and James Gee with persuasive
gaming, Henry Jenkins with spreadable media, or Jay David Bolter and Richard
Grusin on the empathy of remediation—other voices will warn about the
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developmental toll for digital “natives.”43 For example, Nicholas Carr enjoys
bestseller status reporting on the mental “shallows” trickling through web
browsers and game worlds. The logic of Stiegler’s taxonomy runs underneath
Carr’s displeasure with the manner in which the screen “inevitably turns the pages
of books [analog images] into online [analogico-digital] images.” Once converted,
they are “strip-mined” by a passing netizen’s fleeting attention.44 With such
language, not only does Carr make violent the effacement of old media, but
maximizes the threat of an uncanny intelligence.
The erasure becomes even more menacing with Neil Postman who warns
us that the battle lines are not simply drawn as “tool against tool.” It is not “the
photograph attacking the art of painting, television attacking the printed word.”
Rather, for Postman, “When media make war against each other, it is the case of
world views in collision.”45 Nothing less than civilization is at stake, and with the
digital natives as colonizers of the culture war, the older generation of would-be
immigrants have few choices left besides embracing their own analog nativism to
fight the oncoming effacement of digital apparatuses.
With so much vehemence on display, one cannot help questioning where
the unique difference of digital media might lie. Where does the impact of the
erasure come from? A usual suspect is digital processes themselves—the mode of
transmitting sensory information with code. In digitalization, an analog wave is
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sampled at regular intervals, assigned values, and stored numerically; the
compressed data can then travel quickly and economically to another source. As
code, it can be reconstructed in endless iterations of the original input. These
processes of replication have been a longstanding target for critics. Daniel
Boorstin, for one, celebrates the ingenuity of the printing press but laments its
“duplication impulse.” Modern media, he argues, with its accelerated
reproductivity, devalues sacred texts like the Torah, which was once “slowly and
reverently written down...guarded from the vulgar eye.”46 Repetition makes
profane that which was once privileged. In many ways, Boorstin cynically
retreads Walter Benjamin’s history of mechanical reproductions of art. Benjamin
uses the example of photography to illustrate the erasure of an essence. When the
speed of the camera no longer required extensive exposures, it captured its
subjects without sufficient time to let their “auras” appear on film.47
Reformulated with code, the velocity of these “reprints” intensifies
dramatically. Elizabeth Eisenstein relates what might be one of the most prescient
comments about the cultural change wrought by digital scripts. She writes about
the intellectual boon instigated by the printing press’s duplications of
“mathematical constructions, figures and numbers.” The reprinting of code
“transcended old limits imposed by time and space” because it “presented
identical data in identical form to men who were otherwise divided by cultural
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and geographical frontiers.”48 This printed exchange of mathematics sets up the
revolutions of digital media’s supercharged code whose universality would again
dwarf the benchmarks for communicating across time and space.
Speed and standardization continue to spur much of the theoretical
activity surrounding digital media, and understandably so. Cryptographic
procedures execute so fast they transform sensory data into signal and then back
again in pathways invisible to the human eye. The imperceptibility causes Stiegler
to wonder if “technocentrism” is beginning to eclipse anthropocentrism; he
implies that digital media is becoming society’s protagonist.49 The sense of
unchecked propagation also troubles Jean Baudrillard who sees the degradation of
material exchanges as the inevitable outcome of “the stabilized form of the code.”
Code for Baudrillard is modern society’s “true generating formula, that which
englobes all the others;” it is the inescapable form “of binarity, of digitality."50
Vinyl purists and record collectors explain the deficiency of sense
perception based in “binarity” or “digitality.” They insist on an audible loss when
a song’s analog wave is broken into compressed samples of data. Notes become
tinny, as if encased in a machine that refuses to open.51 This abridgment in the
sound quality of MP3s is an unlikely but apt analogy of Heidegger’s critique of the
regulatory drive of modern technology. Writing long before the arrival of digital
media, he warns that “the essence of modern technology lies in enframing.”52
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Heidegger describes enframing as a “setting upon” of human beings, which
compels them to relate to the world primarily through activities of accountancy
and calculation—dividing, classifying, coding, and filing until everything protean
is stable.53 Under such a logic, things in the world become not merely objects, but
resources, “ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there
just so that [they] may be on call for a further ordering.”54 Like a library of digital
music, Heidegger’s enframing renders things to the count so that they might be
more easily arranged and consumed.
Transcoding only expands the clipping involved in standardizing material.
Yvonne Spielmann actually sees a freedom in this conversion to signal. She
welcomes video art as a medium completely devoid of materiality.55 Code and
signal are unconfined in their containment, replicating from screen to screen, free
from the boundaries of a final state of inscription. Unlike the text of a book or
even the consciousness of a human body, digital signal roams weightless and
abstracted. Nevertheless, as Heidegger would remind us, that signal is always
already truncated, processed, and accounted for.
In a recent essay, Giorgio Agamben knits these theoretical strands
together, combining Boorstin’s “duplication impulse” and Heidegger’s enframing
into a critique of the very hybridity that Haraway celebrates and Spielmann finds
liberatory in its disturbance of representation.56 Reacting to trends surrounding
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the smartphone, he returns to Michel Foucault’s definition of an apparatus as a
device organizing “strategies of relations of force” which promote “certain types of
knowledge.”57 The apparatus for both Foucault and Agamben is the site in which
human activities struggle with an array of norms and controls. Somewhat like
enframing, these actions ultimately submit to protocol. What emerges, according
to Agamben, is “a massive partitioning of being into two great groups or classes:
on one side living beings (or substances) and on the other, apparatuses in which
beings are incessantly captured.”58 Narcissus’s pool is vivid again—an inner-face
which, by reproducing and distorting our own subjectivity, alienates and weakens
us. This is clear in Agamben’s version of technological practices, which resemble
a “hand to hand combat” with our doppelgängers. Ironically, this battle—which
requires deeper engagement of the apparatus—only fractures us, and produces
more “subjects.” Digital technology brings the apparatus’s “dissemination” of
subjectivity to a kind of terminal velocity.59 The creatures continue to clone
themselves, exponentially endangering the integrity of our authentic bodies. The
little materiality that remains of the human imagination continues to dissipate
along with any possibility of confronting other agencies besides our own twisted
copies.
Scattered agency plays into often repeated claims of the decreased
attention spans of digital natives. Even Stiegler, as helpful as he is in drawing
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attention to the newfangled “storage time” of digital technology, fails to articulate
an agency more developed than an enabled spectatorship. His prediction for the
future of camera practices envisions an operator who is able to “navigate through
the flow of images in a nonlinear fashion toward ever finer and more iterative
elements, in the same way that we’ve been able to in books ever since there have
been tables of contents and indexes.”60 His hypothetical camera can classify shots,
lighting situations, and objects, much like an expanded version of facial
recognition software. The future camera’s most remarkable achievement for
Stiegler, therefore, is allowing a film to be read as a book. The camera operator
takes the seat of the spectator, empowered by a linked index and new search
commands.
Stiegler’s super-reading camera brings to mind similar projects that try to
grant more agency to users by harnessing the calculative functions of digital
media. Often, however, these endeavors prefer the interactivity in cataloging
images to the interactivity in making images. Lev Manovich’s “database art” and
“cultural analytics” are good examples. Manovich hopes to scan millions of
images and “tens of thousands of movies” to enable users to data-mine and map
quantifiable trends using optical factors like brightness levels and contrast. The
project capitalizes on speed and code to fashion usability within massive
information stores. It aims to stream interactive visualizations of “real-time
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cultural flows around the world,” letting operators track economic developments
or patterns in YouTube video uploads.61 Katherine Hayles envisions similar
technologies granting inundated readers the power to run analytics across vast
collections of texts so that they can “machine read.”62 Surely both efforts will
benefit scholars and industry analysts. As Edward Tufte has shown, data, in the
right hands, can be arranged into stunning infographics; and Mark Danielewski
(Hayles’ favorite example) offers countless surprises in the distribution of
information to readers curious enough to hunt for the patterns in his novels.63
Nevertheless, by being focused on the roles of spectator and readers of sprawling
sets of “image objects”—no matter how expanded those roles might be—practices
of machine looking and machine reading only contribute to the growing malaise
about the diminished activity of the human being, who, with a finger tap, issues a
command to the machine and watches it go.

Enclosure 3: Lost Techne
Enabling people to navigate the seemingly overwhelming flows of data is a critical
goal for visual media studies. Nevertheless, the focus on creating super-users with
apparatuses only reinforces the notion of deficiency or erasure in human ability.
Moreover, it encourages a movement away from practices of making. It favors,
instead, an activity that is more amenable to the humanistic tradition: the
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theoretical analysis of images.64 Textual or artifact-based analysis is still the
dominant method of approaching optical media in the humanities. Education,
research, and scholarship still prefer to leave latent the practice of composing with
images in favor of image analysis.
To name this third enclosure is not to deny the value of close image
analysis. On the contrary, I agree with Manuel Castells who argues that images—
more than any other form of media—create frameworks of power whose
emotional resonances affect the manner in which we situate ourselves socially and
politically.65 Not only do images have power, but, as W.J.T. Mitchell puts it, we
also must attend to the ways in which that power is qualified.
However, we need to do more than critically “read” images. Mitchell’s
method, for instance, demonstrates some of the limitations of artifact analysis.
For one, focusing on images as artifacts continues to keep the focus away from
intra-actions between user, apparatus, and light. Image analysis devoid of practice
constructs another uncanny inner-face; only this time instead of forming between
operator/apparatus, it takes hold between observer/image. Mitchell suggests as
much when he admits his goal “is not just to attribute to [images] life and power
and desire, but also to raise the question of what it is they lack.” 66 With this
combination of life and lack, again an uncanny doubles forms, now in the artifact
of camera practice, the image itself. Mitchell calls the double there a
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“biocybernetic” clone. Like Haraway’s cyborg, these clones in our images are
neither entirely flesh nor entirely technological. In Mitchell they are much more
explicitly linked with the uncanny valley, what he calls a “cloning terror.”67 In the
face of this dread, Mitchell challenges us to be proactive and, quoting from
Nietzsche, to “sound out our idols,” to call forward our uncanny clones. But in a
move indicative of the devaluation of media practice in the humanities, Mitchell
advises that we sound out images with “the hammer, or ‘tuning fork,’ of critical
language.”68 Why not, we might ask, sound out our image idols by striking them
against those of our own making?
There is a reluctance to speak about the degree to which imagemaking
practices are knowledge-making practices. Comparative media programs, digital
humanities, and even multimodal approaches in rhetorics and composition (like
those of Geoffrey Sirc and Anne Wysocki), have all been recent examples of
efforts to include imagemaking in theory, research, and teaching.69 For the most
part, though, the image as art, and by that I mean specific investment in the techne
of its making—its materials, techniques, and instrumentality—is left to fine arts
programs and vocational schools. Outside of these venues, there is seldom a
strong commitment to exploring or qualifying images through techne.
The term techne emphasizes the use of an apparatus. Plato gives context to
this kind of use when he discusses flute playing. He claims that there are three
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arts: one that uses, one that makes, and one that imitates. His disapproval of the
third, the painterly art of representation, is well known. He suggests, however,
that the first two actually possess knowledge of a thing. A person who uses a flute
would be able to say if a flute plays well or produces a bad sound, just as the maker
of the flute might be able to fix it. Use, therefore, brings forward a knowledge in
technique, craft, materials, and instrumentality.70 Plato’s separation of the visual
arts is problematic, not to mention his aesthetics of pleasure, but he opens the
possibility of meaning in performance, or knowledge through an activity of
making.
The knowledge Plato ascribes to techne is modified by Aristotle in the
Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle, as he is wont to do, systematizes three modes or
activities of human beings, each linked to a different type of knowledge: theoria
(theoretical study) aligned with sophia, or wisdom; poiesis (a poetics of making)
with techne; and praxis (procedural practice) with phronesis, a kind of prudential
wisdom.71 Ideally, one would want to pursue each mode of knowledge. Today,
however, the modern educational system has largely isolated poiesis and techne
from its pursuit of core competencies. The consequences of that exclusion are
now being felt as emerging digital media practices are challenging educators to
reassess how knowledge is learned and applied.
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One theory for the exclusion of techne comes from Heidegger. Although
he frequently refers to techne and poiesis being unified in antiquity, he believes
they were rent asunder in the transition from Greek to Roman culture. A fluid
Greek relationship with truth—as the revealing and concealing of aletheia—gives
way to the static Roman definition of veritas, an indisputable empirical knowledge
that holds as true that which is absolute and unchanging.72 Whether or not one
agrees with Heidegger’s reasons, the effects of techne’s division from theory and
the arts can easily be observed in the modern education system. To take an
example from film: usually a student interested in pursuing an advanced degree in
“moving pictures” will have to choose a film theory program, a visual arts degree,
or a technical film school. Other examples abound of techne’s exclusion. One
needs only think of the containment of “craft” in vocational schools or the
unwillingness Elkins finds in many fine arts programs to discuss technique.73
With techne confined to science or vocational education, the humanities
can pursue visual media with greater freedom from the uses of techne. The
downside is that excluding techne enfeebles the contribution of praxis to theory.
In many ways this is the old lament of Marx, who in his Theses on Feuerbach
warned against the neglect of praxis in favor of theoria. Commodification, Marx
believed, replaces relationships when praxis wanes.74 Readers of Marx, like Guy
Debord and Baudrillard, associate this commodification with the image,
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objectified by spectators and removed from practice.75 Images as artifacts and
commodities rise to new status, albeit a superficial one. They have been forgotten
as mediations of human experience.
Others like Barbara Bolt, try to reclaim techne through reinvesting in
imagemaking practices.76 As an artist and academic herself, Bolt is dedicated to
the “two-way action or mutual reflection between practice and theory.” Implicit
in that commitment is an involvement with the techne of “materials, methods,
tools and ideas in practice.”77 Still, Bolt recognizes that as much as this techne
might facilitate meaning-making in the fine arts, techne as technology can lead to
Heidegger’s enframing if it serves as a means of mastery, a way to regulate being,
or depart from aletheia, fixing things in the objectified realm of veritas.78 Here the
mediation of composition disguises itself as Truth.
Bolt uses Heidegger’s discussion of handiness to better explain the
dilemma. A techne of mastery—like Manovich’s analytics—would harness
visualization techniques to make knowledge “present-to-hand,” quantifiable, and
prepared for the standing reserve. If instead we use an apparatus instinctively,
dissolve techne in its use, then technology according to Heidegger becomes
“ready-to-hand,” more connected to relationships of being. Bolt notices, though,
that the ready-to-hand (the use of a tool to accomplish a task) quickly slides into
enframing.79 She suggests, therefore, that art’s techne might be best thought of as
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an “un-readiness-to-hand,” a state similar to the one Heidegger describes with a
broken hammer, when its use is brought to presence. The difference would be
that instead of producing an object of knowledge, a techne of unreadiness would
want to proliferate the rediscovery implicit in brokenness.80
Because Bolt speaks as a painter, the interplay of her imagemaking
practices springs from the meeting of the sun, her environment, and her eyes. If a
similar artistic techne is possible with camera media, then we must turn to the
device and question how its enclosures might be broken so that it offers a view
onto new light.

A Crack in the Black Box
If a fracture is to come to the digital camera, it must penetrate the “black box,” the
idea of the camera as an inscrutable system whose only observable variables are its
input and output. A crack must break the looping inner-face of the FotoMan—its
doubles, its erasures, its hidden techne. However, the black box will never be
infiltrated by engineers, hackers, or programmers. Enclosures will not be
withdrawn by focusing on the camera’s social constructions or its relationship to
human ontology. 81 There is, after all, a certain degree of absurdity in the dream
of fully opening the apparatus. At some point, we must agree with John
Kallinikos that different technologies offer different levels of “manipulability”:
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shooting an 8 mm film and taking video with an iPhone construct different
practices and techniques with the image.82 So while there is value to comparing
the features of “boxes” and enumerating their differences, the challenge, as
Kallinikos puts it, is to discover the “ways by which a technology invites people to
frame a delimited domain of tasks or activities.”83 The statement returns to
Foucault’s definition of an apparatus as “strategies of relations of force,” and
repackages it as an invitation. The question is no longer: What is the offer of the
FotoMan? It is, instead: What will we do with the offer of the FotoMan?
My proposal is that we respond as artist-observers. I take the term from
Jonathan Crary, who, like Heidegger, recognizes modern technology’s drive to
render phenomena to the count. He finds science historically committed to
standardizing vision into magnitudes, which conform to the language of
exchange. However, during Crary’s argument, the figure of the “artist-observer”
appears as a momentary diversion. It comes in the form of nineteenth-century
landscape painter Joseph Mallord William Turner. In Turner’s work, Crary finds
“a direct confrontation with the sun.” It is so overwhelming that the paintings
obliterate the structures and regulations normally imposed by optical technology.
The earliest cameras, Crary argues, were Cartesian instruments invested in
securing “a defense against the madness and unreason of dazzlement.” In
contrast, Turner’s sun-blasted canvases, beckon down a chaotic, swirling array of
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the visible spectrum. They welcome an “engulfing illumination,” a contingent
exteriority. Turner summons a nearly uncontrollable interactivity from light.
Such a compositional practice is antithetical to the archival spectatorship Stiegler
finds in digital image objects or Manovich in cultural analytics or Hayles in
machine reading or Agamben in the smartphone’s dissemination. Turner’s
images evoke a world teeming with materiality and new agency. This comes to a
crescendo in Turner’s painting Light & Colour (Goethe’s Theory): Morning After
the Deluge. A fragile outline of Noah hovers in a golden orb, with halfmaterialized figures of a coming community arching up from a single steak of
blackness below—a world taking form in the light of an eye. In reviewing the
painting, Crary declares that “the sun that had dominated so many of Turner’s
previous images now becomes a fusion of eye and sun.”84 Although Turner’s
images of these other agencies and materialities undeniably is grounded in his
own human body, it is not a narcissistic cloning or an uncanny erasure; these
other “things” in his vision are not estranged doubles or alien others; they are
interactive and consubstantial—sun and eye, people and pupil.
Even though Crary emphasizes that the practices of the artist-observer
contest the regulatory drive of empirical vision, they also share with the sciences a
view through the apparatus onto other materialities. Both the sciences and arts
welcome what Sara Ahmed terms an “orientation to matter”—an openness to the
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“proximity” of other beings and things.85 Ahmed’s orientation participates, for
one, in feminism’s history of recognizing nonhuman bodies. This “new
materialism” or “agential realism,” draws from the work of Gilles Deleuze, Félix
Guattari, Gaston Bachelard, Bruno Latour, and Haraway. 86 If we apply Ahmed’s
orientation to visual practices, the human body’s interchange with light opens
new avenues for interactivity.87 Light itself becomes un-ready-at-hand, and we
can understand it outside of a subject-object relationship. Michel Serres and
Latour define this kind of being as a “quasi-object, quasi-subject.”88 As a quasiobject, light is acted upon although never completely determined by another
agent. As a quasi-subject, it assumes an agency although it never becomes the sole
orchestrator of activity. Light thwarts the dualism and works as a collaborative
agent in the production of visual media.
Haraway describes a similar interplay in her description of a “materialsemiotic actor.”89 Rather than seeing nonhuman bodies as the “‘object’ of
knowledge” or a “passive, inert thing,” 90 they become actors that make
“boundaries materialize.”91 For an example of light’s connection to these
boundaries, one need look no further than a desk. On surfaces like it,
architectural designers Mark Major, Jonathan Speirs and Anthony Tischhauser
find all the “essential visual information about the very nature of materiality.”
Light reveals and conceals the boundaries of surface, “the very edge of matter” and
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its “interface with space.”92 Close the angle of a desk lamp, pull its shade nearer
the surface of the workspace, and suddenly a history of scratches and nicks
appears. Or lower the angle of the look; leave the lamp angled above and crouch
down low, the bridge of your nose almost bumping the table, and a new terrain, a
different “skin,” sweeps into view.
This tripartite relationship among light, other bodies and observers is not
based in dominance or mastery. As Bolt explains, it should not be understood as
the “shedding light on” something, a phrase that encourages the fixing of things as
objects. Instead Bolt proposes “shedding light for” something. Shedding light for
things recognizes the limitations of our vision and its reliance on other material
bodies. Bolt associates its practice with “methexis”—a Platonic word signifying
the participation of specific members in a unified form, which Bolt associates with
indigenous Australian societies who use participatory performances to
“enlighten” their relationships with the land.93 Her personal methexis—like
Turner’s—comes from painting landscapes. In the Australian desert she comes
across an interactivity beyond the boundaries of her vision and her canvas: the
sun has left marks on her skin. In a band of “freckles” and “suspicious sunspots,”
she recognizes the agency of light.94 Her skin, the land, and light’s UV rays,
distinguish themselves while at the same time joining together in the practice of
painting.

39

This is the invitation of the FotoMan: to discover through the camera the
boundaries of other bodies and agents. It means picking up the camera as a coinvolved mediator—an apparatus, as Karen Barad explains, “productive of, and
part of” its own “material configurations or reconfigurations of the world.” 95 It is
an invitation to unearth an “intra-activity” which includes human beings,
nonhuman bodies, and the camera itself. Barad explains this as the “constitutive
nature of practices.”96 Each agent, including the apparatus, is brought into being
through the other.97
It is worth noting that the FotoMan and digital cameras are not the
anointed gatekeeper of this “intra-activity.” As Turner and Bolt remind us, artistobservers have been exploring the agency of light throughout the history of visual
practices. No matter if it is an analog device (a 35 mm camera), analogico-digital
(a camera phone) or even fully digital (the virtual cam of a video game), any
camera invites us to extend into the activity of light, and participate more in its
mediating of our perception. The FotoMan and its descendants—with their speed
and economy and ubiquity in daily life—have only made this invitation all the
more urgent and essential.
Likewise, images are not inconsequential. Perhaps it is helpful to
understand them as being fashioned through the camera’s trope of light in time.
Cameras twist to the surface the boundaries of an interactivity that we perceive
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but do not see. In this way, images make light’s interplay discursive as long as
they stay connected to practice and are allowed to remain broken artifacts of
mediation. If limited to human thinking or an inner-face with the apparatus, they
will become unproductively fixed. They will hide their mediations. They will
forget their testimony of multiple exchanges, their history of being coaxed and
propositioned and imperfectly recorded by the camera.
Photographs by Abelardo Morell demonstrate these deceptive negotiations
among operator, camera, light, and landscape. By blocking the windows of
various rooms and leaving a pinhole aperture, Morell returns the camera to its
etymological room and fabricates a camera obscura. A view of the outside world
projects against the surface of a wall. Exterior and interior milieus do not
transcribe each other; they are entangled. A Florentine olive tree fills one side of
the room, houseplants twist into a garden, tables collide with grass, and a picture
frame struggles to hold the bend of a branch against vivid swatches of red paint.
Boundaries come to the surface only to show that they are overwritten by others.
Agents and objects are overlain in a series of interfaces blown-up past their usual
enclosures. The sign-making of the apparatus takes place.
Much of Morell’s work relies on what might be called the “trick” of the
camera. His images show that surfaces shed a plurality of lights. Projected rays
are confused with the reflected light of actual objects in the room. It all promotes
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a kind of virtuality. Major, Speirs, and Tischhauser again recall the illusions of
surface in the Narcissus myth.98 Instead of declaring that this “trick” is an
uncanny amputation, they suggest we recognize the illusion as a fundamental
property of visual communication. The relationship between the human mind
and visible spectrum of energy is rife with metamorphoses. Certainly, we would
assert that some objects are physically present in the room and others are not.
More interesting responses to this “trick” would challenge the informational
quality of the light in the room (How is the “object” of the end table, transformed
in light?), or would examine the channel of light between objects and observers
(As an observer, what reflections have I grown accustomed to?), or would explore
the ways in which Morell is composing and performing along with them (As an
operator, how might I intervene?).99
Pushed to their limits, these questions demand an investigation of
virtuality’s boundaries and the ethics of the trick itself. I take up both issues in
later chapters (the former through navigation in video games and the latter
through a pedagogy of “cheating”). For now, the value of tricks can be clarified by
a glance back at the stereoscope. An apparatus of the mid-nineteenth century, it
achieved a rudimentary 3D illusion by presenting the right eye and the left eye
with similar 2D images. If the sight lines were controlled effectively, a foreground
image would seem to separate and distance itself from its background. The device
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enjoyed a short run of popularity in wealthy Victorian homes before the early
cinema captured the public’s imagination. Unlike the ticket-holder at a modern
3D feature, Crary relates that the stereoscope’s observers would be conscious of
the contraption’s limitations; they would assume a constitutive role with its
mirrors and planes and perform the “trick” with the apparatus. The image
changed according to the observer’s embodied negotiation with technology; there
was no authorized, objective stance. The viewer would have to work with the
device to cheat the image into existence.100
The stereograph serves as an analogy for the embodied tricks of vision.
Our eyes are tireless performers, constantly focusing for depth, compensating for
blind spots, and tracking movement so that the brain might construct a view of
the world. Haraway uses the language of discourse and accountability to explain
the apparatus’s value in modeling this physiological activity and transcribing it to
the surface: “it is in these visualization technologies in which we are embedded
that we will find metaphors and means for understanding and intervening in the
patterns of objectification in the world—that is, the patterns of reality for which
we must be accountable.”101 The metaphors of our making, which we trick
through cameras, are themselves snatched from the body’s ongoing negotiations
with light. Herein we find reference back to a doubling, back to the uncanny,
back to the erasure of a transcription. Rather than leading to abstractions from
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the real, these camera practices are, in fact, willful attempts to engage the
concealed construction of perception. In daily life we move about largely unaware
of the play of vision; yet as Haraway reminds us, this does not free us from taking
responsibility. By cheating it to a surface—transcribing, personifying, and making
it un-ready-at-hand—we confront its memories of entanglements and become
conscientious of the relationality from which the image was captured.
Having started with the FotoMan, we then continue with the camera in
hand, its uncanny inner-face and binary code no longer threatening. Its vision is
comfortably distinct from our own, only momentarily wed when the FotoMan is
held up to our eyes, pressed there like a Venetian mask. It gives a lopsided look
onto the world—turned and twisted, revealing and concealing—but a view
nonetheless. It shows boundaries and surfaces in a dance that has already begun.
We join with the FotoMan, turning and twisting through the crowded floor,
winking at other bodies as we capture their light.
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CHAPTER 2

PHOTONIC RHETORICS
STAGING COMPOSITIONS WITH LIGHT

The previous chapter describes three enclosures inhibiting engagement with the
camera’s mediation of perception. When we cast the camera as an uncanny
prosthetic, when we focus too much on the differences of the analog and digital
media, and when we continue to pursue image artifacts over camera practices, we
narrow our view of visual composition. These enclosures, I argue, block us from
recognizing the alterity of light in mediating our experience.
An awareness of these enclosures, however, creates the possibility of reopening them. To do so—to open again the shutter of the camera—I invite into
the room someone who is long-practiced in the influence and effects of light.
Richard Kelley easily wears the mantle of the most accomplished lighting
architects of the last century. His commissions include landmarks as famous as
the Lincoln Center in New York City and the Christ the Redeemer statue in Rio de
Janeiro. In the 1950s his “luminous ceiling” designs conferred a sense of twentyfour hour transparency to the Seagram Building and the IBM corporate offices.
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The style, in which light seemed capable of illuminating any surface, would later
become an aesthetic hallmark of our own information age.1
Concurrent with this work, Kelly wrote and lectured about “three
elemental kinds of light effect.” I would like to employ them now to begin
drawing a rhetorics of light—modes through which light inescapably mediates
how we compose our world, both to ourselves and to others. Kelly’s three types of
light effect are “focal glow,” “ambient luminescence,” and the “play of brilliance.”2
These effects—under various guises—have long been familiar to theater
companies and cinematographers. Yet Kelly’s particular labeling and description
of them deserves attention. They highlight, for one, how popular conceptions of
light tend to rally around only one rhetorical mode of light, namely “focal glow.”
This favored cast corresponds to the enclosures of the last chapter, spotlighting a
human actor, and a logocentric conveyance of truth.
By putting this dominant cast on equal ground alongside its siblings, I do
not intend to pit them against each other or strike a compromise. Instead, I aim
to demonstrate ways in which they form a diverse ensemble. This nebulous
network of agency is what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari would call an
“assemblage.” In such an ensemble (or assemblage), there is no single protagonist.
To take their example (which they take from Freud): when a boy witnesses the
beating of a horse, the main character is not the boy, the abuser, or the horse, but,
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rather, “a list of active and passive affects.” The list includes the horse having
“blinders...a bit and a bridle, being proud, having a big pee-pee maker, pulling
heavy loads, being whipped, falling, making a din with its legs, biting, etc.”3 Even
the street itself and the surrounding buildings become actors in this assemblage,
swept together in a time that is both synchronous and indeterminate.
What follows, then, is a description of effects (Kelly’s three casts) to
illustrate light’s “active and passive affects.” Again, these effects/affects of light are
not the primary players of visual composition. They share the stage with
apparatuses, operators and countless subjects and surfaces. Exploring them,
moving beyond the darkened enclosures, leads to a more flexible understanding of
how visual composition and perception are intra-actively mediated. It returns us
to a stage on which light reveals forgotten players and exposes our visual
repertoire to new movements and acts.

Focal Glow: Light as Division
It would not be entirely absurd to say that light has been typecast. It is routinely
deployed in our idioms and myths as “focal glow”—a spotlight that divides the
light from the darkness.
Kelly describes the effect as “the pool of light at your favorite reading
chair. It is the shaft of sunshine that warms the end of the valley. It is candlelight
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on the face, and a flashlight on the stair.” 4 To find a common example one need
only look at the downlights or track lighting in residential homes. Downlights are
usually recessed, installed in narrow encasements to cup light and produce a more
distinctive, illuminated arc. Track lighting produces similar effects but with more
mobility—a favorite fixture for museums wishing to draw attention to a piece of
art. The focal glow they create is the light of distinction. It is the actor’s pool,
framing the performer in sharp relief against the dark background of the stage.
Downlights were a favorite tool for Kelly; he installed them, for example,
around the edge of Philip Johnson’s Glass House, creating small reservoirs of light
on the grass perimeter. At night, the interior radiates an ambient glow,
surrounded by these miniature spots. One might say the whole home is an
exercise in focal glow. It could be likened to what Kelly calls “the campfire of all
time.”5 It shines there, in a glen of New Canaan, Connecticut, like an alien craft
that has just descended in the darkest of woods.6
The central mechanism of focal glow is division and contrast. Johnson’s
house is striking for this reason: the angles of its parapets, the mercilessly straight
lines of its columns, the rectangles of its horizontal length, they all issue a
challenge. The house refuses to conform to its surroundings. If it was set in the
city—even when its design was more novel in 1949—its architecture would have
failed to separate itself as boldly as it does in New Canaan. In the woods, it defies
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its setting and declares itself present because it is not crooked like the tree limbs,
because it is not softly textured like the grass, because it does not grow up but
instead juts out.
The lighting of focal glow reinforces these architectural divisions. Kelly
writes, “Focal glow draws attention, pulls together diverse parts, sells
merchandise, separates the important from the unimportant, helps people see.”7
Focal glow declares that these pieces matter; these others do not. This is where
you should look; over there, you should not. It is where you find value, where you
find what you need, where you find what is true and good.
Roland Barthes refers to this logic as a “marking” of the “binary.” Its
persuasive effects function by appealing to an authority, which signals that a given
term is acceptable (marked) or waste (unmarked). The comment is prompted by
Barthes’ reading of Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises—the founding text of
the Jesuit order. Because the logic of the binary rests on the supposition that
authority exists and has the credentials to direct towards the greater good, Barthes
sees the deference to a godhead as unavoidable. His term for this divine mark is
the “ancient noumen” or “the nod by which the Divinity says yes or no to what is
set before it.” This is “the Divinity’s role...to mark one of the two terms of the
binary.”
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Intrinsic in this marking is a rational order, the signal of intelligent design
and the advancement of meaning. Such a system, according to Barthes, “is the
fundamental mechanism of every linguistic apparatus: a paradigm of two equal
terms is given, one of the terms is marked against the other, which is not marked,
and the meaning emerges, the message is uttered.”8 A transmission is secured. A
rational, authorial intention takes hold. Focal glow produces a similar effect. The
downlights around the perimeter of the glass house insinuate that lines in a
composition, particular textures—in their contrast with their surroundings—are
intended to carry meaning. Those trees above the house matter because they have
been captured in the arc of Kelly’s focal glow. Those in the distance beyond the
house, beyond the boundaries of light, are excluded from the order of the artistic
project. In that sense, the focal glow urges meaning to vacate that darkened space,
collecting it instead around Johnson’s rooms. The artistic “message” (says the
contours of light) lies not there but here, in the light.
Focal glow’s effect of differentiation implies an origin story. Its visual
associations and grammar are based on creation through authoritarian separation.
Something is divided from nothing—house from woods, lit from unlit, day from
night, order from chaos. The refrains are familiar from the book of Genesis,
which opens, in Robert Alter’s translation, when all of existence “was nothing but
welter and waste and darkness.” Everything was unmarked. It is then that God
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issues one of his most famous proclamations, “‘Let there be light. And there was
light. And God saw the light, that it was good, and God divided the light from the
darkness. And God called the light Day, and the darkness He called Night.”9 If
creation is to begin, if beings are to take form, then the abyss must be partitioned.
The darkness must be opposed to differentiate a space unto which life might be
arranged. It must be pierced, the whole divided into parts to establish a logic that
allows figures to come into being, to distinguish their forms. Only then might
they be named: Light/Darkness, Day/Night, Being/Nonbeing, Order/Waste. This
is the first decision of creation—a composition from cutting. Light becomes both
the original mark and the ancestor of all second terms.
The event of this first cut, which creates all proceeding cuts, is what the
Egyptians referred to as the “First Occasion,” a primary split, with which all future
decisions will reiterate.10 An incantation to the Egyptian sun-god Re, dating after
the writing of Genesis, depicts a similar coming to order. He initiates a
primordial partitioning in/of light: “Opening his two eyes, he illumined the Two
Lands, he separated night from day. The gods came forth from his mouth and
mankind from his eyes.”11 The occasion is recalled each morning when the sun
rises in the East and imposes a new unit of time in the break from day to night.
Once the order is established and the lines are drawn, the order can be repeated
and subdivisions can be made, but the original order is never displaced or
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superseded. The ancestral second term continues to both mark and regulate the
legacy it propagates.
Pushed to its extreme, this cast of focal glow creates a salvific space, a
messianic order which functions as a living, redeeming mark on creation. The
decision, the cut, the event from which all things were composed becomes the
idealized state—made manifest in the world—to which all things should return.
The creator’s originary intentions thereby reach their fruition with the enfleshed
return of the ancestral mark. This is the eternal word and divine light found in
the Prologue to the Gospel of John. Its author reworks the first utterance in
Genesis, using the same words that open the Greek translation of the Hebrew
Scriptures. Creation is thus rebooted to assert Jesus’ credentials as the fully living
Christ:
In the beginning was the Word [Logos], and the Word was with God,
and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things
came to be through him, and without him nothing came into being.
What came into being in him was life, and this life was the light of all
people. The light shines in the darkness and the darkness did not
overcome it.12
Christ becomes for believers both a “Divine Light” and the “Light of the World,”
illuminating the kingdom of heaven within the earthly lives of human beings.13

60

All those who will be find eternal life—the gospel goes on to assert—will do so by
recalling themselves to the order of that light. Unlike the other gospels, John,
begins not with human origins but with a high Christology. The good news
originates with God, is articulated in the Word, or logos, and then brings into
being all of creation. This news, its meaning as the incarnate logos, remakes a
community. Human beings are set against the expanse of darkness; though the
logos they too participate in the installment of a divine artistic order. Christ is this
divine mark—the original nod, or noumen itself, which walks the earth and will
ultimately become the final mark on creation. The imagery is similar to the
personification of Wisdom in the Hebrew Scriptures which enforced on earth
adherence to Mosaic Law.14 Outside of the light of Christ or the law of Wisdom,
lies welter and waste.
Together the figures of light, logos, and Wisdom in John’s Prologue
demonstrate the effects of focal glow. They proclaim a logocentrism, declaring
intentionality and meaning do not decay in creation. Light projects from a single
source (a creator), boldly divides the darkness (into matter and non matter), and
inscribes upon creation a master plan (the salvific mark). We might then follow
this living but stable logos which organizes all being. Anyone reaching into its
light will be installed with the proper order. The meaning will be legible and clear.
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In this way, focal glow posits truth-values in a manner similar to the
discursive dialectic method. Barthes describes it as a questioning between a
master and a student, as in Plato’s dialogues. It is “a progressing in the discourse
by a series of alternatives, the interlocutor being requested to mark one of the
terms: it is the concession of the respondent, linked to the master by an amorous
relationship, which removes the alternative from the impasse and permits
preceding to the next alternative, thereby coming ever closer to the essence of the
thing.”15 For it to work, an original creator must be able to mark, that mark must
capture the meaning, and that meaning must be tenable by human beings. All
that is not marked can be cast into the darkness. For this reason, Socrates in
Plato’s Phaedrus, rejects a rhetoric capable of making the “just” “unjust” and
entertaining a multiplicity of trivialities. Instead he seeks a dialectic concerned
with pinpointing truth through clear contrasts.16
Such strong contrasts, however, hold obvious problems. To maintain an
order of division, purgation is required—the casting aside of alternatives until the
“original” meaning is secure. Victor Vitanza has argued that this mode of
dialectic reasoning is built on the “logic of difference by negation.” It leads to
what he calls “species-genus analytics.” These are practices of grouping and
labeling. They require dissection, the kind of activity executed under the
pathologist’s lamp. Focal glow provides the clarity to distinguish nested
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categories of difference. Vitanza recounts the procedure for properly identifying a
specimen:
A species has meaning by virtue of its placement in a genus. This species is
in this genus because it is not like, or is different from, those things that
cannot be placed in this genus. Moreover, this species differs from all
other species in this genus by virtue of a long list of differentiae. The logic
of identification is the logic of negations: We can never say what some
thing is, but can say what it is not.17
All of these negations, which note class, type, and individual differences, assume
that the perceptual field is well ordered and delivers an indisputable view. For
instance, Kelly’s downlights, which circle Johnson’s glass house, inform visitors
what is considered part of the installation and what is unclaimed woods. Once the
general area of looking is identified, visitors can then observe differences between
exterior moldings and interior design. Even further, the interior can be
scrutinized according to its various rooms and substructures. The yield is a
composition of differences. In brings “species-genus analytics” to bear on the
Johannine light, Christians are separated from non-Christians. Types are
classified—Presbyterian, Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Mormon. In turn, those
types (or species) are broken down to individual applications of living out the
good news. As much as these categories are useful for communal identity, their
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histories of persecution and segregation are well known and continue to inform
local and global conflicts.
The logic of difference through negation is unavoidable. This project, for
example, uses it simply by organizing itself around Kelly’s three effects of light.
Moreover, I am sure that if I undergo surgery I will hope for a doctor well trained
in “species-genus analytics.” In the end, rejecting dialectic entirely only
participates in its logic. However, awareness of its predominance and effects
could certainly use more attention. To be more specific regarding the topic of
light, we might become more sensitive to how approaches to visual composition
linger too long in focal glow, are drawn to its analytics of differentiation, and often
through them (whether consciously or not) overlook the complex mediation of
perception and reinforce the infallibility of visual information.
Part and parcel of this neglect is the centrality we award ourselves as the
composers of our experience. Human beings become the focal point for focal
glow, both as its authors and interpreters. Light as focal glow, in other words, uses
species-genus analytics to organize a very rigid hierarchy, with human authors
frequently awarded elite status. Just as the First Occasion is replayed with each
sunrise, so is the hierarchy of creator and creation recast in the relationship of
human beings to other genera and species. This can be read in the Hebrew
Scriptures when the duties of naming are conferred to Adam after the primal
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divisions have been made: Night/Day, Earth/Sky, Sea/Land, Animal/Man.
Readings of the Gospel of John do the same when logos, conflated with light, is
interpreted as the Word, or the foundation of language for human beings.
A cosmology from Plato makes even more apparent the heritage between
focal glow and human exceptionality. In the Timaeus, he directly connects a
cerebral, divine light with human vision. The human head, he claims, is made
round, "copying the revolving shape of the universe.” Here the “correct” order of
the cosmic plan is repeated—or used as a template—to shape the human mind.
For human beings, therefore, the mental capacity becomes “the most divine part
of us and master of all our other parts.” Plato also describes an eternal fire that is
bestowed upon the head, and it projects its light out through the eyes, enabling
vision through the commingling of its own light and the similarly constituted
“daylight.” This is possible because the “pure fire which is within us”—the light of
divine reason—flows through the blackened pupil which acts as a filtration
system. Plato speculates that the shape of the eyes has been crafted with a small
hole at the center “to enable them to keep out all the other, coarser stuff, and let
that kind of fire pass through pure by itself.”18
Importantly in Plato’s origin story, vision’s natural order is to purge. Sight
is “the source of supreme benefit.” It is the sense that provides “ability to make
correct calculations according to nature.” It can “stabilize the straying revolutions
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within ourselves by imitating the completely unstraying revolutions” of the divine,
of the eternal.19 Vision works as a calibration tool, like a carpenter’s level. Its
adjustments help maintain the correct order, or the precise focal glow.
Vision, light, and perception are not mediated in this cosmology. They are
calculated. The vision that is well calibrated occupies itself with activities of
accountancy and time-telling. Those visual practices produce “right” answers and
encourage “correct” ways of seeing the proper count. As a result, a clear causeand-effect relationship develops between visual perception and truth. It is there in
the dialogue with Timaeus, when Socrates claims “our ability to see the periods of
day-and-night, of months and of years, of equinoxes and solstices, has led to the
invention of number, and has given us the idea of time and opened the path to
inquiry into the nature of the universe.” Vision’s ability to parcel materials into
units and categories makes possible one’s knowledge of the divine order. Light
becomes the basis for the empirical sciences and mathematics, but also as Plato
later asserts, for philosophy itself. Sight is the great “gift from the gods,” defined
thus as the rational search for the proper cosmic order, the correct calibration. It
is worthwhile to note in Plato that the definition is built negatively—vision it is
not emotional, it is not coarse, it is not received from objects. Rather, it is
rational. It is divinely ordained. It is projected from an enfleshed subject. And as
such, it is uniquely human.
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Focal glow makes a similar argument: light is calibrated, it is authoritative,
and it is intentioned, like the spotlight of the stage that calls to order an
exceptional actor, a main performer. It sets the actor apart, silences the crowd,
draws eyes away from the rest of the darkened stage. The spot declares that the
monologue is what matters, the actor’s speech will bear the artistic mark, or the
divine nod. The audience is made passive.
Katherine Weiss makes the argument that the spot acting in this way (as
focal glow’s emblematic light) functions as a “prosthetic eye.” The term is
commonly used in cinema studies, often applying to the camera and its direction
of the audience’s gaze. Katherine Weiss, however, uses it to demonstrate Samuel
Beckett’s estrangement of the visual rhetoric traditionally employed by theater
companies. Becket, she writes, calls the authority of the spot into question. In
Play, he personifies it, forcing his audience to confront their deference to its
power.20 As the spot flits among the unnamed characters, Becket indicates in the
stage directions that their speech is to be “provoked by a spotlight.”21 So important
is the spot to this play, that Weiss imagines it as a “fourth player.” When one of
the female characters screams, “Get off me! Get off me!” we are reminded that this
authoritarian light is more conventionally male than female—a light that dissects
and objectifies as it announces its designer’s control.
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Beckett wrote the play thirty years after advancements in lighting
technology had given birth to “the spotlight era.” Powerful arc lights—the same
technology used in searchlights—had driven new techniques for highlighting the
movements of a production’s main cast members. Given the correspondences
these techniques in focal glow share with dialectic reasoning, it is not surprising
that the 1930s spotlight era coincided with higher education’s first theatrical
lighting course. The authoritative divisions in lighting were clear enough to be
systematized and institutionalized. 22
The characters in Play wonder what all this spotlighting (and focal
glowing) is getting after. One character suspects that the light is tormenting her
because she has not yet spoken the truth, or spoken it yet in the way the light
wants to hear. And what might that light want? the audience must ask itself.
What is asking to be said?
When the spot goes black, the characters speak together for the first time.
They are undivided in the darkness. “Yes, peace,” one character says. The
authoritative ordering of focal glow is extinguished. The division and labeling has
ended. Peace returns.23
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Ambient Luminescence: Light as Sameness
Darkness constitutes a different cast of light. This may seem contradictory, only if
the contrast that keeps the terms apart is not dispelled. Consider a darkness that
is not antithetical to the light but constituent of it. That means withdrawing from
difference, distinction, and clarity and being more welcoming of dispersion.
As the light changes so does a conception of logos. In rhetorical theory,
this shift comes in Luce Irigaray’s ideas of “sameness.” Vitanza advocates it as an
alternative to the genus-species analytics. We have seen how the spotlight of focal
glow projects a logic of masculine rationality. Irigaray’s work challenges this
origin story by rewriting Plato’s cave metaphor as a darkened womb. She rewrites
the story of prisoners escaping from a shadow puppet show as the flight of
dialectic method from female hysteria. These prisoners, chained to each other
and forced to become spectators in a primitive cinema, imagine themselves cut off
from the order of divine composition. In the cave, they are hungry for any kind of
spotlight or designer’s signal, which would make sense of the reiterating shadows.
Irigaray believes the anxiety derives from an inability to mark the binary. She
explains that the prisoner’s central problem is that “nothing can be named as
‘beings’ except those same things which all the same men see in the same way.”
There was no authority, or hierarchy of composition, and things were being
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improperly named “on the basis of the conversation between them.” No
authority could be appealed to. Without the divine nod to divide the shadows
appropriately, dialectic processes were interrupted. The order was lost. All this
comes to pass in Plato’s cave because the light is inadequate. Order is restored
with the emergence into the sun. Irigaray concludes that the injunction is against
indistinction: “whichever way up you turn these premises, you always come back
to sameness.”24 The womblike cave fails to separate/distinguish/spotlight the two
terms of the binary. For Plato this sameness is “hysteria,” a madness that confuses
focal glow’s divisions, its projection of a domineering masculine order, its
purgation of disorder and indecisiveness.
To reground logos in this hysterical darkness, Irigaray needs to tell a new
origin story that does not reuse the cuts of day and night. Rather than a series of
iterations of a First Occasion, Irigaray wants to make corporeal a relationality.
Playing against the logic of Genesis, she notes, “the feminine is experienced as
space, but often with connotations of the abyss and night (God being space and
light?), while the masculine is experienced as time.”25 A feminine sameness draws
back from the progression of change, the march of time that builds with units and
“congregation through segregation.” It disturbs the primacy of chronology by
existing “before and after...the light of day.”26 Yet, this space outside of time is not
a negation: “The sameness is not abyss; it neither devours nor engulfs. It is an
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availability so available that for one who lives for utility, for mastery...this
assumption of availability—which proceeds any position that can be discerned—
arouses anxiety and hence efforts to name and designate causes.” Her
“incarnation” is predicated on darkness and togetherness, “which has been
assimilated before any perception of difference.” 27 It is “maternal” in that it is a
part of being long before the individuation of birth and yet continues after the
child has left the womb. A uterine sameness persists.
The rhetoric of this “maternal-feminine” sameness is invoked in Kelly’s
second cast of light, “ambient luminescence.” More commonly, it is referred to as
indirect or diffuse light. An example can be found the dimness of a rainy morning
when the rays of the sun are refracted by thick cloud cover. People tend to
oversleep (or, at least, want to) because the grayness of these days fails to signal
the cut of a new chronological unit. The sky does not declare that Wednesday has
arrived. Night has not broken but, instead, has gradually dissolved. The “weight”
of a new occasion is not so clearly transmitted. Kelly adds to this example “the
uninterrupted light of a snowy morning in the open country...foglight at sea in a
small boat...twilight haze on a wide river where shore and water and sky are
indistinguishable.”28 Ambiences blur horizons. Binaries drift. Day/Night
becomes Day~~~Night. Land~~~Sea. Sky~~~Earth.
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Photographers usually favor ambient luminescence because it does not
paint with stark contrasts. When exposure levels are too disparate in a
composition, two (often unfavorable) consequences result. The first is that strong
shadows from focal glow tend to disguise details. They accent only the most
prominent features—an effect that can often be unflattering in a traditional
portrait or a commercial product shoot. Second, most cameras cannot
compensate for an extreme range of values (very bright highlights and very dark
shadows), such as when a picture is taken of a person standing in front of a
window on a sunny day. The separation of light values is too disparate to balance.
Either the brightly light area will be overexposed (blown out) or the underlit area
will be underexposed (too dark). The human eye tends to accomplish this
balancing-act better than most cameras, a biological advantage that unfortunately
continues to ruin many a snapshot.
To help battle some of these harsh effects of focal glow, many early film
studios built structures much like Johnson’s glass house. Without advanced
electrical lighting equipment and before the development of more sensitive film
emulsions, cinematographers often had to rely on the power of the sun. This
created the problem of waiting for overcast weather to avoid undesirable
contrasts. However, beginning around 1906, pebbled glass was used to build
studios that prismatically broke up the suns rays. 29 This diffusion produced a
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sameness in light that revealed finer textures in costuming, subtler details in
expressions, and slighter gestures in performances. All this would have all been
lost had the film had a more differentiated range of exposures.
Although glass studios maximized the diffusion of the sun, Kelly includes
all outdoor performance spaces as examples of ambient luminescence.
Amphitheaters and open-air stages, he reminds us, cannot employ the logic of the
spotlight; they cannot turn the house lights down and hush an audience. They
cannot separate an actor from the rest of the cast with a simple turn of the arclight. This is not to claim that outdoor spaces are disadvantaged in the theatrical
arts. On the contrary, Kelly enumerates the advantages of ambient luminescence:
it “minimizes form and bulk. It minimizes the importance of all things and
people. It suggests the freedom of space and can suggest infinity. It is usually
reassuring. It quiets the nerves and is restful.”30 Within its equilibrium, there
arises possibility. Without the clear mark of where or to whom the specter should
look, the boundaries of center stage begin to bleed.
Under skies of habitual diffusion, England’s outdoor venues are a
paradigm of ambient luminesce. On the Shakespearean stage, for example,
groundling, hero, and bit player were lit alike. Robert Graves finds that “the lack
of strong contrasts in brightness mean that the audience’s attention could not be
directed to specific actors or properties by means of conveniently placed pools of
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light.” Instead, the actors had to call the audience’s attention with verbal
flourishes, gestures, or entrances. Although these conventions might be deemed
too dramatic for modern audiences, Graves points to one advantage: “By never
employing our sort of illusion in their lighting, Elizabethan dramatists were free to
direct the audience’s attention to some telling stage business or to catch their
imaginations by the language.”31 The ambience provoked adaptations of the voice
and spoken word, but even modified how an actor’s agency was felt on stage. In
the sameness of light, players could more easily influence when the “spot” of the
spectator’s eye turned to them and when it left. A more interactive and relational
rhetoric shaped the narratives that played before audiences in these open-air
spaces.
Of course, with these advantages comes a loss of differentiae. Diffusion
does not allow for the piercing gaze that can identify the most minuscule
divisions. For that view, the focal glow of the arc light or a dentist’s ceiling light is
needed. However, the breakdown of this clarity is what interests Irigaray.
Without it, the definitive cuts of Platonic dialectic are impossible, and subjects
and objects drift from their roles. On the Elizabethan stage without clear
guidelines and optical queues, not only do supporting players suddenly draw the
audience’s attention, but the audience itself is also more a performer in the
construction of the play.
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This interactivity should not be confused with a literal discursivity, at least
not for Irigaray. For her, verbal and written structures are still too invested in the
roles of sender and receiver. She declares that “we must go back to a prediscursive
experience, recommence everything, all the categories by which we understand
things, the world, subject object divisions, recommence everything.” Forget even
the division between actor and audience. Only then will we be able to re-conceive
of old divisions through the expanded agency and relationality of sameness. Only
then, Irigaray claims, will we be able to “bring the maternal-feminine into
language.” This means cultivating an awareness of the presence of other “actors,”
in the broadest of senses, including our own involvement with them. We must
attune to a light that does separate to distinguish—“a light that remains in
obscurity.”32
Irigaray’s language of obscurity and sameness, despite their visual
metaphors, is difficult to define with concrete images. In fact, it leads Martin Jay
to conclude that Irigaray exemplifies the “anti-ocular” bias in modern French
theorists.33 Her materiality is discovered outside the visual plane—in the womb.
Cathryn Vasseleu disputes this charge and, in doing so, offers a reading
that helps illustrate how Irigaray imbues visual perception and light with material
life. While obscurity and darkness are important, Vasseleu calls attention to the
“texture of light” in Irigaray, and how that texture is material, imagining it
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connecting with other bodies. Sight forms a “touch of light on the eye.” It is
corporeal and yet uncontainable. In this sense, light is “neither visible nor
invisible, neither metaphoric nor metaphysical. It is both the language and the
material of visual practices.” Light is both medium and material, and it transmits
change through “the invisible interweaving of differences which form the fabric of
the visible.” But the difference required for one body to touch another does not
solidify into firm boundaries. The trap of subject/object divisions is avoided.
Light pays heed to the physical separations of, say, spectator from player, but, as
Vasseleu claims, it “stands as a challenge to the representation of sight as a sense
which guarantees the subject of vision an independence, or sense in which the seer
is distanced from an object.”34 With the touch and texture of light, seer and seen
commingle. A network emerges of materialities and mediations across which
images are not composed or observed but shared and felt.
Far from being merely an intuitive exchange, Vasseleu’s touch of light
welcomes the empirical sciences into artistic practice and theoretical discussion.
Her formulation of visible/invisible exchanges actually complements optical
psychics. Both the logos of ambience and the quantum theories of light outline
effects of the not-entirely-visible, or a medium dealing in the rhetorics of the
unclear.
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Models of the Big Bang, for example, issue challenges to how visual
composition and bodies of information are understood. Although current
theories of the event are meticulously wrought in units of time, broken down to a
trillionth of a second, scientists admit that Zero Time, or the first moment of the
“First Occasion,” remains entirely a mystery. A crude general description of the
primordial Before would point to the existence of a state of sameness, an
unfathomably dense singularity. This singularity comprised everything—gravity,
electromagnetism (the genus of light), and largely any notion of space or time.
The universe exploded from this singularity into an unfathomably hot
multiplicity, expanding faster than the current physical laws would allow
(rendering questions about what was “visible” during these early moments even
more problematic). Estimates are that the first photon particles (quanta of light)
spread throughout the universe a fraction of a second (10-43 to 10-35) after gravity
separated from the other fundamental forces.35 Yet before even a second of time
had elapsed, the rapid inflation ceased, and the radiant plasma of new matter
began to cool. The photons cast off by these early fluctuations remain in the
universe today, their wavelengths stretched alongside billions of years of growth.36
These same primitive photons are red-shifted, meaning they are charted on the
less energetic end of the electromagnetic spectrum, settling deep within range of
microwaves. They are the afterglow of the Big Bang, or the embers of what the
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pioneering astronomers who first discovered them memorably described as the
“primeval fireball.”37 Diffuse and uniform, these particle embers comprise the
background of the universe. Their energy is all but invisible except to the most
powerful radio telescopes. To human eyes, the glow of the universe’s birth is
blackness between stars; it is the darkness.
But the darkness is legible. For the first decade of the twenty-first century,
a NASA spacecraft—the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe, or WMAP—
has been gathering traces of this energy expelled by the Big Bang, referred to as
the cosmic microwave background. The data maps a thirteen-billion-year-old
light pattern. Spherical with clumps of mostly blue and green color, representing
cooler temperature fluctuations, the map of the nascent universe can easily be
mistaken as a pixilated rendering of the earth.38 WMAP’s visualizations, in other
words, are synecdoche on a cosmic scale. The blue-green quantum fluctuations
are like the topographies of a schoolroom geography poster: oceans and
continents are speckled around a flattened globe in a design that seems to have
been rendered by the brush of George Seurat. It is difficult to believe that this
layout was accidental. Colorizing one of the most popularly contested and
misunderstood scientific theories so that it resembles the earth shrewdly
associates the Big Bang with a visual figure the public is routinely asked to
conserve, protect and “save.”

78

To reinforce these linkages, the texts that accompany WMAP’s images
deploy the commonplaces of mythic narratives. The map’s color patterns are
explained as “the seeds that grew to become the galaxies,” a metaphor used by
numerous creation myths, like those that tell of a cosmic garden; or the Egyptian
and Navajo stories of a Deity who masturbates the universe into light; or even
those from Hawaii and Greece, whose celestial gods copulate in the heavens and
spray their “seeds” across the cosmos.39 Perhaps even more cheekily, WMAP lifts
rhythms from Genesis to answer a FAQ about the initial catalyst for the Big Bang.
What started the Big Bang? “There was matter [morning] and there was
antimatter [evening].” Slyly revising Yahweh’s first command, WMAP adds,
“When they met, they annihilated each other and created light.”40 Rather than a
creator separating the abyss, the darkness itself divides and showers the universe
with light.
This is no slight on WMAP’s information design, nor is it an attempt to
homogenize data collection with creation narratives. Rather, WMAP deserves
credit for recognizing what astrophysicists sometimes neglect: the preoccupation
human beings have with finding their own face in the universe. Carl Sagan, for
one, realized the power of this appeal. In his famous 1974 multi-part
documentary for PBS, he asserted “We're made of star-stuff.”41 Literally, Sagan is
referring to atoms, like carbon, in the human body. Since the early universe was
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comprised primarily of helium and hydrogen, most other elements derive from
lifecycles of stars, particularly their stunning deaths, when they supernova,
explode and shower space with an array of atomic particles. Most theories point
to this process as the most likely candidate for the germination of earth’s primitive
crust. The inevitable conclusion is that all carbon-based beings are made of raw
stellar material. Sagan, however, pushes this well-known cosmochemical fact
further. He mines its imaginative potential and turns over new ground for
psychology, epistemology, and phenomenology: “Some part of our being knows
this is where we came from. We long to return. And we can. Because the cosmos is
also within us.” The suggestion is nothing less than an interstellar eternal
return—from (star) dust to (star) dust. It is a call, borne in the atomic ancestry of
human beings, a lineage as inscrutable as it is compelling. Hidden in the body’s
own darkened cosmic background, there is an invitation to a reunion. All are
invited; one and the same. Come, our bodies beckon, our flesh and bone are host
of a communion across the galaxy. We can return to it through the common
touch of the photon.
Sagan ends with the most radical of his claims, one that separates his alpha
and omega from the logocentric one: “We are a way for the cosmos to know
itself.” He ironically projects his audience’s own epistemological anxiety into
celestial bodies. They too are seeking answers to where they come from. As
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Ptolemy gazed at the stars seeking a mathematic pattern for their seemingly
erratic orbits around the earth (a look that would de-center the Earth from its
privileged position in the universe), the stars in turn were gazing down at him,
hoping to find their end, their own telos for billions of years of nuclear syntheses
and cataclysmic deaths.
At its best, Sagan’s statement might be read as a multidisciplinary inroad,
an attempt to cross scientific studies and humanistic theories, a way to think of
the rhetoric of light on a extraterrestrial and more interactive stage. A less
charitable reading could call it yet another personification: the universe has been
made to serve an astronomer’s anthropocentric celebration of the human spirit.
For the time being, it seems more valuable to tease out the implications of the
former.

Play of Brilliance: Light as Chance Assemblage
To return to the conceit of the stage, let us assume for a moment that all bodies in
the theater are irradiated with Vasseleu’s visible and invisible fabric of light. Let
us also grant that this fabric is material, in that it touches vision, whether the
players and spectators sense it or not. Furthermore, we have explored possibilities
for conceiving of light as compositional, in that it bears information, modifies
forms, and constitutes a body of its own. We must then acknowledge that light
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itself is a player, with a presence and relativity all its own. Yet this player is not an
“actor” in any of the traditional senses of the world. For one, light exists outside
of space and time. It is both instantly present and absent. Since it has no mass
and travels at the speed of light, the photon carries its own frame of reference, one
that must not be compared to the observer’s own. Simply put, photons do not
conform to chronology. When a young girl in Kansas gazes up at Sirius, the
brightest star in our sky, the journey a photon makes from that point nine light
years away to her retina is instantaneous. There is no before and after. Of course,
if the photon could be tracked by earthly clocks, the journey would seem to last
for 8.6 light years. But to the proper time of the photon, it would be more
accurate to say that it exists in both places at once—Sirius and in the eye of the
little girl. This phenomenon, related to what in physics is called nonlocality,
prompts David Grandy to speculate that the experience of vision projects a view
through time and space. In regards to sight, he says:
To be sure, we may back away from the experience [of vision] and posit
various processes, all of which take time, whereby photons transfer their
images to the eye or brain, but in the moment of experience, we see things
at a distance without feeling that we are visually processing them. They
are immediately available and we, visually, speaking, are widely present in
the world.42
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By “widely present,” Grandy is suggesting that in the touch of the photon against
our stargazer’s eye, she participates in a different experience of spacetime, one in
which entities are not separated by geographies or durations. They are instead
connected corporeally in a dimension beyond the confines of the girl’s perception.
To emphasize this point, Grandy refers to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who is
similarly important to Irigaray’s notion of sameness and Vasseleu’s description of
the fabric of light. With Merleau-Ponty we see how these casts of difference and
sameness might congregate the actors on stage without tactics of segregations or
erasures of their individuality.
Merleau-Ponty’s work resonates in part because of his efforts to describe
an act of seeing outside of the Cartesian tradition. That tradition is predicated on
a subject-object relationship, where the world is taken up and processed in the
black box of the observer’s rational mind. In his essay “Eye and Mind,” MerleauPonty counters this structure of perception with an enfleshed reflexivity. In
looking, the body is connected to a network of other bodies and materialities,
while never losing its own singularity. The perceiver can never completely escape
reflexivity. As much as I recognize that I am a part of an assembly of actors, that
“my body is a thing among things,” that “it is caught in the fabric of the world,” I
cannot fully escape that subjective point-of-view. My looking “sees itself seeing; it
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touches itself touching.”43 I can never escape my vision. It is forever mediated by
photons.
This is the lesson of perception, what we find in the nature of the photon
by looking at the casts of focal glow and ambient luminescence. On the one hand,
light constructs us as a subject/object; on the other hand, the nature of perception
forever differentiates us in a mobile assembly outside of our own frame of
spacetime. “Vision alone teaches us,” Merleau-Ponty claims, “that beings that are
different, ‘exterior,’ foreign to one another, are yet absolutely together, are
‘simultaneity.’” This is a “mystery,” he concludes, that “psychologists handle the
way a child handles explosives.”44
Although I do not pretend to handle the mystery any better, I am
interested in the rhetorical questions it begs. With this view of perception, how
do we compose with the camera? How do we relate to light? How are we to think
of rhetorical acts with the photon?
For one, the photon calls into question Kenneth Burke’s definition of man
as the “symbol-using animal.”45 For Burke, non-symbolic motion persists
continually in the world in the pull of the tides, the rotation of the earth, the
crackle of fire. The drama of the rhetorical situation is staged when humans
inscribe this motion into language, or symbols, to be deployed and decoded.
Debra Hawhee points out that many scholars are too quick to draw a division
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between these terms. They portray Burke as a humanist, who finds symbol-use
the only activity of note. Hawhee, however, sees Burke’s notion of language and
motion not as a binary terms but as a pair in that they “overlap and intersect as
often as they pull apart.”46 From this, she argues that language has a motion of its
own. While her project is important to the field of written composition and
linguistics, I wonder if the photon is not drawing us closer to the indistinct line
between motion and discursivity, the very edge on which she sees Burke playing.
If we allow for the simultaneous possibility of individuation and ensemble
motion in visual perception, there seems to enough ground to discuss the rhetoric
of the photon. Its persuasive force would begin in pre-discursive sameness that
Irigaray describes. This would move the center of the rhetorical scene outside of
language and into the obscurity George Kennedy describes in his provocative
essay “A Hoot in the Dark.” Rhetoric there is a “deep” and “universal” field that
extends between all beings, animate and inanimate, plant, rock, and animal—“the
energy of all physics as known from subatomic particles.” On this stage, “marking
is, perhaps, a kind of metaphor, that is, something transferred to the condition of
life from the inanimate world where there is also a kind of marking.”47 The marks
might be found in the turning of a plant on the forest floor to reach the rays of the
afternoon sun, or the coloration of insects as they search for a mate. These

85

compositions would be both non-verbal motion and symbolic action outside of
the realm of language—exchanges that are “purposive though not purposive.”48
Another way to think of the marking is as an excitation. Excitation better
captures the non-linguistic discursivity of the photon—the mode in which it
transmits its force, exchanges its energy, makes its mark. It is a commingled and
embodied action. Technically speaking, excitation occurs when an electron
absorbs the energy of a photon. The electron jumps to a higher, more active orbit.
Eventually it relaxes back to its former state. In doing so it emits the same amount
of energy it absorbed, not as waste, but, as another photon.
If a logos were to emerge from this particle activity, it would be one that is
constantly in flux, transmitting, absorbing, entangling, and emitting. In her
reading of Kennedy, Diane Davis claims that this kind of activity constitutes a
touch beyond logos. Using Emanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, she emphasizes
a responsiveness to other bodies.49 This notion of responsiveness to the Other
cannot be understated, and I will return to it in a moment, but for now I would
like to propose that this responsiveness does not necessarily go beyond logos. In
Heraclitus's descriptions of fire, we find a logos that sparks and flits to life, everpresent and ever-the-same, yet never fixed, never consistently the same.50 It is a
force and a motion that relies on distinctions and separations, only to work from
between them and crackle with life. The logos, or force, of his divine mark is “day
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and night, winter and summer, war and peace, surfeit and hunger;” it “takes
various shapes, just as fire, when it is mingled with spices, is named according to
the savour of each.”51 Like the activity in an Deleuzean assemblage, the movement
of logos becomes symbolic only when it takes on the qualities of that which it
passes through. It might be like the ray of sun, refracted and green through stain
glass, visible in the dust wafting in the air above a pew. Or it is the shapes of a
toddler’s glow-in-the-dark pajamas, when the phosphorescent miniature
spaceships twirl through a house at night. Circumstance and chance bring these
forms into our perception, and in that moment, in that looking, we too become
composed though it—both physically as the photons touch our retina and
subjectively, as we cast ourselves into the assemblage.
This is the light of Kelly’s third and final effect of light—the “play of
brilliants.” It is a cast reliant on twinkling and chance, interruption and
fluctuation, like the many lights one might see at “Times Square at night,” always
changing, always moving. Other examples are “a cache of diamonds in an opened
cave....night automobiles at a busy cloverleaf, a night city from the air.” Kelly
continues with examples of car headlights casting shadows of trees in a bedroom.
Even more simply: “it is a sparkling cabinet of fine glassware.”
Even though this light is remarkable and distinct like focal glow, it is also
commingled and diffuse like ambient luminesce. It still necessitates the
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entanglement of bodies, the motion of networks, the ensemble activity that draws
attention inadvertently and suddenly to a particular member. Like photonic
collisions with electrons, it works by excitation. According to Kelly, it “excites the
optic nerves, and in turn stimulates the body and spirit, quickens the appetite,
awakens curiosity, sharpens the wit.” Like meeting of photon and electron, it
produces fleeting transformations. At the same time, this transformation is not a
call to an eternal order, or a creator’s nod indicating that the essential message is
to be found here or now. Quite the contrary, the play of brilliants can be
“distracting or entertaining.”52 It might be absorbed or ignored; re-emitted or
discarded. Either way, it will change, reshaping itself to be observed in another
moment, in another form.
If the play of brilliants were to be captured in an edifice, it would not be in
the focal glow of Johnson’s glass house or in the ambience of cinema’s early glass
studios. Rather the play of brilliants might best be witnessed in a ruined
greenhouse. Its windows would be missing and broken, jagged shards hanging in
their frames. The panes would be stained with many seasons of weather patterns.
And the plant life below would be nothing but a wild mess. Specimens would spill
from their rows and trellises, creep over the floor and up architectural structures.
Exotic species and local varieties would entwine with each other to reach the
patterns of light sweeping daily through the space. New buds would constantly
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emerge. Sprouts would twist into errant reflections. Visitors might find it at one
moment incomprehensible and in the next moment beautiful.
A problem arises, though, when we want to think about practices in this
space. It is an important one for education and general considerations of these
photonic rhetorics. Amidst such a transformative assemblage, how is an
individual supposed to begin composing? How might the camera and its operator
open themselves to the light of this space? These questions revolve around light’s
tending. By tending, I do not mean a reconstruction, but rather an intentional
practice that is performed with care for the system of entities and activities,
recognizing that the practitioner—inescapably—is part and parcel of that system.
Re-beginning with John’s Prologue provides a way to understand what
this practice might entail. We have seen how the prologue is often read in terms
of focal glow. Its famous line—that the light of the Logos has not been “overcome”
by the darkness—bespeaks of the divisions and separations necessary for the
clarity and permanency of a divine order. However, the Greek word that is so
often translated as “overcome” also shares etymologies with the words
“comprehend” and “apprehend.”53 Thinking of the lines in terms of an
apprehension creates a dramatic shift in the reading of Eternal Light, from a clear
assertion of that which cannot be refuted or conquered, to something that cannot
be quite understood. It is a temporary seizure, in the sense that an odd idea seizes
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its thinker, never fully coming into possession, and then fleeing as quickly as it
appears. It is remembered only incompletely and brokenly. It excites and fades.
Logos conceived in this way correlates with Irigaray’s sameness, Heraclitus’
fire, Kennedy’s universal “purposive-though-not-purposive” force, or even more
explicitly with Heidegger’s formulation of truth as a concealing/unconcealing—an
indeterminacy that never fully comes to light. Deleuze, if we might add one more
voice to our ensemble, uses the figure of a body without organs. The assemblage
of the greenhouse is much greater than its actual pieces; its life, paradoxically is in
the “inorganic” correspondences between organisms. This virtual body, present
between and among the many entities, is the assemblage that is most fully alive.
Whenever it takes a definitive form, that virtual life recedes from view.
Applying this to physics, Darby relates the virtual assemblage to the
unstable properties of light, which as a photon is both wave and particle , but
never both at the same moment. He explains, “We cannot, even in principle,
recover light as an intermediate, separate (and therefore separating) entity
between perceiver and perceived. That is, it cannot be snatched out of the context
of the visual experience and held up for independent scrutiny.” Sameness, fire,
shadows, a body without organs, a photon—these things cannot be possessed.
They seize us.
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This certainty about indeterminacy, only returns to the questions: how
might we perform with and respond to such a logos? How might we use photonic
rhetorics.
Derrida, by way of Levinas and Maurice Blanchot, advocates a
responsibility. For Derrida this means the recognition that any response is not an
autonomous cut but, instead, “a passive decision,” or an unconscious response, to
a radical, material other. It is passive in that it does not try to impose a normative
framework on the other, or subject that alterity to an oppositional relationship.
Moreover, it unfolds in time, which renders the decision beyond mastery. 54 For
Derrida, this passivity is the essence of hospitality.55 Davis finds in Derrida’s
responsibility a rhetorical position of exposure, one which responds, like
Kennedy, to the force that is “enfleshed” in other organic life. Yet she still sees
Kennedy as too anthropocentric, and defends a rhetoric “not first of all an essence
or property in the speaker (a natural function of biology) but an underivable
obligation to respond that issues from an irreducible relationality.”56 Passive
response, thus, situates logos beyond the material touch of these alterities. Davis
re-begins with rhetoric neither as “art or science but an undeliverable
provocation, an imperative to respond.”57
Other writers, particularly those who discuss the visual arts, like MerleauPonty, Bolt, and Crary, try to give to the artist or the composer the powers to
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deliver as well as to respond.58 This implies a pre-discursive logos that might itself
be temporarily seized by the artist and tended. For Crary these are the practices of
the artist-observer. For Bolt it is the act of shedding light for other entities instead
of on them. For Merleau-Ponty it is the painter who, yes, feels the imperative to
respond to exposures but is able to feel that condition more profoundly in the act
of responding itself. He writes:
There is that which reaches the eye head on, the frontal properties of the
visible; but there is also that which reaches it from below—the profound
postural latency whereby the body raises itself to see—and that which
reaches vision from above like the phenomena of flight, of swimming, of
movement, where it participates no longer in the heaviness of origins but
in free accomplishment. Through vision, then, the painter touches both
extremities. In the immemorial depth of the visible, something has
moved, caught fire, which engulfs his body; everything he paints is in
answer to this incitement...Vision is the meeting, as at a crossroads, of all
the aspects of Being.59
In Merleau-Ponty’s version of inspiration, which opens itself to the sciences and
visual arts, the psychological and the neurological enter the assemblage. The
“imperative to respond” and the “undeliverable provocation” are, in fact, most felt
the act of delivery. Here, the seizures of photonic rhetoric might be put into
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practice. Memories new and old, humors, moods and fevers are projected into the
radical alterities and indeterminate assemblages that come into view during
artistic composition. In these “extremities” the sensibilities of the artist observer
are more singularly plural, aware of their mediated view and, at the same time,
stretching back to deliver forward a broken piece of that mediation in light.
Camera media are not discussed at length by any of the above theorists
interested in a prediscursive, sizeable logos. In fact, Merleau-Ponty explicitly
denies photographic media the capability of reaching into these assemblages of
vision. By the photograph’s freezing of motion, access to what Deleuze would call
the virtual realm is shut off.60 The aperture opens, and a multidimensional
assemblage is warped onto a two-dimensional surface.
Admitting that we can never make explicit the assemblage of light, we can
still use the camera to investigate our apprehensions of the assemblage. The
camera can tend to the clarity of focal glow, the sameness of ambient luminesces,
and the contingency of brilliants. As in Plato, Irigaray or Merleau-Ponty, each
approach to light situates a mode of seeing and being in the world—a different
way to conceive of our relationship to logos. Kelly contends that the most
“beautiful” compositions are produced through “an interplay of all three kinds of
light, though one is usually dominant.” 61 Not only am I suggesting that cameras
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are particularly given to studying these three casts of light, but they also offer a
means of assessing perhaps which is more dominant in our lives.
I turn now to three emergent technologies of the camera, and the
possibilities they offer in tending to the mediated compositions of the photon.
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CHAPTER 3

PHOTO APP
THE STILL IMAGE AND MACHINE SUBJECTIVITY

Digitalization and miniaturization have rendered the snapshot camera relatively obsolete.
Most cameras now come ‘prepackaged’ with mobile phones or tablet devices. The
integrated technology has opened a number of secondary markets, the biggest being the
downloadable ‘app.’ Popular software add-ons like Hipstamatic, Instagram, and
Camera+ for the iPhone, enhance the functions of built-in camera phones.1 These
newfangled apps have engendered a host of photographic practices, many of which have
provoked debates concerning the photograph’s claim to objectivity.
Nowhere is this more obvious than on the front lines of photojournalism.
Recently, professional photographers have used mobile phones and, more controversially,
photo apps like the Hipstamatic to document scenes of war. As a style inseparable from
its apparatus, these photo apps unsettle the camera’s journalistic credentials as a factbased observer. In place of objectivism, they bring forward photonic rhetorics—the
persuasive effects of light, the digital transformations of the camera, and the impossibility
of bearing witness to those transformations. In short, they bring forward a machine
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subjectivity, which highlights the mediation of perception while making it, paradoxically,
more personalized.

Machine Vision
To understand how the Hipstamatic is stirring up controversy among photojournalists, it
is helpful to recognize its threat to “mechanical objectivity.” For years the camera has
been the standard-bearer for an ideology that maintains that machines, when unimpeded,
yield direct evidence of the material world.
Importantly, this brand of objectivity has not always been the dominant approach.
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison describe the more interpretive method that preceded
it. Atlas makers and scientific illustrators would often try to norm different samples into
an averaged or characteristic “type.” With these interpretive practices, “the exercise of
judgment in the selection of these ‘typical’ images” was thought to be “not only inevitable
but laudable.”2
By the nineteenth century, with advances in optical technology, a paradigm shift
was underway. Photography established itself within a longer tradition of imaging
technologies that allowed greater precision in visual representation. Like the camera
obscura, which had centuries before made possible greater realism in scientific
illustration, the photographic camera quickly asserted itself as an authoritative source of
empirical observation. The automation it provided mitigated the influence of its
operators. It established “mechanical or procedural safeguards” against the “temptation”
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of overactive interpretation.3 As Daston and Galison put it, the still camera, even more
than the camera obscura, could be trusted to “eliminate the mediating presence of the
observer.” Inevitably, this approach resulted in a radical negation of perceptual
subjectivity. 4
The great riddle that mechanical objectivity solved was devising a method of
“accurately” representing reality without any guesswork about its characteristic type. The
solution, according to Daston and Galison, involved collecting a representative sample—
a “scatter of individual phenomena that would stake out the range of the normal.”5 We
now associate this school of objective study, almost inseparably, with good empirical
practice.
In the history of photography’s transition to cinema, one can witness the close
association of the camera with this drive for representative samples. Late nineteenthcentury pioneers, Étienne-Jules Marey and Eadweard Muybridge invented separate
technologies for this very purpose. Both were scholars dedicated to fashioning a model of
locomotion from a range of samples. Their photographic novelties would serve as the
forerunners of motion pictures, but the apparatuses were originally conceived not to
entertain but quite literally to picture motion.
Marey’s experiments in particular demonstrate his dedication to unlocking the
mysteries of movement and his belief that photographic technology was the key to doing
so. His invention of chronophotography captured multiple exposures on a single
negative, gathering bursts of human movement—the trajectories of walking jumping,
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fencing, running, wrestling. The technique evolved when Marey devised ways to mask the
figure and isolate its movement. He attached illuminated rods and bulbs to his subject’s
joints to demarcate the position and angle of the body. The substitution removed
distracting details from the flow of movement: it hid muscle tone, facial features, clothing,
etc.6 The data that the prints provided, with their representative samples, could then be
mathematically processed into calculations for gait analysis. From these observations,
one could determine, seemingly without interpretation, the common parameters of
movement.
Marey’s early motion studies have been linked as the inspiration for strands of
Taylorism and Russian machinism. Films such as the “biomechanics” of Sergei
Eisenstein and the chisel and hammer experiments of Aleksej Gastev were dedicated to
discovering the most efficient movements through machine observation. Siegfried
Zielinski explains how early movement studies seemed to offer “an ideology-free method
for increasing productivity and...for radically reforming individuals.”7 Their pioneers
believed in the power of the camera to illuminate pathways to the most effective gait, the
most profitable swing of the hammer, or the most graceful exit from the stage.
Marey’s practices were founded on clarity across discrete instances of phenomena,
whether he was photographing birds or multiple positions of an illuminated stick in a
darkened room. This is a tenet of mechanical objectivity. To collect a “scatter of
individual phenomena,” the scientist must ensure that each of the variations is individual
enough to properly demonstrate their difference from others in the set. Marey’s
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chronophotography, therefore, was notable for its ability to capture multiple
instantiations of a single movement, divided only by fractions of a second, each fraction
rendered in sharp focus against its predecessors and successors. For instance, in one of
Marey’s experiments, a single long jumper appears as multiple athletes, some more
transparent (ghostlike) than others, but each presenting its own distinct boundaries.8 A
machine capable of processing visible phenomena in this kind of high definition is a boon
to the pursuit of mechanical objectivity. The “cult of individuating detail,” as Daston and
Galison call it, embraced the accuracy of the camera obscura, but it was the photograph
that guaranteed an almost “effortless accuracy.”9 Jonathan Crary agrees, noting that the
camera obscura engendered a Cartesian relationship with light, with the observer
detached, almost disembodied, in a controlled darkened setting, analyzing a well-defined
plane of light, as a cartographer might calibrate a map. But again, it is photography, and
the technologies that follow it, that Crary holds responsible for accelerating the desire to
translate sensory experience into quantifiable data.10
Opposing Marey’s aesthetic and its attendant theories of visual objectivity was
Anton Giulio Bragaglia. As Italian Futurist of the early twentieth century, Bragaglia
developed a technique to resist the segmentation and quantifying drive of Marey’s
images. Both men shared the goal of expressing motion, only Bragaglia was much more
taken with the fluidity of an action. In Bragaglia’s “photodynamism,” the stroke of a
musician’s bow blurs into vapor over the strings of a cello. Bragaglia adamantly tried to
distinguish himself from his French predecessor: “I deny that I analyze action and I deny
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that I make the equivalent of one hundred instantaneities.” Instead Bragaglia wanted a
“synthesis of the action, which, because it is pure movement...is completely different
from...stasis and completely different from an analytic scientific reconstruction.”11 Mary
Braun, who reviews the relationship between Marey and Bragaglia, finds more similarities
between the two than they or their respective circles admitted (they both, after all,
believed they were revealing something essential about human movement).12 Still,
Bragaglia and Marey could not have differed more about properly depicting the “action”
that so fascinated them. For Marey, the camera could divide and distinguish temporal
intervals of motion. For Bragaglia, the camera was a step closer to an a-chronological
theory of time.13
Marey’s vision and notational system of picturing time has been much more
successfully aligned with ‘truth” than Bragaglia’s durational blurs. Surveys and control
groups continue to tabulate norms with the logic of the representative sample. Perhaps,
though, the most popular offspring of Marey’s legacy is the demand for high resolution.
HD has become the clarion call of the “cult of individuating detail.” It sets the primary
standard against which most visual technologies are judged. Screens and cameras are
marketed on the basis of how minutely they can render differences in the spectrum of
light. The resolution sold is both literal, as in the number of pixels on a screen—the
granularity of the image—and also figurative, as in how definitively the apparatus has
solved the problem of quantifying the complex system of sensory perception. In the case
of recent displays, the problem seems to be entirely closed: the screen can detail an image
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at a pixel resolution beyond the perceptual limits of the human retina.14 The question of
accuracy has been seemingly ‘resolved.’
Machine vision continues to be valued for its insight into otherwise obscure
phenomena. Using methodologies much like Marey’s own, researchers at MIT have
photographed the “propagation of light.” One of the videos released to the public appears
to demonstrate a continuous stream of light moving across an apple. It is actually a
composite, rendered through a series of still samples, shot in intervals over the course of
several minutes. Essentially, the technique reworks Marey’s and Muybridge’s early
experiments. The technology obviously has advanced. The shutter speed of each
exposure is two trillionths of a second. The project team speculates that this camera
could be used to develop new medical procedures for visualizing interior areas of the
body, much like conducting “ultrasounds with light.”15
As hinted in these predictions, the prominence of mechanical vision today cannot
be properly appreciated without recognizing its importance to military and medical
science. Paul Virilio and Kittler both draw parallels between advancements in optics and
the importance of visualizing bodies in higher definition. For Virilio, the camera’s optical
power has replaced material bodies with fields of intensities. Addressing the dominance
of high resolutions in medicine, law, and the military, he concludes that beings are
processed into data, into a “telepresence” that can be counted, measured, and, if desired,
manipulated. He calls it the “merciless more light,” a “hyper-realism” that extends
perception onto a more controllable plane. Kittler, referencing Oliver Wendell Holmes
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and Virilio himself, pushes the theory even further, depicting photography as a negation
of physical matter. What previous media could not capture, photography delivers: “the
possibility of storing, transmitting, and finally processing data without matter and
without the loss of accuracy.” In Kittler’s estimation, the result is “chemically pure
information,” produced from “chemically pure destruction” of sensory material. In other
words, to transcribe vision and turn it into legible information, perception must be
stripped from its material body. This can only happen “perfectly” through the
interventions of a machine. Kittler compares the camera flash to that of a “bomb” or “an
annihilation.” They deliver Virilio’s more light: sensory perception blown up onto a
hyper-real plane. 16 The “flash” and “annihilation” of material makes possible perception’s
‘upgrade’ and resolution into higher definition—the pristine output of information.
So pervasive is the authority of photographic information, that it has been
invested with a morality all its own. For example, Daston and Galison admit that it takes
vigilance to gather multiple samples of phenomena. Observers must be diligent and
patient in gathering information. They must likewise restrain themselves from
interfering with the apparatus, exercising a kind of visual temperance.17 Infused with this
puritan work ethic, the practices of mechanical objectivity occupy an almost unassailable
position alongside values of truth and integrity.
Some might object to extending these ethics and the evidentiary truth of value of
photographic information into our own age. Photoshop and all its offshoots have made
us much more cynical regarding the image’s objectivity. Jennifer Tucker speculates that
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today’s generation of camera-users, with their bevy of digital tools, might be more willing
to see images as “having a life independent of material culture.” Editing applications
might be shaking images free of their connections to the empirical world.
Tucker cautions, however, against a false contrast between the savvy of modern
digital editors and the presumed guilelessness of previous generations. She revisits many
public disputes in the Victorian era over the ‘truthfulness’ of images and the legitimacy of
mechanical objectivity. On many occasions, the scientific community struggled against
popular opinion in the aftermath of infamous photographic hoaxes, such as the scandals
surrounding spirit photography in the nineteenth century and the dubiousness of
photographs that “proved” the existence of fairies and canals on Mars. These doubts
called into question the camera’s mechanical objectivity. They tested the limits of its
reliability and fidelity to the material world, probing how much accuracy its automatized
procedures guaranteed.18
The Victorian disputes are, in fact, quite comparable to current skepticism
surrounding digital editing. In both, I would argue, mechanical objectivity wins out.
Despite many cases of botched magazine covers and careless hoaxes, there remains strong
allegiance to the evidentiary power of the photograph. Often I will hear that
photographs, unlike texts or illustrations, give evidence of how the world is. Just as
frequently, though, come complaints that digital images are rife with manipulation. The
coexistence of these competing attitudes, one of credulity and one of cynicism, finds its
footing in a binary judgment. It declares that images must either maintain the
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“ineradicable glow of veracity” or be judged fake.19 True or false. Touched or untouched.
Virgin or sullen. The binary can be observed holding sway on social news websites like
Reddit, where images are often promoted by communal voting. As images ascend to the
“front page” of the site, they draw more scrutiny. Comments inevitably pepper the more
striking compositions with suggestions that they are “fake” or “shopped.” The criticisms
imply that a modified image does not deserve front-page status. One post appeared titled
“The people in this photo thought they were alone...”. It included a picture of two women
and a young girl crouching down to examine the foliage aside a forest path. Behind them,
creeping up the trail, is a brawny black wolf, its eyes glowing yellow in the camera’s flash.
Users quickly expressed their suspicions about the authenticity of the image. Comments
ranged from lengthy denunciations, with explanations of pixel contours and flash angles,
to more concise statements, like “BULLSHIT.” 20 The original poster of the image
followed up with another link entitled “To all the photo experts on Reddit who claimed
this incredible photo of people unaware of a wolf behind them was fake, here's the fullsize original [pic].” The debate continued onto the new thread.21 The precise language
used on Reddit to evaluate the photograph is an encouraging sign for anyone concerned
about the future of visual literacy. Also, photographic skepticism has proven valuable
time and again when policing false advertising or abuses of power, such as British
Petroleum’s (BP) management of its public image during the 2009 oil spill when it was
caught releasing doctored photographs of its control rooms.22 Still, I cannot help
sympathizing with the exasperation apparent in the original poster’s second title. The
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factuality of Reddit’s big, bad wolf almost completely dictated the terms under which the
image was received by the online community. It won attention almost solely in terms of
its ‘truthfulness.’ The fate of the hikers, the reaction of the photographer taking the
photo, the gender of the three potential victims (all female), its re-imagining of fairy tale
conventions—these were topics that were mentioned only in relation to the defense or the
debunking of the image as evidence of a material, historical event. One of the two terms
of the binary had to be marked: “true” or “false.”
It is this binary judgment along with the authority of mechanical objectivity that
the Hipstamatic has begun to disrupt. Nowhere is this disruption more sensitively felt
than in the field of photojournalism. Because photojournalism relies on trained visual
artists who uphold standards of integrity, it provides a unique window into the struggle to
assert the truth-value of digital imaging technology. On the one hand, photojournalists
have been willing to experiment with novel technologies, like the Hipstamatic. Recent
marketplace pressures on print journalism have created incentives to innovate and find
new styles for distinctive news reporting.23 On the other, the blending of editorial and
news content on many blogs and cable news shows has drawn attention to partisanpolitics and biases in reporting. While some outlets like to define themselves as either
editorially based or empirically based, most balance their reporting between these two
approaches.24 Within the murky middle ground, an original photograph becomes an
important visual sign of a news agency’s resources and dedication to reporting events as
they have unfolded. Therefore, any technology that would call into question the camera’s
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link to material reality or undermine its reliability as an unprejudiced witness, is sure to
draw fire, particularly from those who subscribe to journalism’s empirical model.

Hipstamatic at War
In 2011 these very objections arose when a photograph taken by Damon Winter for the
New York Times was awarded third place by Pictures of the Year International (POYi).
The point of contention was not the subject of the image: a U.S. soldier walking on patrol
through a sparse copse of trees. Rather, some photographers, journalists, and readers
were upset with the technology he used to capture it. He took the photo with a
Hipstamatic app running on an iPhone. 25
The Hipstamatic and its relatives (e.g., Instagram and Camera+) impose visual
effects on images captured with the iPhone’s built-in camera. Most of the effects are
modeled after toy camera formats from the 1960s and 1970s, such as the Diana and the
Holga. The kitschy aesthetic is reinforced by the Hipstamatic’s interface. When users
download and open the app, their screen simulates the back of an inexpensive snapshot
camera from 1984.
Its designers joke on their website that the camera is “precision molded with
gator-skin plastic.” But the casing, along with most of the camera’s virtual parts, can be
customized. Touch the negative loader, and new film stocks can be chosen. Turn the
camera “around” (again, this is all simulated on screen), and the Hipstamatic’s lenses or
flashes can be exchanged for others. Depending on the combination of choices, the
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photos produced take on a distinctive style through shifts in color-tone, sharpness, and
contrast with additions like lighting flares, film grain, and vignetting. No matter what the
combination, all the styles share some features: each image is visibly matted on virtual
paper, square in format, and undeniably effected.
Some photojournalists, like Winter, have used the Hipstamatic as a primary
camera to capture events of the war in Afghanistan. The decision to use automated
processes to compose images documenting traditional subjects of “hard news,” like a
military engagement, has aroused concern, even outrage. Chip Litherland, one of
Winter’s colleagues at the New York Times writes that “the fact that Damon Winter’s
‘Grunt’s Life’ was just awarded a third place at POYi is a game changer. The fact it was
shot on a phone isn’t relevant at all and fair game, but what is relevant is the fact it was
processed through an app that changes what was there when he shot them.” Litherland
sees the Hipstamatic as nothing less than a threat to the integrity of the entire field:
“photojournalism at it’s purest form is over and POYi just killed it.”26
Although the mention of “purity” certainly harkens back to Kittler’s comments on
the photograph’s chemical purification of information, Litherland’s rationale for
denouncing the Hipstamatic articulates a more indirect defense of the image as evidence.
As a photographer, he subscribes, as one would expect, to the importance of the artist’s
“hands” on the apparatus. It is the Hipstamatic’s automatism and inaccessible processing
which troubles him. They bar the techniques of the artist from composing the final
image. This appeal to the virtuosity of the artist replays the fairly well regulated binary
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discussed earlier: the image is either a virtuoso fabrication or a piece of empirical
evidence. In a studio, the artist manipulates images, transforming them into projections
of an individual imagination. In a lab, the scientist uses the image to certify observations,
capturing stills with the camera’s mechanical, unbiased operations. Both types are
directly connected to assertions of the image’s objectivity—one through subverting the
camera’s automated procedures, the other through letting the camera execute its
operations unmolested. Litherland seems to compound these two types, suggesting that
professional intervention is needed to discover the empirical content in a photograph.
A CNN column by Nick Stern returns to Litherland’s critique by calling attention
to the Hipstamatic’s problematic handling of empirical information. According to Stern,
the app betrays the trust we have invested in mechanical vision:
Every time a news organization uses a Hipstamatic or Instagram-style picture in a
news report, they are cheating us all. It's not the photographer who has
communicated the emotion into the images. It's not the pain, the suffering or the
horror that is showing through. It's the work of an app designer in Palo Alto who
decided that a nice shallow focus and dark faded border would bring out the best
in the image.27
Stern’s defense of journalism’s objectivity and the evidence of the camera stems from his
desire to see real “pain” and “suffering.” The problem with these apps is that they end up
only delivering a simulated pain and suffering. Whereas regular photography captures
the material world, the apps turn their lenses on themselves. Audiences are left with
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pictures of a machine’s mind. For a scapegoat Stern’s blame falls on an unqualified
human intercessor—the Palo Alto programmer, who has warped the parameters of the
camera’s mechanical objectivity.
Stern and Litherland both received a good deal of attention for their comments.
Most of the responses objected to their dismissal of the photo apps. The criticism
inspired Litherland to give the technology a second chance. He posted a follow-up to his
blog admitting that applications like the Hipstamatic did have their value as entertaining
devices. He made it clear, though, that he was still nervous about its impact on
photojournalism:
What I haven’t changed my mind on its role in photojournalism [sic]. I think it’s
a slippery slope of ethics to be masking and changing content for news
stories. For feature stories, illustrations, and work not labeled as news? Sure and
please do. I think there is one last holdout of truthiness out there, though, and
that is documentary photojournalism. It is a field that should adhere to its own set
of rules and ethics, no matter how the world changes around it. I’ll preach that
until it dies (don’t worry, I’m not going there).28
Litherland feels that the Hipstamatic is too inconsistent to serve as an appropriate tool
when hard facts are needed. Even Winter agrees with this sentiment. His response to
Litherland in the New York Times photography blog, rationalizes his use of the
Hipstamatic by explaining the story that accompanied the picture was an “essay not a
news story.” Thus, the photojournalists reach common ground: certain news stories
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require the mechanical objectivity of the camera, and the filters of the Hipstamatic, they
conclude, can obscure a more authentic means of reporting the facts.
Not all photojournalists are in agreement. Ted Kuwayama exclusively used the
Hipstamatic to document the daily lives of U.S. Marines stationed in Afghanistan. The
effort was part of the Basetrack Project—Kuwayama’s non-profit initiative to bring
portraits of the war to social media platforms. Speaking about his choice of the
Hipstamatic, Kuwayama argues that mainstream journalism is more concerned with an
“aesthetic...not an ethic.” Objectivism has calcified into a visual style that has little to do
with the larger mission of reporting. His selection of the app, therefore, was meant to
issue a challenge to the field. He recognizes that the Hipstamatic’s images represent a
populist, accessible medium and hopes they “demystify this whole process of
photojournalism.”29
Part of that demystification involves refashioning the photographer’s relationship
to subjects, particularly through more mobile and accessible cameras. Kuwayama and
other Basetrack photojournalists, for example, enjoyed the portability of the iPhone.
They argue that its subtle and familiar presence allowed them to capture more intimate
glimpses of their subjects than if they had been aiming a large DSLR camera. Winter
describes a similar experience: “Using the phone is discreet and casual and
unintimidating....[The soldiers] would have scattered the moment I raised my 5D with a
big 24-70 lens attached. But with the phone, the men were very comfortable. They always
laughed when they saw me shooting with it while professional cameras hung from my
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Figure 2. Photograph by Safi, a flight attendant
for Emerites airline. Safi took the picture after
Balazs Gardi leant him his phone. It was the first
image Safi had taken with the Hipstamatic. (from
“Vienna-Dubai Flight,” Basetrack, October 10,
2010, http://basetrack.org/2010/10/12/viennadubai-flight/) (CC BY-NC-ND).

Figure 1. Photograph by Balazs Gardi. The
image is of an Afghan dog fight. Gardi feared
that a police officer in attendance might prevent
him from taking pictures, but, instead, the
official was too busy taking pictures with his own
mobile phone. (from “The Mazari Tiger,”
Basetrack, February 18, 2011,
http://basetrack.org/2011/02/18/the-mazaritiger/) (CC BY-NC-ND).

shoulders.” The mobile phone, for most people, is an everyday camera. It is the same
instrument used to take pictures of pets, children, friends, lovers. The sight of a
professional photographer wielding an iPhone is like catching a dentist using a
toothbrush. Both instruments give the impression of a domestic procedure; its ordained
operator is laicized, and the object of the procedure is allowed a vicarious agency—this is
something I do. When Basetrack photographer Balazs Gardi was photographing with his
iPhone, soldiers, airline pilots and Afghans would even ask him to play with the app
themselves, taking their own pictures with the Hipstamatic (fig. 1 & 2).30 The iPhone,
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Kuwayama explains, fits with the group’s overall commitment to using technology that is
accessible to anyone, like its Facebook page and custom WordPress site. Each piece of
technology reassures viewers of accessibility—even a war on the other side of the world.
In fact, so intimate and revealing were the Basetrack daily dispatches that they ultimately
doomed the project: six months after its inception, in February of 2011, the US military
judged the project too much of a security liability and shut the embed down.
Besides accessibility, three other points illustrate the Hipstamatic’s threat to
mechanical objectivity. The first is the collection of representative samples. Again, as
Daston and Galison emphasize, the drive of mechanical objectivity is to collect individual
phenomena, replete with differences that describe the range of the normal. If a camera is
incapable of distinguishing differences between shots, then it would certainly lose this tie
to objectivism. The Hipstamatic, according to its critics, exhibits this very incapacity. It
has a consistent gloss. Litherland writes, “ I have a Photoshop action on my desktop that
is titled “POYi filter” I made it as a joke. It rotates an image 20 degrees, adds a heavy
vignette, throws in a bit of grain, and converts to grayscale.”31 In mocking the
Hipstamatic’s programming scripts, Litherland is taking issue with an automation that
endangers the camera’s sensitivity to individualizing detail. Its filters impede it from
making visual phenomena discrete.
A second threat is distance. The Hipstamatic estranges its operator from the
scene of the photographic event. Although Daston & Galison maintain that this is a goal
of mechanical objectivity, they also stress the importance of researchers monitoring the
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photographing of specimens: “once so policed, and presumably only then, could the
photographic process be elevated to a special epistemic status.”32 The claim resonates with
Litherland’s frustration over not being more involved with the processes of development.
The Hipstamatic bars any such oversight. In fact, it flaunts this obstruction. The app
digitally “clouds” the camera’s viewfinder to recreate the smudges and faulty transparency
of plastic windows in toy cameras. And the Hipstamatic provides no preview of how its
final image will be rendered.
Damon Winter, in defending his third-place image, contends that there is no
difference between the Hipstamatic’s automations and the material restrictions of analog
cameras. He offers the example of POYi’s first place photograph. It was shot in black and
white and focuses on a Hmong man clutching a child against a blurred background.33
Winter proposes that its focal length, film stock, and processing predetermined much of
its final visual style. Ultimately, he argues, there is little difference between these
selections and the Hipstamatic’s “choices.”
One has to admit, though, that KC Ortiz, the photographer of the first-place
image, was able to control the development of the final print. Whether it was made in a
darkroom or scanned into editing software, Ortiz had an opportunity to “correct” the
final look. Winter subtly acknowledges this distinction with his qualifications that his
photo was not used for a hard news piece and that he wished he could have used “a
program that applied less of an effect.”
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A third and even more direct threat to mechanical objectivity is the Hipstamatic’s
destructive editing: it permanently marks the image with its modifications. In doing so, it
strips away resolution from the original photo. Most famously, it crops pictures to a
square format, discarding anything captured in an iPhone’s native 4:3 aspect ratio.
Depending on the ‘roll’ or ‘lens’ selected, the app might also digitally matte an image,
scratch an image, add noise, add grain, add flares, decrease the midlevel values, decrease
the depth of field, decrease color levels, desaturate, speckle, gloss, blur, and burn. In total,
its effects conceal information. Its additions are always subtractions.
Photographer and sociologist Nathan Jurgenson and Gizmodo commentator Matt
Buchanan have suggested that the Hipstamatic’s destructive filters capitalize on the
camera phone’s origin as a low-resolution format.34 A cell phone camera from 2004, for
example, could boast only a single megapixel of resolution and reacted rather bluntly in
all but the best lighting situations. Still, the conveniences they offered, including the
ability to send images to other phones over MMS networks, made them wildly popular.35
They were mobile, miniature toy cameras that defined a generation’s first foray into
photography. The Hipstamatic, with its destructive additions, nostalgically harkens back
to this low-tech aesthetic.
In fact, Jurgenson finds the Hipstamatic’s nostalgia running even deeper. He
contends that its filters attempt to recapture procedures of yesteryear, while remaining
conveniently free of their material history. He sees the standardized formulas that drive
these outcomes not only diminishing the range of photographic expression, but also
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dangerously glossing present-day scenes of war. The Hipstamatic drapes these scenes
with visual queues associated with battles safely fought and ended, conflicts that have
been archived and contextualized in the historical record. The visual mimicry imposes
nostalgic meaning on a modern landscape, which would otherwise remain troublingly
indeterminate. Jurgenson terms the Hipstamatic images “faux-vintage photographs.”36
They are like new t-shirts at a department store that reprints a design from the 1980s only
distressing it to imitate years of weather-beaten wear. They sell the comfort of the
familiar with the authenticity of aged cultural commodities.
I do not wish to refute any of these criticisms of the Hipstamatic, but I would like
to re-contextualize them through a discussion of photonic rhetorics. As we have seen,
photo apps create challenges to mechanical objectivity. Those same challenges, however,
also indicate strategies emerging in visual communication, modes of sense-making which
are more entangled with the persuasive effects of light. In the automation of these photo
apps, we ironically find structures of a more subjective mode of perception. As much as
the Hipstamatic’s inaccessible scripts would seem to lead to a standardized, even
universalized style, they inevitably yield more personalized images.

Machine Tricks
A way to investigate this concept of personalized automation is through a disagreement
between the aesthetic philosopher Nelson Goodman and art historian E.H. Gombrich.
Goodman, in Languages of Art, criticizes Gombrich’s belief in perspective as an a-
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historical construct.37 In Goodman’s estimation, any claim of an objective, noninterpretive representation of a material object is absurd. He uses the description of train
tracks running into the distant background: “the artist who wants to produce a spatial
representation that the present-day Western eye will accept as faithful must defy the 'laws
of geometry.'” Physically speaking, train tracks never converge; yet we represent them
this way on a two-dimensional plane. They are a sign that signifies to those who can read
it that these things are continuously parallel.38 Perspective, Goodman believes, must be
learned. Even when it is, differences will still arise because of the conditions of its
viewing. The angle of light will change from one position to the next. He adds, "even
where light rays and the momentary external conditions are the same, the preceding train
of visual experience, together with information gathered from all sources, can make a vast
difference in what is seen." Learned convention, physical properties of light, and the
unique experience of the individual erode any idea of universal perspective or a machine
that might reliably and faithfully reproduce it.
Goodman might very well have enjoyed the Hipstamatic. It brings to the surface
assumptions that regularly remain hidden in the photographic act of communication.
The filters foreground visual conventions, the play of light, and historical experience as
conditions for the legibility of an image. Elements that might otherwise have been
assumed to be inherent to the image’s “truth” suddenly become optional. By simply
changing the aspect ratio and color balance of default iPhone photos, the Hipstamatic
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depicts all other photos as not-having-been-customized. Photographic vision becomes
(again) a much broader spectrum of decisions.
It must be admitted that although the Hipstamatic allows one to intervene in
some of the conventions of photographic vision, it makes these processes largely
impenetrable. Little access is given to the filters beyond ‘selected’ or ‘not selected,’ turned
on or turned off. The scripts are numbered and closed. Each automated sensibility
reveals its presence while concealing its trick.
In his response to Goodman’s criticism, Gombrich provides an interesting way to
interpret this closed trick. He argues that even though some conventions of perspective
might be learned, optical illusions demonstrate that there exist some commonalities in
subjective responses to visual phenomena. He recalls a study by Robert Thouless in
which a coin on a table always appeared to be more inclined toward the viewer than it
should given the rules of geometry. From this, Gombrich posits, “there is indeed
something compelling in the trick”—there is consistency to the inconsistency in the
transformations of the real into the sensory. What interests him is the “perspective
renderings,” or optical disturbances that “unsettle our perceptions” and wake us up to the
trick. But he adds, “pictures constructed on a tightly knit system of perspective (which is
imitated by the camera) tend to resist this process. It takes a special effort and much
unlearning of reactions to see them merely as things. The very way they dissolve and
transform themselves approximates them to that elusive experience we describe as the
phenomenal world."39 A photograph is constructed with conventions so similar to the
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tricks of human vision that the viewing experience layers seamlessly onto assumptions
and habits learned from eyesight. The default settings of an iPhone, or of any digital
camera for that matter, reconstruct this “tightly knit” system of ocular perception.
Perspective, white balance, focus—it has all been calculated to ‘replay’ the tricks of vision.
The Hipstamatic, on the other hand, resists being dictated to by the conventions of vision.
It unravels the system and (re)exposes the image as a thing unto itself, another mode of
seeing, comparable but unlike our own. In doing so, it begs us to evaluate how an image
is seen. How is the machine accomplishing the seeing? What tricks has it played with
light? And how are they related our own?
These questions necessitate attention to the properties of light. The Hipstamatic
testifies, in shot after shot—despite its scripts—that the properties of light are by no
means fixed quantities nor do they operate by way of restrictive formulas. Rather, they
are contingent and wily agencies, revealing as much as they conceal. With each ‘print,’
the app corroborates Goodman’s claim that “the behavior of light,” despite its consistent
physical properties, “sanctions neither our usual nor any other way of rendering space.”40
Instead, the Hipstamatic capitalizes on the persuasive effects of light and readily admits
its peculiar method of interpreting them. Change the filter to change the method. The
effects are tenuous modes of invention within fluctuating assemblages of light. They are
styles that flaunt their idiosyncrasies. No mode ever becomes the mode, no hierarchy of
settings or a combination more authoritative than the last.41 They are filters meant to be
changed.
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With its tricks visible and their secrets disguised, the Hipstamatic invites users to
try to perform them. To do so, the user must accept that some transformations and
agencies lie beyond the operator’s control. Basetrack photographer Rita Leistner
compares this trade-off to trashing “all your training” and “all your experience” and
substituting it “with a Green Lantern Magic Power Ring that anyone could use.”42
Although overstated, Leistner’s comparison emphasizes the Hipstamatic’s investment in
occult metamorphoses. Like a superhero’s intergalactic power ring, its “skills” and
“powers” transform the behaviors of light into dazzling displays. Every image
“developed” by the Hipstamatic entails some degree of surprise, a pleasant or unpleasant
disturbance between expectations and output, similar to the unpredictability that was
common in the development of Polaroids, or prints picked-up at the pharmacy, when an
instant captured by the camera resolves itself far beyond the reach of expectations and
memory. The only difference with the Hipstamatic is that it has been engineered to
dramatize this subversion of photographic intentionality. Its delivery caricatures our
efforts to make vision legible. It distorts what we hope to preserve of our perception of
light. This effect can never be de-selected. Its spell is cast no matter what filter we
choose.
As much as the transformations are meant to startle, the operator is invited to
wield the ring and imagine what metamorphosis it might work next. This is its game:
play and be played. The rules require a kind of pattern recognition: what are the
persuasive tendencies of light? After all, the app is not an unlimited wonder-worker. It
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performs its tricks by exaggerating several persistent rhetorical effects of light—certain
conditions that affect perception in fairly reliable ways. I am referring again to Richard
Kelly’s casts of light, described in the previous chapter as a way of approaching photonic
rhetorics. Awareness of these patterns will not unlock the code to the game nor will it
unmask the alterity of light, but it will expand the interactions available through the app
and deepen strategies for harnessing the persuasive possibilities of light.
First, it should be noted that the Basetrack photographers often shot with a
consistent set of Hipstamatic filters. Ina’s 69 film was usually paired with the John S lens.
Leistner claimed this duo produced the least “radical” of effects. The combination tends
to boost areas of clarity against areas of obscurity. It narrows the depth of field, focusing
some areas of the image, blurring others. It also increases the contrast, deepening the
black values of an image and elevating its highlights. The ultimate composite of these
filters inevitably leads to strong distinctions—the effect of “focal glow.”43 When a
helicopter flies over a forward operating base, the craft is transformed into a prehistoric
bird (fig. 3). The behemoth seems to carry a light all its own. It is backlit by the sun, and
the camera’s sensors compensate by casting the land and Marines below into darkness.
Only the brightest highlights on their helmets and jackets read in the image. Whereas
most cameras would overexpose the sky, blowing it out to intense whites, the Hipstamatic
paints the sky in circles of yellow, green, blue, and finally black at the edge of the photo
where it has been vignetted into a night sky. The lighting ensures that the background
object will take the foreground; all eyes will regard the passing of this creature.
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Figure 3. Photograph by David Gurman (from
“Rotor Wash,” Basetrack, October 10, 2010,
http://basetrack.org/2010/10/10/just-got-here-2/)
(CC BY-NC-ND).

Figure 4. Photograph by David Gurman (from
“Rotor Wash,” Basetrack, October 10, 2010,
http://basetrack.org/2010/10/10/just-got-here-2/)
(CC BY-NC-ND).

Figure 5. Photograph by Teru Kuwayama (from
“SSgt Gonzales & Alpha Co,” Basetrack, October
15, 2010, http://basetrack.org/
2010/10/15/ssgt-gonzales-alpha-co/) (CC BYNC-ND).
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A similar style is used when a helicopter is photographed in the distance, airlifting
civilians to safety from a bombed airbase (fig. 4). Here the Hipstamatic accents the
rotorcraft by illuminating a phosphorescent draft of air in an otherwise navy horizon.
The smoke flickers to life through the filter. The helicopter’s descent to the bottom of a
plume of light suggests both destruction and salvation. The divisions of light form a vigil
candle around the wick of the helicopter.
In yet another scene, a staff sergeant stands before his company and gestures
toward the horizon (fig. 5). The contrast of sunlight on his profile against the shadows
across his audience cut his figure from his surroundings. He has been made into a mythic
hero: a baroque bronze statue or a die-cut action figure model. The disparity of values
and the limited color palette announce that this man must be reckoned with, simply for
his ability to so authoritatively distinguish himself from the landscape. Kuwayama’s
framing combined with the Hipstamatic’s reading of focal glow demands we listen to
him. He is the protagonist of the image, the one who will speak for the composition.
As much as the filters can accent the effect of focal glow, they can also cover the
world in a pervasive sameness, harmonizing even the most diverse elements. The effect is
best observed in the Hipstamatic’s Kaimal Mark II lens, which washes images in a
uniform haze of magenta, what Kelly would identify as “ambient luminescence.” The
preferred filters of the Basetrack project achieve a similar effect with hues of blue and
green. Because of the wartime setting, the consequences of this rhetorical cast are even
more profound. When an Afghan and U.S soldier grasp each other’s hand, their fingers
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Figure 6. Photograph by Balazs Gardi (from
“Kunder Village: Make Friends and Influence
People,” Basetrack, October 27, 2010,
http://basetrack.org/2010/10/27/kunder-villagetrying-to-make-friends-and-influence-people/)
(CC BY-NC-ND).

Figure 7. Photograph by Balazs Gardi (from
“Kunder Village: Make Friends and Influence
People,” Basetrack, October 27, 2010,
http://basetrack.org/2010/10/27/kunder-villagetrying-to-make-friends-and-influence-people/)
(CC BY-NC-ND).

Figure 8. From Basetrack: One-Eight, open source publication, May 30 2011,
http://basetrack.org/2011/05/30/basetrack-one-eight/ (CC BY-NC-ND).
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intertwine with identical swatches of green peppered throughout their skin and sleeves.
Their agreement is sealed in a sameness of color (fig. 6).
The logic of ambient luminescence carries over to images that might otherwise be
construed as confrontational or oppositional, like a soldier patting down an Afghan man
(fig. 7). The Hipstamatic camouflages the soldier’s camouflage, overlaying the uniform,
the landscape, and the Afghan’s civilian clothes with a palette of mint and jaundice
yellow. The pat-down alludes to an embrace. Or when a marine (tan) escorts a bound
Afghan prisoner (bluish-gray), the dense blacks and desaturated highlights are dispersed
enough to point to an equilibrium, to a momentary middle ground. Perhaps the two have
gone out for an evening stroll (fig. 8).
The Hipstamatic is perhaps best known for maximizing the impact of Kelly’s third
cast, the “play of brilliants.” It is the chance flicker of light, the fleeting sparkle that owes
its life to a particular angle, a particular movement, a happenstance arrangement of an
assemblage. With this perceptual trick, Basetrack photographers are able to execute their
most arresting images with the Hipstamatic. Sunlight on a soldier’s helmet, for example,
becomes so radiant it appears like a Pentecostal visitation. So often the faces of children
are also caught in this contingent flash. In many of the photos they appear like specters,
lurching into the foreground or hidden in the background. In either position, the light
differentiates them as evanescent beings—rare creatures seldom glimpsed in a landscape
overrun with men and guns (fig. 9 & 10).
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Figure 9. Photograph by Balazs Gardi (from “Just
Like Any Another Operation: Part Four: The IED,”
Basetrack, December 31, 2010, http://basetrack.org/
2010/11/07/just-like-any-another-operation-partfour-the-ied/) (CC BY-NC-ND).

Figure 10. Photograph by Balazs Gardi (from “In
Front of the FOB,” Basetrack, December 31, 2010,
http://basetrack.org/2010/12/31/in-front-of-thefob/) (CC BY-NC-ND).

Figure 11. From Basetrack: One-Eight, open source publication, May 30 2011,
http://basetrack.org/2011/05/30/basetrack-one-eight/ (CC BY-NC-ND).
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The paradigmatic Basetrack child stands against a tree while two US soldiers walk
past, their rifles readied for battle. From the photographer’s angle and through the
iPhone’s sensor, the sun explodes in a tree above the child. Beams of its light shoot down,
shielding the child from whatever mission or danger drives the soldier forward (fig. 11).
This play of brilliants aligns with the Hipstamatic’s central directive. It is
configured to remind us of fortune in any photographic event. The contingency does not
reveal individuating detail. Quite the opposite: it takes place in the erasure of detail—
blinding flares, smudges of grain, signs of distress, inconsistencies of color fields. Marks
like these in early photographs would often be left as signs of a machine’s impartiality,
testament to an untampered image. Yet the Hipstamatic’s digital marks simulate
commonplace flaws. With every artificial click of its shutter, the app reminds its users
that the image will be remarkable as much for what it reveals as for what it conceals. An
aesthetic built on this maxim could potentially be a consolation or a threat for a
photojournalist facing the problem of depicting the horror of war. No matter how
technologically advanced the apparatus, no matter how many pixels, or how high the
definition, the Hipstamatic provides the indelible digital mark of something that has been
left out. It avows that that all things have not been captured by the machine. The facts
within have been utterly distorted. Additionally, these digital marks carry consequences
for photography at large. They hint that their distortion might never be shut off. They
tease every machine, every image—they tease vision itself—that in each there is a mark.
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One Basetrack image encapsulates this re-scripted photography. A Marine wears
an improvised plastic mask to protect himself from the sand and wind (fig. 12). Through
the Hipstamatic’s filters, he takes on the appearance of a post-apocalyptic figure crudely
disguised and slouching across a beaten landscape. The image featured prominently
when the Basetrack photographs were exhibited at the New York Photo Festival.44 Its
resonance is clear: aesthetic and subject have combined. The image declares that this is a
new face of the war. This is a different vision of the campaign in Afghanistan. This is the
news as you have never seen it before. At the same time, the image conceals itself. It has
no face. The winds have literally occluded its individuating details. Yet it remains
personal, an aesthetic willfully outside the confines of journalistic objectivity. This is a
subjectivity without a fixed, discernable subject.
With the Hipstamatic, digital stills become mysteriously more scripted and more

Figure 12. Photograph by Balazs Gardi (from
“Dust Storm Approaches Combat Outpost 7171,”
Basetrack, November 14, 2010,
http://basetrack.org/2010/11/14/dust-stormapproaches-combat-outpost-7171/ (CC BY-NCND).
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contingent—a flirtation among operator, apparatus, and light. It is easy to dismiss this as
nostalgia, or as a longing for authenticity that analog formats captured long ago. The
apps themselves encourage this comparison in their marketing campaigns (Camera+
actually names one of its filters “nostalgia”; it belongs to the “I [heart] analog” package).
Most effects are specifically designed to simulate old processes and technologies.
Nevertheless, it would be an oversight to dismiss the apps as simply another form of
mimesis—a desire to reproduce and reclaim an old cultural cache. Arguments that the
Hipstamatic elevates style over substance need to be contextualized within this history of
the photograph as evidence. The resistance of these photo apps to the dominant
application of mechanical objectivity provides opportunities to re-evaluate our own
preconceptions about the camera’s relationship to truth.
Furthermore, by using its self-referential style to exaggerate the structures of light,
these photo apps sell the pleasure and possibilities of using digital instruments to explore
the rhetoric of visual perception—an approach to the alterity of light that has long been
confined to the province of artists or bracketed by science. In this way, the Hipstamatic’s
‘degradation’ of the image is not a strict erasure. Its simulation of old styles betrays much
more than simply a yearning to make the present past. Rather, we might think of the
authenticity as that which comes from resisting a particular brand of mediation, namely
the “objective” style of translation into high definition. By tagging the clarity of photos,
the Hipstamatic gestures to a subjectivity of perception, which is mediated by a much
more inaccessible and multiform script. Its images are not so easily resolved.
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CHAPTER 4

VIDEO CLIPS
LONG TAKES AND EMBODIED RHYTHMS

Pier Paolo Pasolini requests that we “consider the short sixteen-millimeter film of
Kennedy's death. Shot by a spectator in the crowd, it is a long take, the most
typical long take imaginable.”
The twenty-six second sequence of President John F. Kennedy’s death,
filmed by Abraham Zapruder, serves as a touchstone for Pasolini’s reflections on
uncut cinema. The long take is noteworthy for its unbroken continuity and its
reproduction of the “present tense.” It is a personal form, Pasolini argues, which
instantiates singular experiences of time and “coincides with human action.” The
Zapruder film highlights not only this individualism of the long take, but also its
connections to death and the struggle for meaning.1
The Zapruder film is also a paradigm of the contemporary digital video
clip.
As much as we tend to think of digital imagemaking in terms of
fragmentation and short attention spans, the long take that Pasolini describes has
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become the default style of communicating with moving images. It is the form of
video chat and many video games, not to mention citizen journalism, video
diaries, skateboarding videos, surveillance footage, family movies, and clips of pet
tricks. The long take’s rise in popularity is due partly to convenience. It is simply
easier to shoot and upload an unedited video than to cut together a compilation.
The other reason is digital accessibility. Since tape has been replaced by disk
space, the cost of keeping a camera running is largely negligible, apart from
demands on memory.
Despite these changes, montage—the long take’s editorial foil—continues
to be the primary style of cinema and television. Short clips and quick cuts are
also frequently used online in remixes, mashups and compilation videos. Still, in
daily practice, montage has been largely relegated to a boutique role—a luxury, if
one has the time and resources. Indeed, it is the long take, or the sequence shot,
that has come to define our contemporary relationship with the moving image.
In this chapter I argue that the long take offers its users the ability to
compose with two rhythms: one that archives a present pattern, and another that
distorts it. This phasing of time fascinatingly corresponds to our own biological
responses to light, our own circadian rhythms, and the struggle to entrain
ourselves to the indeterminate events that comprise lived experience. But to
explore these inventive rhetorics and rhythms, we must first treat the compulsion
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to cut, which since the 1980s, has steered discussions away from longer
performances with light.

Montage Fever
“The substance of cinema is therefore an endless long take, as is reality to our
senses for as long as we are able to see and feel (a long take that ends with the end
of our lives); and this long take is nothing but the reproduction of the language of
reality. In other words it is the reproduction of the present.”
—Pasolini2

The long take is rarely discussed as a new media practice. For one, the form is
often associated with the “auteurs” of Hollywood, not everyday camera-wielding
consumers. As an expression, "the long take," and especially its more
professional-sounding cousin, the “sequence shot,” conjures associations of
expertise and cinematic marvel. “The long take” evokes memories of Martin
Scorcese’s steadicam in Goodfellas—the tracking shot that follows Henry Hill (Ray
Liotta) and Karen (Loraine Brocco) through the Copacabana nightclub.3 “The
long take” also seems to carry art house credentials, appropriate for films like
Andy Warhol’s Sleep (a five-hour shot of a man sleeping) and Empire (an eighthour shot of the Empire State building…standing). Long sequence shots also
seem to go hand-in-hand with big budgets, like the money Alfonso Cuarón spent
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to build a car capable of housing a camera rig that could travel from back seat to
front for a dazzling sequence in Children of Men. "The long take" seems like it
needs talented performers, like Chaplin, Keaton, or Jacques Tati, whose comedic
acrobatics can keep a sequence brimming with life. One would have to
extensively plan, like Andrea Sokurov, who filmed an entire feature in one
unbroken take through the Russian Hermitage Museum, 96 minutes of
continuous shooting culminating in an enormous ensemble waltz. Dances need
to be choreographed, fights need to be blocked, like those in Park Chan-wook’s
Oldboy, whose protagonist uses a hammer to beat and maim his way down a
seemingly endless corridor of adversaries, while the camera refuses to cut. Those
sequences come to life with a Bruce Lee. A Gene Kelly. Altman’s irony. Leone’s
vistas. Kubrick’s detail. Ozu’s observational eye. 4 In sum, the long take requires
company that does not seem to come cheaply. Certainly, it is not the stuff of
smartphone shooting.
Another reason for the lack of attention to long sequence shooting might
be the prestige afforded to montage theory in cinema studies. Since the seminal
work of Lev Kuleshov and Sergei Eisenstein, the art of filmic technique has often
been associated with pictorial juxtaposition. For these early Russian innovators,
meaning and emotional resonance was shaped in the difference between two
images. For example, Eisenstein in the famous Odessa Steps scene of Battleship
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Potemkin intercuts among czarist troop movements, rifle shots, and peasant faces
to convey the terror of a massacre.
Likewise, his contemporary, Kuleshov, tested montage albeit on a smaller
scale. He wanted to demonstrate the difference of effects between cutting from a
famous actor to bowl of soup and cutting from the same actor to a coffin.5
Kuleshov’s experiment was memorably re-enacted by Alfred Hitchcock for a
Canadian television show in 1964. The episode centered on Hitchcock’s
demonstration of what he calls “pure cinematics,” which for him meant “the
assembly of film,” or montage. The show itself cuts between an interview with
Hitchcock and Hitchcock’s own version of Kuleshov’s experiment. His version
opens with Hitchcock filling a medium close-up. That shot is paired with his
point-of-view of a woman playing with a young child on the grass. The film cuts
back to the close-up of Hitchcock smiling. Hitchcock explains in a voice over that
the edit constructs a character that “is a kindly man. He is sympathetic.” The
same close-up and reaction shot are then paired with a girl in a bikini. “What is
he now?” Hitchcock asks about his own image. “A dirty old man. He’s no longer
the benign gentleman who loves babies....That’s what film can do for you.” The
“you” in this last comment is telling. The pronoun refers to us, his audience,
explaining that montage is the unique service the filmmaker can offer us. It is the
conduit for his ideas. The point is emphasized by Hitchcock casting himself in the
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role of the onlooker. It all suggests that the filmmaker is the performer and
author of an idea; the audience is its recipient.6
This authoritative relationship between filmmaker and audience is central
to Eisenstein’s theory of montage. Whereas Kuleshov speaks of montage as the
“brick-by-brick” building of cinematic experience—the assemblage of a formal
structure for spectators—Eisenstein is much more forceful. Montage, he claims,
grants the filmmaker a godlike, violent power, arranging shots as a series of
collisions. Eisenstein’s descriptions are overrun with images of war. He writes
that the “phalanx of montage pieces, of shots, should be compared to the series of
explosions of an internal combustion engine.” Its force “bursts” and “shatters”
and “splashes.” These “dynamics of montage serve as impulses driving forward
the total film.” He does admit that the single frame, or solitary shot (like a long
take), can replicate this conflict, but only on a much lesser scale. He feels it is
better to drive singular ideas into one another so that their “cage” might be
destroyed.7 Through this volatile and staccato rhythm, the sensibilities of the
filmmaker and the art of the medium rupture into light. As with Hitchcock, the
drive is unidirectional: filmmaker to spectator.
Far from being an outdated theory of early cinema, montage continues to
be retrofitted to apply to visual practices. In the 1980s its seemingly bellicose style
was closely linked with the pop culture phenomenon of MTV. Echoing
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Eisenstein’s descriptions of phalanxes, John Caldwell portrays MTV as a general,
who in the 1980s “marshaled many of the looks and tactics of the avant-garde.” It
disciplined them into a more palpable format—the music video.8 The new genre
championed rapid-cutting and fragmentation over longer durations and
continuity, capitalizing on montage’s rhythmic flexibility. Some critics like Carol
Vernallis celebrate this development, claiming MTV’s montage-style “exceeds the
functions of film editing largely through its responsiveness to musical features—
rhythmic, timbral, melodic and formal.”9 Others, like Wheeler Winston Dixon,
have not been so optimistic. His comments reflect many of the more cynical
opinions of the MTV style. He calls it “MTV hyperedited ‘shot fragment’ editing.”
According to him, it yields little more than the “hysterical blenderization of
visuals.”10 It jumps. It is disjointed. It is impatient.
For Mark Le Fanu, the style produces “cheap thrills,” which threaten a
more informed spectatorship. They erode “the patience to look--that is, to linger,
to explore, to risk boredom in the search of epiphany.” Already that practice
seems a distant memory, a value “that so long ago was part and parcel of the
serious cinema-going experience.”11
Many of these laments conveniently scapegoat a cable network for a range
of historical developments. Recounting a litany of similar objections to MTV,
Marco Calavita argues that the “‘MTV’ in the MTV aesthetic trope serves a
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predominantly symbolic function.”12 It gathers together a host of influences—
from international cinema styles like the Hong Kong action film to technological
developments, including the rise of nonlinear editing systems. It is this latter
association that is particularly important to theories of the long take. The MTV
trope sets up a pervasive assumption that montage is allied with technological
innovation and the long take indicates a more organic, “analog” experience of
vision.
The association holds firm years after MTV’s peak as a cultural icon, and
continues to assert that quick cutting is the archetypal style of digital media. It
seems to make sense, give the inherent fragmentation in pixel-based resolutions
and hyperactivity of code-based processing speeds. David Rodowick, for example,
contends that the very nature of “digital cinema” is “code,” whose discrete units
breakdown analog’s “continuity in space and movement,” replacing it with
“montage or combination.”13 Expanding on Rodowick’s work, David Shaviro in
Post Cinematic Affect links the deconstructive and recombinative features of
digital cinema to video games—the most likely candidate to assume MTV’s
scapegoat status of aesthetic provocateur. Electronic gaming in Shaviro’s
argument feeds the “hyperbolic, hyperactive A.D.D.-style montage” of postcinema.14
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These comparisons feel right. Given the anxieties of digital culture—its
speed, its standardizations, its presumed impact on human imagination—
hyperbolic montage seems like the perfect postmodern practice. But this
assumption brings a few problems. To start, its historical perspective is somewhat
restricted. In looking at a broad sample of films and measuring their Average
Shot Length (ASL), David Bordwell debunks the conventional wisdom that fastcutting and quick takes constitute a recent phenomenon coinciding with the rise
of MTV. Bordwell shows that the ASL of many contemporary movies is
comparable to that of the ASL of many films from the silent era. Cutting was
much quicker before bulkier equipment needed to record dialogue confined the
mobility of the camera. His conclusion echoes Calavita’s argument about the
complexity of forces behind the MTV trope, many of them technological in
nature.15 Of course, non-linear editing systems, which freed editors to cut without
scissors and to manipulate footage in a variety of novel ways, motivated the return
to a faster, more attenuated ASL in the 1980s. But other camera technologies had
a role in the change too. Better lenses, for example, influenced ASL. Bordwell
explains that their enhanced optics provided a more expansive and affordable
coverage model. Shooting tight with a shallow depth of field from multiple setups saved labor hours and gave directors more control over performances. As a
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result, backgrounds and full-body shots were more seldom seen in popular
cinema at the turn of the millennium.
Just as changes in the material constraints of filmmaking influenced the
reconfiguration of cinematic production and spectatorship in the 1980s, digital
camera technology has again reconfigured ASL. The convenience and
accessibility of cameras in networked phones, tablets, and laptops along with the
affordances of video sharing services have conspired to stage a renaissance for the
long take.

Rhythms of the Long Take
One of the most recurring criticisms of Eisenstein’s montage theory of cinema is
nicely (dis)embodied in Eric Cameron’s “Keeping Marlene Out of the Picture.”
Most of the video is a static framing of a forgettable lobby. We hear the high heels
of a woman about to enter the frame, and just as her body is going to cross into
view, the camera cuts. These “cut-outs” are alternated with extreme close-ups of a
nude female figure—one which never entirely takes the stage. Lived continuities
are sacrificed in favor of the filmmaker’s editorial decisions. All the audience can
collect are fractured pieces.16
Cameron’s film nicely illustrates Andrei Tarkovsky’s main complaint with
montage cinema and Eisensteinian conceptions of technique. He asserts,
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“Eisenstein makes thought into a despot: it leaves no ‘air.’”17 For Tarkovsky,
montage is too concerned with the communication of the filmmaker’s ideas.
Tarkovsky would rather let the world breathe into his shots. He would rather let
the lens linger with characters, explore spaces, or simply be still and observe. He
writes, “I am convinced that it is rhythm, and not editing, as people tend to think,
that is the main formative element of cinema.”18
His film Solaris provides one of numerous examples of this “rhythm” in
his work. Solaris tells the story of a man’s fleeting visions of his wife who has been
dead some seven years. The narrative, which is mostly set in outer space, is
framed by matching long takes of thin grasses undulating underwater.19 The reeds
ripple and sway. The camera watches them long enough that the motion becomes
an alien undertow, foreshadowing and concluding the protagonist’s otherworldly
encounters with his wife. These shots are more meditative than explosive.
Haunting, not startling. They flow; they do not collide.
But these words are all too abstract to helpfully describe the rhythms
Tarkovsky is referring to in the long take. Bazin suggests, “duration” could still
serve as an operative term. Any film, no matter how long its “take”—even in the
case of Sokurov’s or Warhol’s work—cannot escape the alpha and the omega.
There will always be a cut-in and cut-out. Long takes must start and they must
finish. Brian Henderson’s term for these first and final points are “intersequence
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cuts.”20 Vida T. Johnson and Graham Petrie actually counted them in Tarkovsky’s
films to measure his pacing. They note that the ASL in Ivan’s Childhood often
hovers between two and three minutes—“brief by Tarkovsky’s later standards, yet
long enough to impose a measured and studied rhythm on the film.”21
That is one way to measure the rhythm of the long take. However,
Tarkovsky suggests that these intersequence cuts are not the beats that interest
him. “Rhythm,” he says quite bluntly, “is not the metrical sequence of pieces.”22
Another alternative is to study the camera’s movement. Johnson and Petrie claim
that this too can establish a sense of pacing. With pans and tracking shots,
Tarkovsky avoids “visual monotony because of the constant movement of the
camera.”23 Still, the bookend shots of Solaris’s grasses are mostly static, and many
long takes in cinema do not move the camera at all.
Tarkovsky offers yet another term to solve the riddle: “what makes
[rhythm] is the time-thrust within the frames.” This “thrust” reaches beyond the
movement of the grass or any other filmed object. It is the unique fluctuations of
our own response to a visual take of light over time. To illustrate this point,
Tarkovsky contrasts film to music. While music can be arranged in a
prefabricated schema, producing an “abstract” effect from the tightly controlled
exertions of musicians, “cinema, on the other hand, is able to record time in
outward and visible signs, recognizable to the feelings.”24 Tarkovsky is gesturing to
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the indexicality of the camera—it’s ability to make legible the visible phenomena
of the world. It all becomes “recognizable to the feelings” because we are naturally
responsive, at a physiological level, to these fluctuations of unscripted visual
stimuli.
Bazin mostly agrees with this conclusion. For him, the long take’s
openness to space-time allows it to put on display alterities from the visible world.
This openness to continuous durations is particularly important for the realism of
documentary films like Nanook of the North and Where Vultures Fly. The long
take’s “respect” for “spatial unity” is what creates correspondence. He explains,
“realism here resides in the homogeneity of the space;” it produces a mimetic
“spatial flow of the action” in real time. 25
Of course, there are problems when asserting that a technology is able to
capture reality. It builds on assumptions of the camera’s mechanical objectivity
and overlooks the differential scripts of apparatuses. It also carries troubling
ramifications for art and aesthetics. Brian Henderson scrutinizes these points in
his criticism of Bazin. In Henderson’s view, the spatial unity that Bazin promotes
ultimately equates the aesthetic with the real and therefore transforms everything
that exists into art.26 A more phenomenological problem with Bazin’s realism is
framed in Heidegger’s “On the Essence of Truth” in which he attacks the
assumptions of correspondence theory. His objects to reducing truth to a double
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for that which is made visible. The problem, as he sees it, is that anything which
resists making itself clearly and empirically present—anything which refuses to
correspond to that which can be known—must be excluded from the domain of
truth. Heidegger proposes instead to clear a space for “nonaccord” as a pathway
to truth.27
That being said, Bazin’s (and Tarkovsky’s) notion of the real is much more
nuanced than Henderson suggests. Bazin does suggest pathways through noncorrespondence. He speaks of the fluctuations between stylization and realism,
indicating that power is produced in the irresolution between the two. When
Bazin discusses Robert Bresson’s The Diary of a Country Priest, he claims, “It
would be in vain to look for its devastating beauty simply in what is explicit.”
With its long sequence shots, it functions rather by an “accretion of effectiveness,”
which is “not due to the editing” but builds up instead as a kind of “static
energy.”28 For Bazin, the fluctuation between the concrete and the abstract
constructs a film’s inquiry into indeterminate reality.
Similarly, Tarkovsky’s “outward and visible signs” are not a
straightforward index of time. The flowing grasses do not merely make explicit
the activity of underwater plant life. They are not simply documents of grass’s
movements, its colors, its lengths and widths. They point to something more
elusive. They thrust in time towards something that does not correspond.
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An Important Aside on Embodied Long Takes
The effects of rhythmic accord and nonaccord are inscribed in our own daily
exchanges with light. If the long take creates, as Bazin says, a “spatial unity” and
“concrete duration,” in reaction to the passage of light, then our eyes themselves
can also be said to be constantly responding the rhythms of long takes.29 Recent
studies in the science of circadian rhythms have demonstrated that
photoreceptors in our eyes respond to different wavelengths of light.
Photosensitive cells in the retina receive visible light and, based on its frequency,
relay signals through to the hypothalamus to adjust circadian rhythms. What
these adjustments mean depends on the structure of light received. Blue-shifted
light, common when the sun in brightest, triggers the body to produce, for one,
more dopamine, helping our biological systems rouse themselves from slumber
and provide us the energy we need to begin our day. On the other hand, redshifted light or the absence of light in general, will in turn compel the body to
raise its melatonin levels, signaling the same systems to begin relaxing for sleep.30
So powerful are the regulatory functions of light that night-shift workers
have been shown have suppressed melatonin levels. Because their bodies are
constantly exposed to high-frequency visible light (the same that can be found in
fluorescent lights and even television screens, or seeping through the curtains of
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the bedrooms in which they sleep during the day), their circadian clocks never
properly correspond or “entrain” to their schedule. The lack of melatonin has
been shown to put them at a higher risk of, among other things, breast cancer.
Fortunately, darkening their bedrooms can help phase their circadian clocks back
to a healthy rhythm.31
Light, as well as social cues, constantly phases our circadian clocks ahead
or behind in time. The production of sleep-inducing melatonin, for example, will
be delayed if a person is in an illuminated room, chatting with friends. Of
important note, though, is that the hypothalamus seems to have an internal
default to which it will constantly defer.32 Phase it as much as we like, and still our
body will recoil back to a set rhythm, which measures just over twenty-four hours.
Although watching long takes in a darkened room at night can phasedelay the production of melatonin, I am not suggesting that sequence shooting
will alter our endocrine levels.33 But the agency of light in phasing circadian
rhythms serves as an apt model for the rhetorical effects of this style of visual
composition. Just as our bodies have a set rhythm which we daily replay, so too
do our perceptual habits have a standard rhythm to which they will usually
default. Yet we can be phased. We can be shocked. Contingency and nonaccord
in the long take, like the wave patterns of light in our optical field, can phase us
into new patterns.
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Pregnant Spiders
Bazin’s static energy and Tarkovsky’s time thrust come to the screen not through
the mere indexing or transcription of familiar signs, but in their alienation. This
rhythmic fluctuation between concreteness and abstraction, correspondence and
non-correspondence, is strongly tied to the technique of the long take. Siegfried
Kracauer articulates a similar rhythm of filmmaking when he discusses Italian
Neorealists like Vittorio De Sica who best exhibit the camera’s “miracle of
movement.”34 The miracle occurs when the unexpected and unfamiliar suddenly
appear in the “blind spots of our mind.” By exposing the “transient,” the “refuse,”
the “invisible relationships” which are ordinarily not seen, Neorealist filmmakers
and their long takes reveal the flow of life.35
Kracauer calls this flow the street life of film. He believes that “the affinity
of film for haphazard contingencies is most strikingly demonstrated by its
unwavering susceptibility to the ‘street’—a term designed to cover not only the
street, particularly the city street, but also its various extensions.” Parks, shops,
any assemblage replete with the patterns and accidents of everyday life are places
where the long take can thrive in a network of spatial and temporal continuities.
Because it avoids rhythms that the filmmaker imposes, the long take can bring to a
surface, in Kracauer’s words, “a kind of life which is still connected, as if by
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umbilical cord, with the material phenomenon from which its emotional an
intellectual contents emerge.”36
The long take, therefore, does not blandly record daily interactions. Nor
does it exalt its material to an idyllic form. It would be counter-productive to
imagine Tarkovsky’s long takes as Nariman Skakov describes them, “where every
movement is a memento of a transcendental quality.”37 Rather, the intensities
fluctuate. The long take wanders into the banal only to retrieve images that
Kracauer describes as overflowing with “glittering, allusive, infinite life.”38 The
eruptions are striking because they emerge from familiar patterns. Habitual sights
flicker into uncommon instants. Miriam Hansen finds this oscillation in
Kracauer’s understanding of the camera: “the same indexicality that allows
photographic film to record and figure the world also inscribes the image with
moments of temporality and contingency that disfigure the representation.” The
realism of the long take grabs hold, or thrusts, because of the promise of
correspondence followed by the sudden phasal event of non-accord. Street life, in
other words, flows from familiarity that continuously deforms itself. Below are a
few contemporary examples of these phasal events:
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“Victim Fights Back”

39

The familiar: A bully threatens another boy. He
jabs; he taunts.
Then: his victim lifts him off the ground and body
slams him into the cement.

“Charlie bit my finger - again!”

40

The familiar: two young boys sit together in a
chair. The elder puts his finger in this younger’s
mouth.
Then: the elder’s cry of pain—“Chaaaaaarlie!”—
and the younger’s knowing smile. It is the
singsong tone, the timing of the smile, the creases
of the pained elder’s face that awakens an
uncommon accord within the scene.

“Kill it with Violence!”

41

The familiar: A portly spider waddles across a
cement floor. A bottle appears above the frame;
sounds of youthful encouragement, hints of
malice. Someone says, “Kill it with violence.” The
bottle smashes down into the spider’s thorax.
Then: its young scatter from the carnage,
hundreds of premature offspring blanketing the
floor. Screams. Shouts. Life has erupted.
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Virtuosity
Each of these video clips—all of them long takes—accentuates Kracauer’s notion
of street life. In fact, in some ways they play these rhythms more immediately
than their Hollywood counterparts. Unlike De Sica, Tarkovsky, and Bresson,
these clips are not exhibits of their shooter’s skill. Le Fanu reminds us that the
long take has traditionally been a sign of its maker’s “virtuosity.”42 It requires a
skill in choreography and execution that only the most skillful crews can
orchestrate. A sequence shot can be a stand-in for the quality of a film’s technical
expertise, such as in Hitchcock’s Rope, or Sokurov’s Russian Ark, or the singletake Uruguayan horror feature, The Silent House.43 Each of these films were
marketed and reviewed largely on the basis of their talented applications of the
long take.
In most digital clips, shot on phones and uploaded to video servers,
virtuosity and technical expertise are not a factor of success. The prestige that
these videos provide is measured instead by the significance of the events that
unfold and the impact they have on the community with which they are shared.
Cachet is granted on the basis of “being there” and capturing the remarkable.
Perhaps the best evidence of virtuosity’s diminished role is the fact that it
is so often disguised by professionals to make shots appear more “authentic.” In a
Gillette commercial with Roger Federer, the tennis star is shown chatting with a
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crewmember backstage before a commercial film shoot. They stand just outside
the confines of the set. Federer tells one crewmember to place a water bottle on
his head. Federer backs up, raises his racket, and fires a tennis ball straight at it.
The bottle shoots from the crewmember’s head to the ground, much to the delight
and surprise of all the backstage onlookers.
Although staged, the clip appears to be amateurly shot, shrewdly setting up
Gillette for a viral marketing campaign. Audiences are encouraged to ask: Was it
real? The clip attests to its own realism first and foremost through use of the long
take. A cut would diminish the seemingly impromptu transition from a backstage
chat into Federer’s trick (which, interestingly, he performs after backing up onto
the professional set). Second, the virtuosity of the camera operator is downplayed
to sell the scene as being haphazardly captured. The same tactic is used in movies
like The Blair Witch Project and Cloverfield, which affect an amateur, hand-held
style to blur the line between realism and their fictions. Everything that appears
onscreen seems to have been unchoreographed. 44 The camera jostles around, not
confident about what exactly it should be shooting. Federer actually says to the
“amateur” camera crew, “You guys want to maybe get out of the way a bit.” The
line emphasizes the continuous physical dimensions of the space. It also indicates
that the operators have no idea what will unfold next—as if to say to them and the
audience, “Get ready, the contingent is about to happen!” The Gillette ad even
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shows professional technical equipment in the background to verify this is not the
camera package that the operator is using to shoot the scene. So expertly naive is
the shot that the camera barely pans in time to catch Federer’s serve hitting the
bottle. He performs the trick again so that the camera can better position itself
now that the operator supposedly knows what will happen. That way everyone
can better see the ‘“true virtuosity” on display, namely Federer’s serve.45
The rhythm of these clips is equally important. The pacing must be slack at
times. There must be lulls in the movement between the arresting feats r
surprises. Federer, for example, prattles at a table before deciding to perform his
trick. The bully prods his prey before the slam. Charlie considers putting his
finger in his brother’s mouth. The hand above the spider tries to work up enough
courage to crush it. There is excess and surplus and refuse in the pacing of these
takes, and for that, they are sometimes more shocking than their Hollywood
counterparts. The slack allows them to perform more of an Aristotelian peripety,
establishing a secure pattern only to overturn it with a sudden jolt.46
Not only are the subjects of long takes caught in this rise and fall, but so
often also are the operators. The camera operators of the Gillette ad and the “Kill
it” clip both exclaim and gasp in surprise at the scene they capture. The shooter of
the “Victim” video eggs the fight on. It is not uncommon to see operators
questioning, laughing, or taunting the subjects themselves. They enact the role of
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both spectator and shooter, encouraging viewers to project themselves into their
position. This is not the restricted art of the auteur. This is not Hitchcock
crafting a message for his audience. The video take, rather, is constructed around
interchangeable roles. Operator stands in for audience and the audience is invited
to conceive of themselves in the place of the operator. The only thing separating
the two is the singularity of the event itself.

Crises in Time
Kracauer suggests that film’s “miracle of movement” speaks to a particularly
modern crisis. There exists a “hunger for life.” It has been created, first, by a
“disintegration of beliefs and cultural traditions which had established a set of
norms, affinities, and values for the individual to live by.” Furthermore, he finds
society overly analytical, “which means among other things that with modern
man abstract thought tends to get the better of concrete experience.” Finally, he
believes there is:
an increasing difficulty for the individual to account for the forces,
mechanisms, and processes that shape the modern world, including his
own destiny. The world has grown so complex, politically and otherwise,
that it can no longer be simplified. Any effect seems separated from its
manifold possible causes....So we look for compensations. And film, it
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appears, is apt to afford temporary relief....There the frustrated may turn
into the kings of creation.47
In her reading of Kracauer, Mary Ann Doane adds a fourth cause: “the negation
of unorganized, unstructured time.”48 She argues that with the rise of industrial
society, time has been made scientific, broken down to be measured, arranged,
evaluated—much like the logic of Marey’s and Muybridge’s earliest experiments.
The camera both replays and responds to the conditions of this crisis. It
captures the “contradictory desire,” on the one hand, “of archiving the present,” to
ensure its security and legibility, and, on the other, of seeing contingency destroy
that same dominant order. 49 These dueling “times” are related to Hansen’s
description of the camera’s oppositional activities: its ability to index material
figures and its susceptibility to erratic disfigurement. The camera is both salt and
salve, it “embalms time”—as Bazin has said— and, simultaneously, it phases to life
this deadened state of stasis. It does so with the promise of the next moment, or a
suggestion that a surprise potentially awaits in the next frame. It turns on the
coming attraction.50 Thus, Doane concludes that “contingency is both lure and
threat....The embarrassment of contingency is that it is everywhere and that it
everywhere poses the threat of an evacuation of meaning.”51
We can see this in the long take video clips referenced above. They all
follow through on their threat—they deliver their mutinies of standardized time.
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The exploding spider also explodes our expectations and pre-formed meanings
(that the spider will be flattened and die). We can see the lure and the threat even
in videos that don’t include exploding spiders or unexpected body slams. In many
clips a phasal event never arrives, the rebellion never forms, and the status quo of
the archive persists. A child runs in circles on the grass. There is nothing
remarkable about his gait, about his persistence, about his speed, or sounds, or
route. He runs as hundreds of other children have run—forgettable in his play.
Still the dual rhythm takes hold. Still there is the threat of the contingent even if it
never arrives. What will he do next? Will he fall? Will he giggle?
The rhythms of the lure and the threat even apply to the long takes that are
streamed but never recorded, like video chats with friends, family members, and
lovers. Webcams still index the present moment, even if it can no longer be
retrieved. In coming to the screen, the moment has been transcribed. The camera
has represented it for viewing. The surface of the image is its insurance of
indexicality—of being preserved for another’s gaze. A colleague, a girlfriend, a
grandmother has been written and delivered. Our presence has as well, in a little
box on the corner of the screen which relays our own video feed back to us. Our
mutual transformations into each successive moment have been witnessed and
recorded. Together both parties, facing their separate cameras can say, “Yes! We
have been alive.”
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Deathways
“I must now tell you my thoughts about death (and I leave my skeptical readers
free to wonder what this has to do with cinema).” —Pasolini52

As Pasolini suggests with his choice of the Zapruder film, the long take itself—as a
rhythm and visual style—is intimately bound to intimations of life and death.
Pasolini sees this in the intersequence cuts that begin and end a take. Punning on
the word obiettivo—which denotes simultaneously the camera’s “lens,” its
“object,” and its “aim”—Pasolini declares that the final cut of a clip brings
meaning to a sequence, much like death brings meaning to a life. Before the cut,
multiplicities can still accumulate. Only the finality of a break can quiet the threat
of contingency. Only in the end might we look back at what was made and
attempt to interpret it, make it re-inhabitable for meaning. For Pasolini, the cut as
a death ratifies the index of the archive.
Doane contrasts Pasolini’s handling of death with Charles Pierce’s
conclusion that death is the “domination of chance.” Pierce believes death is the
ultimate mark of contingency—there can be nothing more untamable than its
annihilative cut. She concludes that the camera “embodies both” of these views.53
However she sides more with Pierce, arguing that “death and the contingent have
something in common insofar as both are often situated as that which is
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unassimilable to meaning. Death would seem to mark the insistence and
intractability of the real in representation.”54 Death serves as the mark that
disfigures the archival mechanism of the camera. It destroys ultimately the
standardizations of industrial time.
Long take videos of “fails” and “feats” demonstrate this well. In a “fail”
take a skateboarder would slide down the handrail of an outdoor staircase and
topple over midway onto his spine. In a “feat” take he would slide down the rail
fully and land squarely on his skateboard. Fail takes mean that cars crash, people
trip, jumps are missed, or things explode. Feat takes celebrate animals that do
tricks, people who work wonders, jumps that are stuck, and bottles that are
knocked off heads with tennis balls. The videos above of the bully, Charlie, and
the spider are all fail videos. Things do not go according to plan. On the other
hand, “The Evolution of Dance,” the video that once had the honor of being
YouTube’s most-watched video, is a feat take: a comedian combines dozens of
different dance styles into a single continuous routine. In the former contingency
strikes. In the latter it is mastered. Both are related to death.55
When we capture feats and failures with the long take, we are phasing
rhythms between the archive and chance, the familiar and the unfamiliar, the
living and the dead. It is not so bizarre to claim that we might be thinking about
death in such a mediated and indirect fashion. Many have made the connection
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between the camera and the grave, and David Sudnow reminds us that the best
way to examine our attitudes towards mortality is not always the study our
reactions to death itself.56 There are other “deathways”—a term anthropologists
Richard Huntington and Peter Metcalf use to describe the many rituals
surrounding the dead, of which the mortuary and the funeral are only small,
relatively standardized pieces of a more unwieldy range of practices. In many
cultures, death is not instantaneous. It lingers. It returns. It is represented and
re-represented in rituals. Death is interactive.57
The long takes of digital videos certainly do not interact with death as
explicitly as Huntington and Metcalf have found in other cultures. However, that
does not preclude the long take from being a practice through which a deathway is
performed and shared. The camera becomes a way, not so much to mourn, as to
probe at Kracauer’s “hunger for life.” In Doane’s words, the camera’s “art
emerges as a somewhat anomalous category...it mediates between structure and
event, design and accident.” Disassociating and re-associating us to time, the long
take mediates our encounters with contingency—and with it, the emergence and
evacuation of meaning, death being the most traumatic.
By mediating these different rhythms, the camera enables its users to
become like the Neapolitans in Italo Pardo’s study of mourning in the
Mediterranean city. Neapolitans, Pardo claims, maintain a “flexible negotiation
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rather than sharp opposition” between life and death, opening ambiguous spaces
in which to communally recast meanings of death.58 Similarly, camera practices
with the long take fashion ways to re-compose expectations and habits of living.
By either showcasing masterful feats or exposing random failures, the long take
affords a more plastic view of the present tense. Whether shooting or viewing
them, we participate more in the mediation of our time.
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CHAPTER 5

VIRTUAL CAMS
SURROGATE VISION AND THIRD NATURE

The virtual cam is often not considered a camera at all. As the optical eye that
orientates a three-dimensional perspective in a video game, it is designed to be
unobtrusive. Its “black box” cannot be viewed or held. It fuses itself entirely with
its rendering of a graphical landscape. Game designers and players are certainly
aware of its importance, but those who approach digital environments as
procedural systems tend to miss the virtual cam’s use as a performative tool. The
result is that the agency of the virtual cam’s operators—the players themselves—is
often overlooked along with it.
My contention is that the virtual cam is a crucial apparatus in shaping the
future of spatial interactivity because of its construction of a “surrogate vision.”
This surrogate vision mediates players’ identification with their avatar, their
understanding of game mechanics, and their engagement with both digital and
physical landscapes. Surrogate vision is critical to understanding how players are
simultaneously trapped and set free in natures not entirely of their own making.
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Shooters
Although the long take has been the primary style of video games since Pac-Man
began gobbling up power pellets without a cut or an edit, the virtual cam only
began to play a role in orchestrating these sequences with the advent of threedimensional graphics. The first-person shooter, Doom, for example, gave players
control of a virtual camera to guide an avatar through corridors of monsters. The
camera acted all the while as the player’s “eyes.”1 The long take and virtual cam
are also married in third-person perspectives, such as in the “sandbox” games of
the Grand Theft Auto series or the virtual “worlds” of massive multiplayer online
games (MMOs) like Star Wars: Old Republic.2
In fact, Alexander Galloway claims that it is video games’ negation of
montage that gives them their sense of unrestricted movement. He explains that
“traditional filmmaking almost never requires the construction of full spaces.”
Games, on the other hand, leverage the opportunities of space and make it
“actionable.”3 The long take of the virtual cam is essential to providing both this
sense of fullness (a player can literally look in any direction) and actionable space
(the continuity of perspective allows players to maintain an easy sense of direction
with which to navigate). Galloway uses the label “subjective shot” to categorize
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the type of long take that first-person shooters employ. As opposed to the POV
shot in cinema that approximates a person’s vision, the subjective shot applies
“when the camera shows what the actual eyes of a character would see.”4
Galloway provides many examples, such as the Terminator’s red-tinged
augmented vision, or even the gauze that covers the camera in the opening
sequences of The Insider, replicating Al Pacino’s blindfolded vision.5 Games
accelerate this subjective effect with visual and auditory queues, such as when the
HUD, or heads-up-display, will turn red to indicate that a character is wounded.
Virtual subjective shots simulate not only physical vision but also a psychological
state of the avatar.
Although Galloway only addresses first-person games, the trailing cameras
of third-person perspectives similarly invite the player to identify with the avatar.
Instead of being subjective shots of vision, they orchestrate a subjective shot of the
body. The camera beckons the player to attend to details like the avatar’s feet
placement. For example, when Nathan Drake, the protagonist of the Uncharted
series, prepares to jump across a ravine, players have to account for the position of
his boots in relation to the cliff edge. The same applies to the jut of his shoulders
and knees behind a crate when he takes cover from gunfire.6 Additionally, thirdperson subjective shots also render psychological effects: whenever Drake takes
damage the colors of the screen desaturate. Color loses its vibrancy, just as we are
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meant to take notice of Drake’s depleting energy. The response is intended to be
one of empathy—Drake is like us and we are like Drake.
With this effect of self-identification, the subjective shot of video games
departs from cinematic convention. Galloway lays out how the subjective shot is
so often used in slasher films to represent the perspective of the killer, the
monster, or whatever antagonist is pursuing the hero.7 The cinematic convention
is to put viewers in the role of the most threatening character—like, Jason, from
the Friday the 13th series, the uncontrollable force of destruction and bringer of
death. Thus, it suspends the audience in a state of anxiety because of their
impotence to intervene. They are entrapped in a horrific mask of vision.
The virtual cam, however, inverts this logic. Its subjective shot yields
control. It embodies the player’s agency in the landscape. This is the last critical
component distinguishing the subjective shot of the film camera from the virtual
cam: the players become the operator-observers of vision. The terminology
Roland Barthes employs in Camera Lucida might be of help in describing this
notion. He classifies three activities involved in the production of images. There
is: the operator, the person handling the instrument of the camera; the spectrum,
the subject of the shot (or, to put it in Lacanian terms, the object of the camera’s
gaze); and the spectator, the person who views the image produced. Video games
illustrate the manner in which these roles merge into a hybrid activity. The player
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is operator, manipulating the camera through a given interface (often a game
controller or keyboard). At the same time, the player is spectator, observing and
processing the images composed on the screen. And yet still, the player, as onscreen avatar becomes a kind of spectrum, a locus of the camera’s gaze.8
In virtual environments, hybrid re-embodiment produces a fourth
category—the surrogate. It dissolves the boundaries among artists, audiences, and
actors. What results is a level of agency and complicity in optical media that has
no “analog.”
Surrogacy in video games is controlled through the operation of the virtual
cam. Whereas the cinema restricts its spectator from handling the camera, video
games employ operation as a primary activity. Players, positioning the eye of the
camera, assume control of the subjective shot. In so doing, they modify the way
their avatars and their gameworlds visually come to presence. This is one of the
reasons the activity of “shooting” has become so important to video games. Guns,
crosshairs, and targets incentivize the virtual cam’s operation. Shooting shifts
focus from the avatar to a secondary spectrum in the landscape. As the playeroperator directs the virtual cam from one object to the next, the space of the game
becomes actionable. The player’s object becomes the surrogate’s object. It also
becomes the object of any other spectator watching the game. This alignment of
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spectra constructs a surrogate vision. It is the mechanic and mediator for
interactivity between player and digital environment.
Many games are aware of the camera’s pivotal role in orchestrating these
activities. While the “shooting” of surrogate vision is often masked with
metaphors of guns and ammo, it can just as easily be replaced by a more literal
representation—namely, a photographic camera. Rockstar’s Bully enrolls the
avatar in a photography class and structures progression around the player
completing class assignments. Subjective shots through the in-game camera snap
and make prints of various activities around campus. In Bioshock avatars are
given a virtual knockoff of Kodak’s vintage Brownie camera. With it they take
research photographs of various adversaries, earning power-ups for identifying
enemy weaknesses. Even more literally, Beyond Good & Evil casts players as the
photojournalist Jade, who must gather photographic evidence of monstrous
activities and deliver layouts of an alien invasion. Last but not least, there is the
main weapon of Fatal Frame’s protagonist—a portable device called the Camera
Obscura. In this survival-horror game, only through the Camera Obscura can
players view the specters that threaten them. And in a clever allusion to
spiritualist photography, it is the Camera Obscura that “shoots” and traps these
spirits.9
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By bringing surrogate vision to the foreground and letting players
photograph their environment with still images, these games remediate the
indexicality of the mechanical camera. They create an archive in a digital
environment. They capture contingent encounters instigated by the player’s
interactions with virtual objects. But this raises the question: What is being called
into being by these virtual cams?

Procedural Places
Whether it is a rifle or a camera—no matter how photorealistic the gun fights
seem in Call of Duty, or no matter how gripping the battlescene footage appears in
a game like Warco (in which players take up the video camera of an embedded
photojournalist)—all of these targets and objects remain scripted.10 They are rulebased, arising from a tightly controlled notational system.
Some theorists, mainly working from film studies, use this fact to dispute
any connection between the rhythms of the virtual cam’s surrogate vision and the
long takes of more conventional cameras. David Rodowick calls our attention to
the fundamental distinction of “code.” According to him, the virtual long take,
because it is built algorithmically, is composited from “a combination of logically
discrete elements.”11 The parts are autonomous; the lines of programming script
form digital elements that can be individually manipulated. They function as
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independent objects. The dust that an avatar’s foot kicks up, the weapon that an
enemy drops, the clouds that track in the sky are each individuated in the game
world. These objects, Rodowick claims, are exclusive bits of data that appear
conglomerated but are no more connected to each other than they are to the
player’s physical hand. It would be improper, under such terms, to speak of the
archive or contingency of the long take because there is no continuity or
materiality being referenced or threatened. Rodowick states, “What looks
photographically ‘real’ has actually shed its indexical or casual qualities....When
photography becomes simulation, it yields to a new imaginary that is
unconstrained by causal processes; creation from physical reality gives way to the
composition of ‘elastic’ reality.”12 Virtual objects are pliable bits of light because
they have shed their reference to physical matter. And while this flexibility might
sound appealing, Rodowick sees in it a great loss: with the virtual cam, there is “no
longer continuity of space and movement.”13 In fact, Rodowick believes
“nothing moves, nothing endures in a digitally composed world. The impression
of movement is really just an impression—the numerical rotation and
transformation of geometrical elements.”14 The illusion that is created, therefore,
constructs itself through “montage and combination”— incessantly fast
juxtapositions in disguise as the long take.15

177

Steven Shaviro agrees with Rodowick’s ontology for the virtual cam,
contends that the virtual long takes in video games have influenced the noncontinuity of modern action films by making “visceral involvement” a goal of
cinema. The two media achieve those ends in a completely different fashion:
games through “processual and combinatorial” interactions, films through
“A.D.D. style montage.”16
Objections could be raised to Rodowick’s comments on multiple levels,
not the least of which is the assumption that movement in physical formats is in
any way more “real” than that of virtual environments. Nothing in either format
actually “moves.”17 But in many ways Rodowick and Shaviro are justified in
drawing attention to the discreteness of these virtual objects, reminding us of their
separateness, their autonomy. Still, to deny any kind of emergent coherence to
these parts—to claim that their assemblages have no cumulative effect as a virtual
setting for our activities—would be to underestimate the power of surrogate
vision and the agency of the player.
One can think of this interchange operating at the levels of surfaces and
rules. Jesper Juul explains that while the idea of total immersion in the fictions of
virtual settings has largely been discarded as a myth of game design, one cannot
simply explain away a game’s interactivity as an execution of a program. Juul’s
answer lies in a “half-real,” two-level partition between visual representation and
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the rules—the “half-real” being the player’s mediation between the two. 18 Espen
Aarseth injects into this conversation the importance of space. He proposes a
“classification of computer games...based on how they represent—or perhaps,
implement—space.”19 Representation, again, constitutes one level on a dyadic
structure, the other level being “rule-based.” There are procedures, and there are
representations that come to a surface through those procedures. Aarseth advises
this these forms technically do not constitute a “space” but rather a “place,” which
reductively fuses rules and surfaces as “a means to achieve the object of
gameplay.”20 This corroborates Rodowick’s definition of games as “teleological,”
and essentially numerical transformations. Code provides the impression of
movement through virtual space in order to achieve objectives.21 The rules, in this
configuration, take precedence over visual representation.
The trend continues with Georgia McGregor, who adds onto Aarseth’s
space/place. She claims that video games discard most of what they mimic in the
real world and, in doing so, are entirely architectural.22 Even those landscapes that
attempt to mimic wilderness she sees divided into rooms in which different
categories of activities are arranged. Her reading is immediately apparent in one
of the games she discusses, World of Warcraft (WoW), which separates its lands
into clearly demarcated zones for different levels of play, zones which themselves
are subdivided into smaller sections for particular types of quests, searches, and
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purchases. In similar ways the rooms of our homes compartmentalize and
bracket our activities: if we are fortunate enough to afford the separation, we will
eat in one room, sleep in other, and relieve ourselves in yet a third. According to
McGregor, these procedural scripts override any superficial representation
(interior design) with which the rooms might be decorated.
The predominance of architectural rules in the governance of digital
landscapes comes to a head in Ian Bogost’s procedural rhetorics. As a designer
and theorist, he is particularly attuned to notational systems of games, concluding
that their persuasive power essentially lies within their blueprint. Bogost takes up
Janet Murray’s subordination of “procedurality” to narrative, only to flip the value
signs. In his estimation, “procedural expression must entail symbol
manipulation.” The rules oversee “the construction and interpretation of a
symbolic system that governs human thought and action.”23 Procedurality
“constructs,” “interprets,” and “manipulates,” both at the level of representation
and at the level of player interactions with the representation. Procedurality’s
power largely lies in choosing which representations to render when. In this way,
it consumes interactivity and marginalizes a player’s agency. Bogost states as
much when he writes that “the total number and credibility of user actions is not
necessarily important; rather, the relevance of the interaction in the context of the
representational goals of the system is paramount.”24 The essence of interactivity
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lies not within players’ actions, but in the framing of those actions according to
the markers for success built by the procedures.
The rhetoric of procedurality can be conceived as a razor-thin isosceles
triangle. Power is stretched between the designer and the design (the design being
understood here as the procedures which model symbolic representations). The
role of the audience, to whom all of the messages are directed, remains below the
surface, with very little agency, barely registering as a point on the triangle at all.
The important questions do not lie in the way forms are rendered, projected or
used by players. Any agency or activity in the land lies in its schematics.
Juul somewhat undermines these assertions about games as architecture
and procedural systems when he points out the ability of space to conflate the
authority of rules and representation. Spaces are where games are at their least
“themable”—when the representations of the rules are unique and resist
replacement.25 An example might be an early scene in Uncharted 2 when Drake is
caught at the base of a train that is dangling off a cliff. In a classic set piece of
action films, he must ward off an attacker while climbing to safety before the
entire train plummets to an explosive end. As the player struggles to escape the
deathtrap, it would be difficult to imagine these rules recast in a different space.
Of course, the train could be a different color. Perhaps it could be bus or a sinking
ship, but at some point it must be granted that these rules are rather specifically
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defined by their fictional setting. Therefore, in Juul’s estimation, the experience of
a game world is better conceived as architecture overlapping interior design. One
can separate the rules from the representations, but there would be little value in
doing so. A merger occurs across the lines of code and the symbols of visual
surfaces.

Birth Circles
A step away from the teleology of rules is a step back to the surrogate interactivity
of the player. It helps explain the myriad of ways in which the virtual cam as a
tool invites us to construct divergent meanings from the digital bits and scripts of
light that come into view.
Bonnie Nardi addresses these mixed realities in her ethnographic study of
WOW, My Life as a Night Elf Priest. She claims that game applications make
compelling appeals for the investment of human activity in virtual artifacts, in her
case, her avatar, in which she invested numerous hours and substantial resources
of emotional energy. According to Nardi, visual performativity is a necessary
component of space.26 Players’ own direction of a game’s surrogate vision—their
own passage through an architectural world—creates an autographic experience,
giving birth to individually resonate meanings unique to a particular digital time
and space.
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The starting zones of WoW prove a fertile testing ground of these limits. If
Juul is correct in believing that spaces most closely unite the rules to their
representations, and if the virtual cam coordinates a surrogate vision, then
starting zones where characters are “born” is the best place to see how all three
interact.
In WoW after choosing a race and customizing an avatar, players log into
a server. There they are introduced to the landscape through a virtual cam
flyover—a separate one for each racial starting zone. The accompanying
narration relates a snippet history of the player’s chosen race and plants vague
objectives through a tale of defending or reclaiming a homeland from or against
other races. All the while, the flyover camera twists and turns through minarets
and trees, across grasslands and gorges, until it tracks up to the back of the
player’s avatar, who is standing in an open clearing, facing another figure—a
quest-giver, marked with a bright yellow exclamation point over his or her head.
There is a short fade-to-black as the virtual cam shifts from flyover to subjective
shot, an attempt to smooth over the otherwise jolting handing-over of authorship,
from designer to player. Galloway describes a similar scene in Metroid Prime:
...the transition from the third person to first person is accomplished not
with an edit but with a swooping fly-through shot where the camera, in
third person, curves around to the rear of the player character and then
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tracks forward, swiftly passing through the back of the cranium to fuse
instantly the first-person optics of the character with the first-person
optics of the player.27
Yet as Galloway suggests, there is more to this than the mere avoidance of a cut.
Indeed, each racial starting zone in WoW is an opportunity for game designers to
cast rules and fiction alike into the landscape. The opening of the game is meant
to reinforce this point—the story will be told in large part through the characters’
relationship to the land. The flyover of the prologue joins landscape (the visual
model) to a history (the oral voice over) to a body (the soon-to-be surrogate
avatar). When we touch the keys, motion with the mouse, we are puppeteers,
taking up a new body in the opening movements of a performance. The curtain is
drawn. The screen goes black for only a moment. When the lights come up
again, spirit and body have joined. Our avatar is our own.
To heighten this effect, the game bars control of the virtual cam in the
character creation and customization screen. There is no surrogate vision. A
player may only rotate the figure and zoom, like a three-dimensional product for
sale. Only when the avatar arrives in the landscape, where targets may be found
among the rocks and trees, only then does surrogate vision take hold.
Moreover, it is no mistake that the virtual cam’s surrogacy is first bestowed
upon the player within a circle. The physical point of arrival for every race in
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every starting zone conforms to this shape—some are drawn in the dirt, others in
a clearing of snow or grass. It is a literal and figurative magic circle, separating the
playworld from the “real world.”28 The effect on the player is meant to be
profound—a uterine passage, with the flyover being the forceful contraction into a
new world. There is even a helpful quest-giver, like a midwife, beckoning every
newborn avatar out of still birth.
The wide-eyed awakening of each character brings with it a unique
receptivity to the landscape. Newcomers need some degree of guidance
concerning the rules of their surrogate vision. Here the persuasiveness of
procedurality must be simultaneously at its strongest and its most subtle. When
design becomes too intrusive—with tooltips, onscreen menus, excessively helpful
non-player characters, or splash screens of instructions—the initial wonder of
being transplanted into a foreign landscape and being able to explore it in a
remediated body quickly evaporates.
Luckily, the nuance of designing for usability has evolved over the years:
the thick gaming manuals of the 1980s were followed by the mandatory in-game
tutorial of the 1990s, which in turn gave way to orientations driven by clever
narrative hooks and spatial queues. WoW uses the logic of pens and pastures.
The starting zones are usually enclosed, allowing only the feeblest of beasts to
roam. Helpful non-player characters (NPCs) are plainly obvious, and the land
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divides neatly between wilderness—in which monsters can be slain—and
dwellings, where trade and training can be found. In contrast, at higher levels this
distinction is not always so easy to make: NPCs are tucked high atop mountains
and villages are populated with foreign races whose allegiances are uncertain.
Other open-world systems use narrative events along with pen and pasture
logic to mask early exercises in surrogate vision. Usually this begins with a
“trying-on” of a subjective shot—an initial period of simply looking at the
landscape through a new avatar body. Interactive features—including mobility
itself—are restricted to let the player focus on relationality within a new world.
Fallout III accomplishes this orientation by beginning literally at the avatar’s birth.
As an infant, the avatar is passed around a hospital room; all the player can do is
redirect the baby’s gaze—left and right, up and down. Similarly, in the medieval
fantasy Skyrim, avatars begin as prisoners on a wagon ride to their own execution.
In this first scene, the player can only pivot the surrogate’s view to take in the
passing countryside and the conversations of the other prisoners in the cart.
Batman: Arkham City opens almost identically, with Bruce Wayne bound and
under escort through a dystopian prison-setting. Wayne is restrained not only by
manacles but also by the absence of his famous batsuit. He is allowed to move
forward and to look around.29 Each of these scenarios uses narrative events and
an emphasis of surrogate vision to gently corral players into a relationship with
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their avatar and the game world. Surfaces and surrogacy in the world come first.
Then, the player is introduced to rulesets.
Eventually these games expose core mechanics as they expand to everbroader and more open vistas. After Fallout 3 constricts its open world to the
easily mappable and confined corridors of an underground bunker, it stages a
breakout and lets its players wander into the charred wasteland of the D.C. metro
area. Bruce Wayne, likewise, breaks his shackles and fights his way to the
Gotham’s skyline where he finds his famous utility belt. The rest of the game is all
gliding and bat-cabling over city blocks.
Even in non-open-world systems, in which the entire landscape cannot be
explored, surrogate vision is corralled from chutes to more open pens. Uncharted
2, for example, uses its “train” sequence to construct a very narrow route through
game content (there is usually only one way out of each passenger car). This in
turn forces the player to coordinate certain views of the virtual cam with specific
game mechanics. Players learn how to make surrogate vision actionable through
the combination of fictional danger and procedural safety in the dangling
passenger train. Only after beating this sequence will the avenues for interactivity
widen.
All these games endeavor to strike a balance between agency and aid. As
Eric Heyot and Edward Wesp note, geography in a game like WoW is progress,
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and it is never more open to players than at that moment of still birth. At the
same time, it is never so closed. To a low-level player, the entire game world
beyond the pasture of the starting zone is forbidding, promising death with every
encounter. The more the word is explored, the more of the design that is
experienced, the more the game closes off places of possibility and “sites of future
progress.”30 That moment before the first step is taken, when players pan their
view, or take their first step, or jump and jump and jump (as some do)—that is the
final moment when designers will control a player’s view of the world. Each tap of
the finger or gesture with the mouse will take avatars in directions that become
exponentially more unpredictable. At the moment of first spawning, however, an
entire geography awaits. Progress and the singular experience of the avatar must
be charted, and landscape is the great physical force with and against which
players must contend.

Labyrinths
In the nineteenth century, when public parks gained popularity with the boon of
urban planning, there was great interest in making recreational spaces both
“didactic” and “democratic”; David Schuyler explains how the renown parkplanner Fredrick Law Olmsted and his associates subscribed to the notion “that
the physical spaces humans occupy influence their patterns of behavior. Thus the
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question...was not merely an aesthetic one, but involved a statement of political
and social ideology.”31 Since that time, it has become commonplace for art
historians and cultural theorists to discuss the projection of nationalisms into the
landscape. In fact, Ginger Strand reminds us that we have never stopped recomposing the land: “Cicero called it ‘second nature,’ nature transformed by the
human hand. In our age, second nature is all there is; ‘first nature’ has gone
AWOL.”32
Her words are particularly true for digital environments. Game worlds
have become the ideal optical medium in which to project our ideologies of
landscape. Despite appearances of being wild and untamed, digital environments
are inescapably manicured spaces. They have been thoroughly shaped by
programmers’ desires.
Strand, who wrote a history of the taming of Niagara Falls, concludes that
“no one believes in landscape anymore.” Landscape—be it engineered or
uninhabited—no longer holds any magic: “Power and politics trail in landscape’s
wake, because land itself is never un-ideological.” 33 It has been overwritten by
our own aspirations and agendas. This holds especially true for virtual lands. So
pliant is digital light that we could speak of video games being composed in a
hyperbolized second nature, or as a second nature+. They are proceduralized
representations of physical lands that have themselves been subjected to ages of
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proceduralization and manipulation. Digital spaces are, thus, thoroughly didactic.
They exist, as Olmsted hoped, to encourage a specific pattern of play and preserve
a specific social order.34 The symbols have been legislated. The signs are
“formless,” just as Mitch Rose notes about physical landscapes, invoking Georges
Bastille’s language to describe how a space might “have no meaning and only
tasks.”35
It is my suspicion that—given the immense capacities of game designers,
the intricacies of code, the processing power of computer systems, and the clarity
of procedural rhetoric—the field of game studies, even more than geography, is
prone to formlessness. Gameworlds seem like very determined places. Not only
is the study of the land made formless; so are understandings of player
performances. In such an overdetermined stetting, a “trained incapacity” takes
hold: an inability to speak about excess, about a player’s performance that spills
over expected patterns, or enacts the procedures in unforeseen, startling ways.36
What must be accounted for are not only the different activities of
individuals in the landscape, but also their particular ways of seeing differences in
the landscape. Art critics have tried to address this phenomenon. In The
Languages of Landscape, Mark Roskill describes the viewer’s observation of
Poussin paintings as a struggle to reconcile “elements of the natural world and
what has been placed there, the contribution of which is left incompletely
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specified.” Unlike Poussin paintings, most the elements of a game word have
been placed, usually without any direct reference to the natural world. How does
the viewer see the differences among those elements?
For Roskill the image is composed in the viewer’s “habits of attention” and
“performed expectations,” These modes of seeing are helpful in clarifying the role
of surrogate vision in game worlds. Fist, “performed expectations” can
demonstrate the conventions of surrogate vision that are specific to a title; and
those that carry across genres. For instance, an expectation particular to the
gaming title Assassin's Creed concerns the avatar’s body: if placed in close
proximity to other NPCs, it will be camouflaged. A performed expectation that
carries across three-dimensional genres involves focus: the object closest to the
center of the screen (as opposed to peripheral vision) will most often be selected as
a target.37
Additionally, “habits of attention” is useful in recognizing the virtual cam’s
use of overlays to redefine a player’s expectations of landscapes. The overlay—a
two-dimensional information design—is coordinated with the user’s operation of
the virtual cam. The information spreads out transparently over surrogate vision
to make visible, like a decoder ring, the notational system at work underneath the
representations of the gameworld. It might properly be called the next generation
tooltip. Traditionally tooltips, like the one implemented in WoW, launch a fixed
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pop-up window on the HUD, autonomous from surrogate vision. However, the
overlay acts as a lens or gel, blending itself into the subjective shot.
Usually this mechanic is couched in a bit of fiction to lessen its potentially
bothersome intrusion into the player’s identification with the gameworld. The
best example comes from “Detective Vision,” the overlay in Batman: Arkham
City. When the player switches it on, the screen is washed in a monochromatic
palette. The exceptions are enemies and actionable objects formerly hidden in the
environment, like breakable walls or accessible air duct coverings. These objectsof-interest sharply stand out, usually through the use of vivid colors and a form of
x-ray modeling. Furthermore, any object-of-interest brought into the center of
the screen will usually generate an informational tool tip. However, these tooltips
are still dependent on the spectrum of the camera and can be manipulated through
surrogate vision. Pan the virtual cam and a pop-up detailing one enemy’s weapon
will shift to another explaining the function of an electrical generator built into
the wall.
The overlay is a noteworthy development in game design because it
situates operation of the virtual cam as an intermediary among the system rules,
visual representations, and the user’s surrogate vision. It calls the procedurality of
the system onto screen, yet it still finds a skin or mask for these procedures—it
does not simply expose the code. At the same time it avoids further corralling the
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player into particular activities with surrogate vision. It fully respects the kind of
divergence and digression Charles Harrison contends are part of viewing any
landscape painting: its “effect,” he explains “may rather derive from some
coincidence between thought and making that is a derogation both of the
protocols of viewing and of the supposed significance of latent content.”38 Thus it
would be mistaken to see the development of the overlay as further legislation of
vision. Instead, the overlay demonstrates alternatives to the habits that players
might not even recognize. It calls out to the unseen. It points to the forgotten. It
welcomes chance combinations.
Further examples of the overlay can be found in many applications of
augmented reality. The popular Star Walk software application uses the built-in
camera of hand-held devices to project an astronomical overlay across the sky.
Point a camera at clouds or stars and it will reveal the names of planets, the shapes
of constellations, and their positions in the night sky. One could focus certainly
on the heightened second nature of these applications—how they excessively map
natural landscapes and use procedural scripts to encourage specific kinds of
viewing. Star Walk’s iconic illustrations of constellations, for instance, discourage
study of those stars that are not fortunate to be named after a mythic figure or
carry an appealing graphic. But this would neglect the third nature that these
virtual cams bring into view—an opportunity to think outside our habits of seeing
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and expose ourselves to new coincidences of reflecting, exploring, and interacting
with the landscape.
Rather than contributing to the determination of virtual and physical
worlds, one might better see overlays as encouraging the kind of indeterminacy
Rose finds in Bastille’s labyrinth. Rose prescribes it to cultural geographers who
cannot see beyond the “formless” state of the land:
It is a space that can never be fully accounted for because we are always
creating it....Its presence is not engendered by features in the landscape
itself but by the various ways it is called forth and put to task. In this
sense the only thing that landscape ever is is the practices that make it
relevant.39 (2002, 461-2)
The labyrinth cannot be enframed by a server, by code, or by any graphics engine.
Its meaning is never latent because it is always in a state of becoming. Rules give it
shape but that shape slips from grasp the moment we bring the landscape into use.
The labyrinth does not call for the abandonment of procedural study, nor
does it undermine every discussion of representation. It does, however, demand
that our worlds be populated by the mystery of coincidence and the indeterminate
relationality. It allows for a space where a player to be emotionally affected by a
virtual fawn skittering across a stream or the shape of Pegasus taking form across
an overlay of the night sky. The labyrinth accentuates bodies—avatar, player, and
virtual object alike—and reminds us that their agencies emerge when the
landscape is called into practice. The resulting interactivity remains in a maze,
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one whose ground can never be mapped and whose shifting can never be
stabilized.
Here we recognize we are trapped in the magic of landscape.
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CHAPTER 6

CAMERA TRICKS
A PEDAGOGY OF CHEATING

Each weekend, my great-aunt would take my brother and I to her neighborhood
pool. It was not much more than a fence, a bathroom, and a diving board. A test
of courage in those days was to swim to the floor of the deep end. At its center
was a rusted drain. The children who could touch it were considered decent
swimmers. The drain itself was a checkerboard grate, with openings large enough
for keys to pass through. Years later, models like it would be banned after wellpublicized cases of children drowning when their skin or hair had become caught
in open suction.1 Even though we were oblivious to these risks, we associated a
vague sense of danger with the drain, primarily because of its murkiness and
inaccessibility. The difficulty in reaching it made it an attraction. We pushed
through earaches to see it, kicking deeper until noses would bleed. For those who
made it to the bottom, the drain would reveal its treasure: an ever-changing
collage around its cover. Leaves, coins, toys, goggles—specimens of a week’s
activities—all pulled together atop the cracks and holes.
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As our lungs grew, we studied these collages for longer and more frequent
periods, until they held few surprises. We had charted the range of the
collections; the pool’s waste had a predictable pattern. So we invented a new game
that involved sitting around the drain and trying to be the last one to come up for
air. To gain better leverage, we wrapped our fingers through the drain holes, and
as a distraction from the desire to breathe, we looked up at the sunlight reflecting
off the surface of the water. Its rays arrived at the bottom of the pool distorted
into odd wavelengths, like the sounds from other swimmers. The sky would
sometimes swirl with textures. Blobs of children would undulate on the diving
board. In those moments, it seemed like our plane of vision had been removed
and stretched into a screen above us. I’d watch it as long as I could—this
distended version of my eyesight—until my chest burned and I had to burst
through its surface to breathe again.
The drain and the surface of the deep end have become emblematic for
me. They have come to stand in for two approaches to design: the drain as collage
and fragmentation; the surface as rhythms and optical tricks. The first alludes to
the cut, the montage, bricolage, construction itself. The other refers to the take,
the trick, illusion, perception itself. Unavoidably, these metaphors prejudice the
practices they allude to: the drain puts collage in an underworld, where entities are
concealed and threatened by an undertow. The surface, on the other hand, puts
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“the take” in the company of illumination and life-giving air. One can easily be
read as “bad,” the other “good.” But that would be reductive. Both reveal as much
as they conceal. Both rely on contingency and chance. Both harbor their own
discoveries and dangers.
In this final chapter, I propose swimming down to look up at optical
media. The challenge of the dive is to bring photonic rhetorics—the persuasive
effects of light and perception—into education. As I have already stated, the fine
arts and the sciences have already welcomed optical media into the classroom.2
But if visual communication is to be considered a core competency of general
education, or a liberal art for twenty-first century students, then we must attend to
its rhetorics of invention.3 How are we to teach imagemaking as an activity for
reflection, expression, and politics?
A strong model for new media literacies already exists. Gregory Ulmer
has named it “heuretics.” Thomas Kent calls it “paralogical rhetoric.” Victor
Vitanza’s term is “pararhetoric.”4 These rhetorical theories speak to a mode of
invention and pedagogy that resists totalization, undermines any attempt to root
“instruction” in permanent ground. Ulmer, especially, aligns these rhetorics with
emerging styles and practices in new media. Ulmer’s new and “electric” media
uproot singularities and branch (rhizomatically, contradictorily, ironically) into
multiplicities and pluralities.
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In this text, I have welcomed a paralogical approach to invention with the
camera. Paralogy certainly has its advantages. It resists a self-involved “innerface” with the camera. It breaks down the objectivity of mechanical images. It
interrogates habits of perception. It celebrates unexpected linkages over stable
models, mini-narratives rather than grand narratives, subversion over genre
conventions, transgression always over conformity. Its invention-by-intervention
reveals ideologies that might otherwise remain hidden. Agile and creative
thinking often proliferates under its practices.
But paralogical rhetoric does not compliment all of photonic rhetorics.
As we have observed, optical media are as dutifully scripted as they are wildly
contingent. Light and digital apparatuses bear their own rigid protocols for
vision, and many of the rhetorical effects of camera technologies—whether they
be photo apps, video clips, or virtual cams—require a proficiency with their codes
before their scripts are subverted. As helpful as paralogical rhetoric is in thinking
of invention as an intervention, it tends to avoid these specific protocols of
practice. When it does address the techne of optical media, it usually does so
indirectly, through the indeterminate and improvisational forms of collage.
As a standard-bearer for practices in optical media, collage’s cutting and
collecting sometimes impede more than they let pass. Although these tactics are
compatible with strategies of paralogy, collage tends to filter out alternative
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techniques, conventions, and agencies of composition—elements that are vital to
exploring the instrumentality of photonic rhetorics. The consequences of this
separation, I fear, will most likely be borne out by students, who must compete in
increasingly exclusive markets that expect specific competencies in optical
communication.
Still, paralogy’s goal of invention-by-intervention is laudable. The
challenge becomes keeping hold of paralogy’s tropes of resistance and nonexclusion while at the same time encouraging technical expertise. Its reward
would be a freethinking techne of imagemaking.
The proposal below is for a pedagogy of conscientious cheating and
curative tricks. It is based on a cinematic practice of stretching the rules of optical
composition to achieve a desired effect for an audience. In a general sense, all
camera media invite their operators to play as they are being played—to test
techniques until something striking and unexpected is produced. A pedagogy of
cheating embraces both these facets of new media, both its rules and its tricks. It
serves as an alternative paralogical approach to visual composition, a way to bring
together optical techne and rhetorical invention, technical proficiencies and
political interventions, singularities and multiplicities—a way to look at the sky
while holding onto the drain.
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Paralogy
Conscientious cheating offers an alternative to pedagogies of collage. By
“alternative,” I am not situating it as a replacement; merely, an addition. To
follow paralogy to cheating and new media, we should trace its heritage in
rhetorical studies, specifically paralogy’s investment in collage as a central
technique for visual composition.
In the early 1990s, in the midst of hypertext studies and a rapidly
developing internet, Gregory Ulmer established a “non-place” for teaching electric
or “hypermedia” in the tradition of rhetorical invention. Hypermedia was best
demonstrated, he felt, with the logic of “artistic experiment” rather than “critical
interpretation.” Ulmer develops this theory through two neologisms—“heuretics”
and “chorography.” Both attempt to set up signposts for his experimental
approach to invention, pedagogy, and new media. The word “heuretics” he coins
for its resonance with the heretical thrust of the artistic avant-garde and French
post-structuralism. Heuretics, in this sense, is a counterpoint of heuristics. It is
likewise a foil to traditional hermeneutics, or interpretive approaches that seek to
pin down the meaning of texts.5 Ulmer compares hermeneutics to a positivist
strain in geography that maps locations by standardizing them, emptying them of
their cultural differences and societal features. In Greek, this neutered and
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standardized version of place is expressed as topos. Ulmer claims that topos is the
same “place” that Aristotle uses to systematize the commonplaces of rhetoric. To
rethink this normalized version of rhetorical invention, Ulmer draws from
Derrida and posits another Greek term for place—chora, which also implies a gap.
It is an evacuated space. Unlike geographic topoi, these gaps are not emptied of
“spirit” and “social feeling.” Rather, they are open with possibility, welcoming the
return of the very personality that topos excludes. Chora, therefore, might be
thought of as a haunted place, one that is overrun with the logic of riddles or,
according to E.V. Walter, a “dream reasoning.” Within it, experimentation and
invention constitute an “abgrund,” or non-ground, for the study and practice of
electronic media. 6 That unstable foundation, Nicholas Entrinken explains,
establishes practices in “an intellectual continuum between science and art.”7
In Ulmer, this middle space for new media is defined (or rather undefined)
by a paralogical rhetoric—an anti-structuralist approach to invention in the field
of rhetoric and composition. Paralogy radically re-evaluates how knowledge is
communicated. It runs alongside the traditional structures of formal logic.
Instead of dialectic and propositional truth-values, it weaves contradictory and
ambiguous patterns. Thomas Kent, in his text on Paralogic Rhetoric, explains that
paralogy is not a method but a “stance,” or “alternative vocabulary,” which
“allows us to formulate an account of interpretation, language, and meaning that
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foregoes talk about invariable truths that we discover through the application of a
systematic methodology.”8 Against, method, against foundations, paralogy
disturbs the principles that govern communication theory. Victor Vitanza, in his
essay “Three Counter Theses,” works through these paralogical “disorders”
referencing Lyotard, as he writes:
I distinguish paralogy from traditional or modern 'invention' (Postmodern
61-62) which is smooth, continuous, and controlled and accounted for by
a system or paradigm of knowledge and which is used to promote the
capitalistic, socialistic, scientific ‘efficiency’ of that system or
paradigm...Paralogy however is ‘discontinuous, catastrophic,
nonrectifiable, and paradoxical.’ It (re)turns—that is radically tropes—
against the system or paradigm of knowledge, ‘changing the meaning of
the word knowledge’ (Postmodern 60)...Whereas invention is used for
traditional or modern science, paralogy is used by postmodern science.9
Paralogy breaks from the urge to coordinate knowledge with clarity, to organize it
into a reliable structure. Style mimics an invention built contingently, one that
speaks in riddles, undermines itself, drifts quickly from any attempt to tie it down.
Vitanza, like Lyotard, performs this “radical troping” in his writing, leading some
reviewers close to invective as they struggle for footing amidst deliberate typos
and unfamiliar linkages.10 This merger of paralogical style and invention is
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difficult to dissociate, Vitanza admits, from the “postmodern science.” That
science often takes the form of Derrida (for Ulmer), Lyotard (for Vitanza), and
Donald Davidson (for Kent). It is also difficult to dissociate from the advent of
the internet and the acceleration of digital optics, which occurred concurrently
with paralogical composition studies in the early 1990s. Paralogy, in many ways,
was tailored for the digital image.
Ulmer commits himself to this correlation between paralogy and electric
media. He sees the rhetorics of digital images as a challenge to the “apparatus of
print.” By apparatus, Ulmer means not an actual device, like a typewriter, but a
“social machine,” a network of practices, media and communication strategies.11
In opposition to the linguistic operations of the print apparatus Ulmer installs the
“image apparatus.” His term for its inventive rhetorics is “electracy.” He writes,
“electracy is to the digital image apparatus what literacy is to alphabetic print.”12
Paralogical rhetoric—which some might say began as an application of
postmodern theory to written composition—finds in electracy a non-method, or
“post-modern science” of teaching visual communication, design, and digital
media.
Because of its paralogical roots, electracy is not a mere transplant of
literacy into the digital and imagistic realm. Sarah Arroyo, in her review of the
impact of electracy on pedagogy, notes that:
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electracy has less to do with literacy...and more to do with a combination
of the concepts of “electricity” and “trace.” Both of these concepts can
begin to take us out of the apparatus of print and work to describe the
logic and metaphors we use in a culture built upon images. Electracy
emphasizes a multiplicity of meanings for anyone concept, supports
imagination, and encourages creativity and invention: all of which are
traditionally not valued in a university environment built upon analytics.13
Electracy instigates a re-thinking of the ways in which composition and the
rhetorics of invention are systematized for students. It engenders a move from
hermeneutics to the anti-logic of heuretics, from interpretation to
experimentation, from fixed-meanings to un-pindownability. For Ulmer, this is
not simply experimental play for the sake of novelty in the classroom. Rather, it is
a political act against an institutional system that seems to value conformity over
self-expression.
The pedagogy of electracy also, and unmistakably, involves political action
for both individual and community. It is always an intervention. Ulmer asserts
that it is always “mediating the formation of identity at the individual and
collective levels.”14 This transgressive approach to education reaches beyond work
produced and becomes an important participatory act for the individual in what
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might otherwise seem a neutered system or an impenetrable flow of electronic
media.
Electracy’s framing of new media as a political act draws substantially from
paralogical theories. Kent makes the lineage clear in his statement that defines
“communicative interaction as a thoroughly social, public, and historical–albeit
uncodifiable—means through which we get things done in the world.”15 This is a
direct refutation of the stereotype of the rhetorician as an aloof, amoral
stylistician, more concerned with demonstrating a talent for clever turns of phrase
than a substantive interest in the wellbeing of others or public policy. Ulmer
constructs a similar argument in his juxtaposition of electracy with news items of
children beaten to death for bedwetting.16 This is what must be mediated—the
structure of his book suggests. This is what electracy must help us better form: a
sense of identity, both individual and collective, that could intervene in a parent’s
compulsion to batter the skull of a child. Vitanza, likewise, fashions inventive
resistance as a political act in his readings of Lyotard and Paul de Man. The
disparities between two parties, Lyotard argues, can never be justly addressed by a
single totalizing system. The interests of one or both parties always will have to
deny something of themselves to fit within the system. The impasse leads to
Lyotard’s differend. The only way to adjudicate it, Vitanza reminds us, is to “bear
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witness to new idioms.” Paralogical invention must upset the topoi we use to think
about stylistic technique and communicative design.
Paralogy’s political act, therefore, implies a pedagogical act. Politics are
performed not only in the style one choses to communicate in, but also in the way
one formulates notions of education. In Vitanza’s essay an “In(ter)vention into
Composition Theories and Pedagogies,” he argues “against a stable topology--that
is, a rhetoric of persuasion.” The teaching of a stable topology should recall
Ulmer’s criticism of the “neutral topos”—that which has been “emptied of
personal and social feeling.”17 An alternative then for Vitanza is an “unstable
‘tropology.’” For Ulmer, its synonym would be chorography. Through tropology,
Vitanza urges us, like De Man, to declare allegiance “against the game of
knowledge as a means of totality and for the game of avant-garde theory-art as a
means of resistance"18 And it is here in Vitanza’s mention of “avant-garde theory
art” and in Ulmer’s dedication to the interventions of the “digital image
apparatus” that we begin to see the importance of optical media and image-based
communication to the future of paralogical-invention. Here, in the crossovers
between art and composition, the visual rhetorics of post-pedagogy will
congregate.
The usefulness of the visual arts to paralogical rhetorics cannot be
underestimated. Ulmer invests it with restorative abilities. It becomes one of the
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few principles of an otherwise “unprincipled pedagogy.” He writes that “a
principle of the EmerAgency [the interventions of electracy], is the application of
arts methods... Art practices are a homeopathic cure for the aestheticizing of
politics.”19 Art is the antidote to systematic analytics, hermeneutics, the
dominance of critical interpretation. However, in his appropriation of artistic
practices for the field of rhetoric and composition, Ulmer favors one artistic
strategy in particular. Because paralogical invention is so intricately connected to
experimental style, the post-pedagogy of “avant-garde theory art” ends up rallying
around practices of collage. A substitute term would be bricolage, a strategy
Michel De Certeau memorably uses to define theory as a “cut-out” and “turnover.”20 Although collage, like bricolage, can cut-out and turn-over any genre, any
convention, any style, it collects together the fragments of a rather restricted
approach to practice.

Collage
In a 1984 essay, edited by art historian Hal Foster, Ulmer publishes his most
compact summation of the interplay he sees between communication and art.
Ulmer declares that “By most accounts, collage is the single most revolutionary
formal innovation in artistic representation to occur in a century.”21 Collage,
however, applies to much more than paper and glue designs. Ulmer is already
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pushing past the “print apparatus.” He sees the television camera essentially as a
“collage machine.” He also extends the term to still photomontage and the music
of John Cage.22 The category is based broadly in tactics of montage, mimicry, and
allegory. Together these tactics, he claims, feed off their host. However, he rejects
the word “parasite” due to its essentially negative status. The term “saprophyte,”
he decides, is a much more appropriate figure for collage. The saprophyte
establishes a revitalizing symbiosis with its host. Like a mushroom, the
saprophyte transforms the decaying matter of the dead into new life.23
The saprophyte of collage is constructed through a series of what Ulmer
later refers to as “relays.” The relay orientates a work relative to a model,
although Ulmer qualifies even this potentially hegemonic structure: it is a “‘weak’
model...not a template for our own work, but it orients us in the right way,
demonstrating some of the possibilities of the form and style that may be adapted
to the needs of our project.”24 The possible adaptations from weak models have
multiplied under electracy and the “digital image apparatus.” It is easier than ever
to requisition a work for the purposes of weak modeling. Downloading it,
copying it, scanning it, ripping it, etc.—these are facile tasks. Electronic media,
likewise, makes the relays of mimicry and montage user-friendly affairs. We can
quickly interrupt our weak models by cutting, remixing, embedding, filtering, and
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converting them to new formats. Collage capitalizes on these trends and offers a
way for electracy’s paralogical theories to seamlessly entwine with relay practices.
Other theorists of paralogy and electronic media have used collage to
shape approaches to visual composition. They too look towards music and avantgarde art to situate collage as a central practice of rhetorical invention. In Geoff
Sirc’s delightfully conceived essay, “Box Logic,” he builds a pedagogical approach
from the practice of collecting fragments. Students arrange and annotate artifacts
in a small box, then reflect on the bricolage framed within. The containers, Sirc
hopes, “help them bring an art consciousness to their world.”25 Two of the more
telling “weak models” for Sirc’s project both come from the visual avant-garde: the
survival kits produced by the Fluxus movement in the 1960s and Marcel
Duchamp's’ collages. Reinforcing the importance of the latter, Sirc quotes René
Block, a turn-of the century art dealer and museum director: “The collage
technique, that art of reassembling fragments of pre-existing images in such a way
as to form a new image, is the most important innovation in the art of this
century.”26 Sirc sees the form resonating in Kurt Cobain’s journals, and in the
scraps of rap lyrics his students gather in their boxes. Picking up on these musical
notes, Jeff Rice in The Rhetoric of Cool, articulates yet another theory of
paralogical collage for visual composition. Rice speaks even more explicitly to
new media composition and Ulmer’s precedent. His six “rhetorical moves"—
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which he claims are critical to understanding the nature of emerging modes of
composition—all derive from Ulmerian tactics for collage. They are “chora,
appropriation, juxtaposition, commutation, nonlinearity, and imagery.”27 Rice
connects juxtaposition in particular with musical sampling and uses it to
construct a collage strategy based on the hip hop freedom to simultaneously cutout and turn-over musical “standards.”28
Hip-hop is a natural companion of paralogical collage, not just for its
parallels with bricolage, but also for its history of political and cultural resistance.
Henry Louis Gates Jr. famously traces hip hop’s stylistic techniques to the African
roots of signifying, its prevalence as a mythomorphic narrative form and
vernacular discourse, as well as its capacities for political intervention.
“Signifyin,’” is so attractive to collage theory because it expands the “free play” of
standard associations and meanings.29 Other scholars have explored links
between graffiti tagging and music samples as ways of subverting dominant
cultural forms and articulating a vision or voice from outside the mainstream.30
Jazz also becomes an important precedent—a kind of oral collage, a blending
together of forms and hooks to orchestrate an entirely new composition.
For rhetorical studies, using music to bridge electronic media and visual
communication holds a number of benefits. First, sampling and signifying exert
an undeniable influence on many forms of visual media crafted and shared online,
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from remixes and mashups to memes and fanfilms. Also, deferring to hip hop’s
politics and cultural cachet solidifies collage as a paradigm that can overcome the
“theory/practice split.”31 The political history of hip-hop’s style, in other words,
advances paralogy’s interest in a politics for excluded parties and differends. It
offers a pedagogy of intervention in an academic system that Vitanza asserts
“does, indeed, finally exclude others (that is, both people and ideas) from being
‘expressed.’”32
But hip hop is not collage. I will return to this point in a moment, but for
now it should be said that by focusing on the credentials of such a specific stylistic
practice like collage, electracy and collage theorists risk fetishizing a technique of
visual composition. Arroyo can’t help but champion it when she contextualizes
the goals of electracy in the classroom. She writes, “intervening requires putting
together a collage of our own.”33 The strategy of the collage style has been so
closely linked with theories of electracy and post-pedagogy that it has become a
requirement for individual expression. De Certeau’s theoretical cut and turn-over
becomes the applied practice for the classroom. It resists totalization because it
never asserts its authority, never combines into a grand narrative, but remains
instead an elusive, non-form. It is ever sampling again. Collage cuts right to the
cut, editing through strict forms and structures.
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Current trends in the teaching of the fine arts offer helpful insight into
what is overlooked when we skip to the riff and the remix. In Why Art Cannot Be
Taught, James Elkins avows that modern art programs have largely jettisoned a
disciplined approach to method. He correlates this shift with the Bauhaus
rejection of baroque drills and rote systems of developing artistic proficiencies.
He concludes that “modernism and postmodernism have certainly brought
radical changes, but it wouldn’t be prudent to lose sight of the fact that technique
itself has also been lost.”34 He summarizes the shift away from technique by
returning to Aristotelian categories of learning:
In Greek philosophy there was a distinction between subjects that could be
taught and subjects that could not. Whatever could be taught had a
theory, or a body of information, a set of methods, or something that
could be written down and handed to students. Such subjects were called
techne, and for the Greeks they included arts, crafts, and sciences. Other
subjects could not be taught. Instead they had to be absorbed, or learned
by example. Aristotle called them empeiria.35
Deriving from the root peira, which means to “test” and “experience,” empeiria
usually explains how we ride a bicycle. Let us imagine a girl who has never seen a
bicycle ridden before. She reads the instructions. She listens to her father talk
about pedaling and steering. She memorizes the procedures for proper balance,
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breaking, and acceleration. When the moment arrives for her to finally try out
her two-wheeler, we would all expect her to fall. She has no empeiria to draw
from. By watching others ride, by testing the motions herself, by finding her own
balance, she will learn to ride. While some tips and pointers might help her, she
largely will have to absorb it for herself. Guitar playing, on the other hand, would
be an Aristotelian techne. Its craft can be practiced, trained, challenged,
disciplined. It can be written down, made into tutorials, lessons, classes. While
guitar playing does involve some modeling, and while some gifted students can
quickly mimic the sounds they hear without instruction, the craft of guitar playing
remains largely a focus of instrumental techne. The same applies to hip hop.
On the other hand, collage and the rhetorical pedagogies that have been
built around it, conceive of visual composition as a subject of empeiria.
Electracy’s imperative to intervene in new media and create one’s own collage
(what Ulmer would call a “myStory”) encourages a kind of imagemaking built on
absorption.36 The techniques for the production of the material that is to-be-cut,
or to-be-collaged, tend to merit less consideration than the act of assembling the
fragments. Processes are mainly left to the student to discover, for it must be his
or her own sensibilities that direct the cutting and turning over. To propose a
code or a standard to be learned would undermine the discovery of the student’s
own terms for intervention. The craft of image-construction—its properties,
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materials, histories, and effects—must remain mostly muted. This bracketing of
techne mirrors Elkins' criticism of fine arts program: “What we think of as art is
more like empeiria: it does not depend on rules so much as on nonverbal learning,
things that can’t be put into words. To Aristotle art was techne, essentially a
matter of rules. Since the Renaissance, the concept of techne has shrunk so that it
means basically ‘technique,’ and we have demoted “technique” to a level below
fine art.”37 With its aversion of rulesets and stable narratives, collage theories of
visual composition risk encouraging this discounting of technique in optical
media.
Importantly, though, one need not bracket technique to make collages. In
fact, the histories of sampling and riffing that collage theories draw from are
deeply interested in learned techniques and studied forms. That devotion to
techne is obvious in the classical training of a bass player and the orchestrations of
professional hip hop artists. Some of the rhetoricians I have grouped into the
collage school are well aware of this compossibility. My chief concern is that weak
models, relays, and mimicry demand just enough familiarity with digital
instruments and optical topoi to begin troping their conventions, playing around
with their scripts, and combining them in new ways. Of course, this form of
invention brings benefits. It encourages self-expression and exposes students
immediately to strong examples for their work. But I return to what Elkins calls
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“an idea that was absolutely fundamental in art academies before the twentiethcentury: the notion that looking and working are not enough, that art requires a
balance between theory and practice.” He suggests that this “is an idea worth
pausing over.” If we reflect long enough to weigh the balance of current rhetorical
approaches to optical media, the scales tip rather decisively to theory. The
practice and techne of optical media have been so concentrated in theory-friendly
collage that their rulesets and scripts are often obstructed, not to mention the
industry demands, genre styles, and audience expectations that have developed
around these rulesets.
A second possible, unintended consequence of collage’s ascendency is a
return to the inner-face of anthropocentrism. Collage’s tropology of cuts and
turnovers vests its agency in human operators. Despite the emphasis on the
Derridian trace and the incommunicability of knowledge, the collage style of
paralogical rhetoric encourages its practitioners to view their own hands as the
primary arrangers of meaning. Even though collage’s subversive mimicry reenacts the impossibility of clarity and the unavoidable breakdown of
compositional stability, it foregrounds the rhetor’s own performance of these
breakdowns. Emphasis shifts away from the tropes that precede those of the
collage’s cuts—the tropes of the visual apparatus, the tropes of light, the tropes of
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perception, and how the rhetor’s activity has already been mediated. These
become faint footnotes to the composer’s own bricolage.

Surface Tricks
I am advocating a critical distance that will allow us to better intervene in multiple
strata of tropes. The goal is to arrive at a tropology inherent to the mediations of
light and imaging apparatuses, in addition to the greater awareness we already
have of the cuts and turnovers we perform with our own collages.
One way of creating that differential space is to turn from collages to a
more primary consideration of surface. By surface, I mean that which is
questioned in Morell’s camera obscura photographs, or the surface that suddenly
comes into view across a desk when the angle of the reading lamp above it
changes,38 or the surface that appears, swirling and shifting, when we look up from
the deep end of the pool. Surface calls attention to the ways in which the world
around us is distorted into vision. It gives testimony to a collaboration, a material
assemblage, which precedes the camera’s image. Its reflections presuppose
“collages.” Surface lives on the basis of tropes, or tricks, which follow patterns yet
break free of expectations to enact an illusion.
I would like to explore three such tricks of surface. Together they
constitute visual composition. There is (1) the trick of light that makes a surface
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legible; (2) the trick that an apparatus imposes to re-render that legibility in a
digital or chemical medium; and (3) the trick that we enact—the moding,
collaging, tweaking, and editing that let us intervene in the display of captured
light and surfaces.
Turning to these tricks of
surfaces means re-investing in the
instrumentality of imagemaking.

LAYERS OF

SURFACE TRICKS

An orientation to optical techne
draws us closer to the tricks that

Operator

precede our own. If we put aside

Apparatus

(just for a time) our efforts to
Light
demonstrate our own paralogical
inventiveness, the cameras we wield
can reveal the paralogical inventiveness of light itself.
Each of the camera technologies I have described in the preceding chapters
demonstrates the first two layers of tricks. The Hipstamatic, for example, with its
interface of scripted effects, alludes to a fairly wide-ranging material history of
lighting effects. Each filter simulates a visual style deriving from a particular
chemical process, negative stock, or lens technology. Each one showcases a visual
artifice, whether that is the aesthetic of toy cameras, the stylings of pictorialism, or
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the striking imperfections of wet plate collodion.39 The spectrum of pre-scripted
styles calls attention simultaneously to the user’s choice and to the tricks that
photographic instruments automatically impose. Each package offers a different
interpretation, a different script for light. Similarly, digital cameras, in their
shedding of material records, encourage long sequence shooting—uninterrupted
“filming” of events as they unfold. The techniques of capturing these shots
involve both a practiced “eye” with the camera, much like virtuoso film directors,
but also a sensitivity to the embodied rhythms with which light phases, or tricks,
our experiences of events. Even the virtual cam—with its fusion of shooter,
subject, and spectator—stages tricks in landscapes of data and light. Its twodimensional information maps that navigate three-dimensional worlds point to
future machinations between virtual optics and biological eyesight.
These specific camera technologies and digital optics in general invite us
deeper into the furtive play of camera techne. They give and take control. We
feel it in the vast assortment of customizable views, the freedom to shoot anytime,
anywhere, and yet the nagging limitation of not having captured (or sometimes,
miraculously, having captured) exactly what it is we would most like to preserve.
In doing so, the digital camera presents, at once, unprecedented control over the
camera’s trick of light and the elusiveness of light itself.
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This important tension between light and the instrumentality of digital
devices can be better understood if we begin to recognize how cameras are both
shooters of contingent events and codifiers of visual perception. The tricks of
surface can be accessed through these two modes—shots and scripts. As shooters,
cameras call for certain performative measures, like a camera phone’s start-up
time, shooter-subject distance, and capture speed. The shooting parameters
dictate which moment will be captured and maintain the camera’s unique
relationship to its visual reference. Roland Barthes describes the special status of
the reference in photography as a “certificate of presence”40 an “emanation” of a
“real body…that-has-been.”41 Contrary to Barthes’ claims, the case of the
reference applies for all modern cameras, not just traditional photographic media.
The reference exists for a video game player, whose onscreen avatar is a
“certificate of presence” for off-screen hand movements. The real body
emanations are, in this case, gestural.
Because of this unique reference, Nelson Goodman calls camera media
“autographic.” No matter how much attention is given to recreating the lighting,
angles, and settings of an original shot, it can never be recaptured at another time.
The image bears the autograph of a singular event—a unique appearance of
surface in space and time.42 This autograph is the response to the primal trick of
light, that is, its troping of surface into view.
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Kodak capitalized on this feature of photography in a 1914 marketing
campaign. The “Autographic Kodak” allowed photographers to write on the back
of their exposures, marking down the date, a name, perhaps a title. It was, in
many ways, a precursor for current practices of image tagging. More
interestingly, Nancy Martha West argues that the Autographic Kodak coincided
with the company’s attempt to elevate the authenticity of the photographic event.
It was an instant with remarkable origins—a tale that was authored and could
stand in as potential competitor of language itself. The Autographic Kodak made
Barthes’ “certificate” of reference a legible, writable surface. However, the
domestic snapshots that the camera produced—far from becoming iconic
storybooks—ultimately remained closed off, resonating only for those
immediately involved in the event of their taking. The medium, in other words,
was so given to autography that its references struggled for any kind of
universizable “language.”43
Along with autographic reference, the camera maintains another mode for
making legible the tricks of surface: its “code.” While the code is quite literal in
digital cameras, it also applies to the chemical reactions analog formats use to
proceduralize the transcription of the autograph, or the translation of light into an
image. Goodman calls this the “notational system.” Most photographic
instruments allow access to it via measurements for shutter speed, gain, and depth
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of field. Virtual cams also might provide players some interactivity through a
video game’s settings, which let a player, for example, modify the contrast and the
rendering speed of graphics. However, the notational systems of these virtual
simulations usually are left fully open to designers. The rendering of colors, the
transparency of shadows, the reflections of a virtual sword as it is swung through
the air—these scripts often remain the exclusive province of game designers. The
point is that the province exists is thoroughly mapped; digital technology has
radically codified the apparatus’s translation of light.
Unlike the autograph, these notational effects are not unique. They are the
standardized, neutered topoi. Goodman describes them as forgeable.44 The
vignette that Camera+ adds, or the auto-correction for outdoor white balance in a
video clip, or that glint on a video game sword as its swung the air, is always
repeatable. The sword will always glint in the same way. Even if the program is
written to generate random patterns, still its effects will always be retrievable and
perfectly reproducible because it runs through a notational system.
Although Goodman addresses this multiple notational system in analog
and chemical photography, digital optics and the diffusion of camera media
proliferate the scope and precision of notational systems. They now compete in
importance with the autographic events they process. Photo filters can be as fun
as framing the shot itself. Graphic engines provoke as much admiration as a title’s
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gameplay. The interaction between the autograph and notational system is
descriptive not only of our current relationship with light, but also how we
fashion meaning with images. In the interplay between shots and scripts, we find
the tricks of the camera.

Deliberate Practice
Optical techne not only provides a way to better study these primary tricks of light
and image-making apparatuses, but it offers a distinct pedagogical advantage in its
engagement of topi and notational systems.45 Students discover a structure in
which to develop expertise in visual composition. I recognize that mention of
technological “expertise” or “mastery” invites associations with a hegemonic
teacher-student relationship. It suggests a preconception of knowledge as
something that might be controlled, disciplined, and lorded over.46 However,
there is still room for nuance with these terms, specifically if we begin to think of
expertise not as the dominance of subject material, but as the advancement of
performative flexibility.
Current research on expertise offers a hopeful message to students and
teachers alike. It claims that exceptional proficiencies are not necessarily innate,
but can be acquired. This theoretical school of learning, known as “deliberate
practice,” has been pioneered by K. Anders Ericsson at the University of Florida.
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His research suggests that expertise is less a matter of genetic predisposition, less a
matter of logging time in a given field of study, and more a problem of creatively
challenging skills through the application of past experience. Ericsson and his
colleagues assert that this activity is distinct from “indirect” learning, like subjects
of empeiria, when new understanding is acquired “with minimum instruction”
and “without the primary purpose of attaining and improving skills.” Direct and
deliberate practice, as a counterpoint, seeks situations where techne defines the
circumstances for learning. According to Ericsson, the most pivotal factor is:
the subjects' motivation to attend to the task and exert effort to improve
their performance. In addition, the design of the task should take into
account the preexisting knowledge of the learners so that the task can be
correctly understood after a brief period of instruction. The subjects
should receive immediate informative feedback and knowledge of results
of their performance. The subjects should repeatedly perform the same or
similar tasks. When these conditions are met, practice improves accuracy
and speed of performance on cognitive, perceptual, and motor tasks.47
The key features of deliberate practice—a focused pursuit of technical
improvement, integration of past experience in learning outcomes, productive
feedback, and repeatable tasks—can be observed in the best musicians. Contrary
to popular stigmas, Ericsson finds that most expert players spend the same
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amount of time in training and rehearsal each week, but the best dedicate their
time to exercises that challenge their techniques and past knowledge.48
Psychological approaches to immersive learning also indicate that greater feelings
of satisfaction and achievement are won when performers are push near the limits
of their capacities.49
One of the most compelling case studies of deliberate practice is the Polgár
sisters. Zsuzsa, Zsófia, and Judit Polgár are each internationally ranked chess
Grandmasters. Before their birth, their father László Polgár, had published a book
theorizing that genius could be taught and was independent of genetic disposition.
Noticing a proclivity for chess in his eldest, Zsuzsa, he decided the game was as
good model to test his theory. As Carlin Flora describes it, chess had everything
László was looking for. It was “an art, a science, and like competitive athletics,
yielded objective results that could be measured over time. Never mind that less
than 1 percent of top chess players were women. If innate talent was irrelevant to
Laszlo's theory, so, then, was a child's gender.”50 Remarkably, all of the sisters
became internationally top-ranked grandmasters, in a sport where only 24 of the
approximately 1300 grandmasters are female. Home-schooled and competitive at
a young age, they describe their childhood as a happy one. Zsuzsa attributes their
success to their father’s commitment to directing their energies to a specific
pursuit.51 With an environment tailored for deliberate practice—created by their
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father and cultivated by their small community of siblings—the sisters were able
to hone the techne of chess.
Studies of grandmasters have revealed that exceptional skill does not
derive merely from the amount of hours committed to practicing. Hours logged
in tournaments or in competitive games, for example, have less of bearing on a
player’s ranking than do hours devoted to “serious study” of stratagems,
precedents, and techniques to improve current proficiency levels.52 Furthermore,
although memory and visual/spatial processing are crucial to deliberate practice,
grandmasters are not gifted with strikingly superior intellects or memory
capacities. Rather, eye-movement studies highlight the importance of “visual
encoding”—a combination of perception and recall in which patterns are
recognized in the context of past experiences.53 The best players imagine chess
layouts as strategic topoi. They can see spatial commonplaces, each with their
own advantageous moves and possibilities for gain.
The role of memory and trained vision emphasizes techne’s importance to
this learning model: without a fixed topography or notational system the “serious
study’” and “visual encoding” of grandmasters would be impossible. In sum,
standardization has its value. As Elkins claims in his review of contemporary art
programs, “tedium, discipline, and repetition can even be attractive in their own
right.”54 Without the stability of techniques and conventions, it becomes much
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more difficult to fix markers to assess performance, challenge one’s performance,
and maximize the lessons gathered from past encounters.55
This defense of techne is by no means a suggestion for pedagogies of visual
composition to transform themselves into a series of tutorials. I am not
suggesting we simply teach the apparatus or the application and leave the rest to
the student’s own time. Nor do I want to construct self-expression into a bitter
enemy of techne and deliberate practice. In fact, I see them being complimentary
of one another.56 And the last thing I hope to advocate is a canon of absolute
techne—a coda that will be instituted with the authority of “master practices” and
serve as the key to all new media designs. That kind of reliance on singular
foundations misses the point. For one, scholars of deliberate practice have shown
that the best achievements are made when individuals can keep available a
multiplicity of approaches. In one study, design engineers were shown to exhibit
the most creativity when their own intentions clashed with clients’ goals for a
project.57 In another, successful architects demonstrated that a hallmark of
superlative design technique was, in fact, a plurality of techniques. The majority
of the best designers employed what Bryan Lawson calls “parallel processes.”58 It
is the ability to exercise a Kierkegaardian irony, which juggles alternatives while
treating each one with consideration and vigor. Kierkegaard describes this
problem-solving approach as a “perpetual movement,” which “continually sees to
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it that the question does not become entrapped in an incidental understanding,
that is never weary and is always prepared to set the issue afloat if it runs
aground—in short, that always knows how to keep the issue in suspension and
precisely therein and thereby wants to resolve it”59 Applying Kierkegaard, we
might say the even though one set of design practices should not be imbued with
greater authority over the other, that does not mean all options must remain
lightly “touched.” Quite the contrary, alternatives must be thoroughly taken in
hand, precisely weighted, exactly aligned, before being sent aloft again.
When the juggling ultimate settles down into some definitive shape, it
should not be confused with a final conformity to the rules. Another twist is
required if we are to arrive again at the politics of paralogy. It is here that we
might turn to conscientious cheating. I use this word “cheating” in full awareness
of the deceitful and illicit spirit it carries into any mention of pedagogy.60 I
summon these ghosts not to startle, but to demonstrate how those very
provocations and subversions might allow for a productive meeting of many of
the competing terms we have discussed surrounding rhetorics of visual
communication. Conscientious cheating takes up optical media’s autographic
nature and it systematic notations. It is a method that gathers in the contingency
of the camera’s shots without filtering out the restrictions of its scripts. It opens
itself to paralogical interventions through the techne of deliberate practice.
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Rules
To make explicit the distinctions of “conscientious” cheating, the rules of the
game must be known (the game in our case being composition with optical
media). Gonzalo Frasca, a theoretician and designer, proposes four different
levels of rules for any game system. Each level offers a way to access the
notational scripts of optical media. Level One is representation. These rules
dictate the way in which a thing will be rendered: how, for example, the glint of
our previously mentioned virtual sword will be displayed. Level two is formed by
“manipulation” rules. These are the stipulations though which gameplay is
executed. One manipulation rule of a soccer match is that players may not touch
the ball with their hands (unless they are the goalkeeper). Level Three dictates the
goal rules, or objectives, a popular one in most game systems being the “highest
scorer wins.” Finally in some cases we find a fourth level: “meta-rules.” These are
rules that allow other rule levels in the game to be modified.61 Tegwar, a card
game from Bang the Drum Slowly, consists almost entirely of meta-rules. Players
are dealt a hand of cards and take turns inventing a new manipulation rule.62
Vitanza uses the game to illustrate the need for “paralogical linkage” and to “bear
witness to new idioms” when faced with a differend.63 The only answer is to
invent new rules. Frasca explains that this fourth level is not always available:
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some designers allow for customization; others ban it completely. He notes, “with
or without meta-rules, the simauthor always has the final word and remains in
charge because total player freedom is impossible since it would imply that no
rules are unchangeable and therefore the game could literally become anything.”64
Even in Tegwar, there are some rules—some idioms—that persist. In the film
version, the representation rules remain intact (there are cards). Manipulation
rules stay fixed (each party may take a turn).
In thinking more broadly about visual design, we might say that any
composition circumscribes a domain for itself by applying some combination of
these rules. A photograph necessitates certain conditions for the successful
production of an image. Its goal rules call for the camera’s aperture to be opened
and a surface to be exposed to some degree of light. Each apparatus will also
impose its own representation
rules for rendering an image.
FRASCAʼS

Shooting with the FotoMan will

RULE LEVELS

produce a pixelated, black and

Representation

white, low resolution image, quite

Manipulation

unlike the representation rules of

Goal

a DSLR camera (although their

Meta

goal rules are shared). Finally,
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every digital image can be adjusted under certain manipulation rules—a change in
f-stop, a reconfiguration of RGB levels. The same typology could be imported to
visual projects. For any assignment in optical media, we might enumerate its goal,
representation, and manipulation, rules. Most would be shaped by format, genre,
and audience expectations.
Frasca’s rule-categories merit this broad application because they help
identify the ideologies formed and communicated at each level of these rules.
Additionally, Frasca’s notes on meta-rules remind us that we might not always be
free to intervene in these ideologies through strategies of collage and radically
reconfigure the scripts of the system itself. Due to the demands of an assignment
or the restrictions of technology, often we must make the best of the
representation, manipulation, and goal rules at hand. It is here that conscientious
cheating can uncover new possibilities and paralogical interventions .

Cheating
Definitions of cheating are not without their own idioms and litigations. Many
players, for instance, condemn modification of manipulation rules as a cheat. Mia
Consalvo in her review of cheating in video games points to players who hack into
the code, script their own programs, or run third-party software to crack the
system’s randomized calculations. This illegal creation of a meta-rule usually
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gains the player some kind of virtual capital (handicapped adversaries, boosted
powers, or maybe the acquisition of rare items).65 Other respondents draw an
even harder line and define cheating as any activity that distorts the “spirit” or
“expectations” of a game, which applies even to play that lies within the
boundaries of manipulation rules.
An example of this more extreme rule-enforcement can be found in the
case Blizzard brought against a guild of elite players of its video game World of
Warcraft. In 2010, the Ensidia guild won the prestigious honor of being the first
party to “kill” the Lich King, the main antagonist of one of Blizzard’s expansion
packs. Soon after claiming victory, the guild was stripped of their title and banned
for 72 hours (an eternity for hardcore gamers). Their transgression was that they
had discovered a bug in Blizzard’s code that made the battle against the Lich King
relatively easier. The players did not hack Blizzard’s code nor did they run any
third-party software to distort the game’s processes. They merely discovered a
“gap” in the program Blizzard had scripted. If they threw a certain type of bomb,
they could prevent part of the platform on which they were fighting from
crumbling, giving the players more room to maneuver.66 Consalvo’s term for
Ensidia’s cheat would be “gaming the system.” She explains that, like the
members of Ensidia, players who game the system “tend to see themselves as elite
gamers who have already surpassed the normal challenges offered by a game and
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so turn to gaming the game itself for exploits.”67 In soccer, British commentators
often make this complaint against Mediterranean teams when to earn a free kick
players throw themselves to the ground after light contact from an adversary.
This sort of diving, the commentators lament, cynically distorts the intended
spirit of play.68 They would be loath to admit that diving is something of an art
itself. In fact, divers must perfect a talent for sensing potentially suspicious
contact and tumble well enough to “sell” the foul to the referee.
“Gaming the system” is a charge that might also be lobbed at prep-courses
for standardized tests. These prep courses have little concern for the SAT’s goalrule ideology of measuring a student’s quantitative and qualitative skills. Instead,
they teach students how to exploit the test rules for a higher score.69
The skill it takes to “game” in this manner presents a pedagogical
opportunity. This form of cheating leverages fluency in a structure’s
manipulation rules to gain an advantage. Expertise is on display in the finelytuned performances of Ensidia’s world-beaters, the veteran defenders of Spain,
and the high-scorers of the SATs. The gaming of the system that they are able to
achieve is the result of deliberate practice in the techne of a field. The expertise
they manifest develops only after immersion in the mechanics of their “art.” With
that expertise, they are able to work a graceful subversion, one that isn’t
particularly destructive or negating. Rather it is a sleight-of-hand—a dash of
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cleverness and critical thinking that challenges conventional play, an achievement
that is fashioned from troping and topos.
Magicians frequently game optical media this way. They are practiced
meddlers in the rules of perception. In fact, illusionists and the theaters where
they staged their “phantasmagoria” have a notable history for pioneering new
applications of optics. One of the most prominent examples is the Royal
Polytechnic Institute of London, which flourished in the nineteenth-century
under the direction of John Henry Pepper, more commonly known as his pseudostage name of “Professor Pepper.”70 Collaborating with inventor Henry Dircks in
1862, Pepper staged an optical trick that Dircks had patented years before to little
fanfare or profitable gain. With Pepper’s showmanship, the technique—which
projected a moving, transparent person on stage—became famous as Pepper’s
Ghost. The feat was accomplished by angling a pane of glass across a stage and
lighting a figure just in front and below it, outside the audience’s view. In this
way, Pepper and Dircks could cast a ghostlike figure alongside more “material”
actors. The effect was only possible after Dircks had carefully studied and
“gamed” a mundane phenomenon—namely, the occasion of passing by a window
and catching one’s reflection in the glass, whereupon the onlooker’s image is
seemingly projected inside the building. Audiences were thrilled by this “ghost.”
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Other magicians tinkered with the trick, derived new contexts for it, and restaged
it throughout the world.71
Pepper’s Ghost also served a crucial pedagogical function. Pepper used it
as a showcase for optical science. His hope was that a newfound appreciation of
contrivances in light might help his audience discredit the hoaxes of the
Spiritualism movement, which was nearing the height of its notoriety at the end of
the nineteenth century. The Spiritualists—self-proclaimed emissaries of the
nether world—would use practical or photographic lighting effects to counterfeit
encounters with the dead (almost always for a steep price).72 Their “cheating,”
while conforming to the framework I described, targeted the naive or the griefstricken for profit. Pepper’s magic, on the other hand, constructed the cheat for
the benefit of his audience (although it must be mentioned that Pepper certainly
profited from it as well). In this sense, the optical game of Pepper’s Ghost is
representative of illusionists practicing what Jim Steinmeyer describes as an
“honest kind of trickery.”73 In his history of stage magicians, Steinmeyer notes
that the best performers leave an audience feeling not like they have been duped
or conned, but that something “has been given.”74 It is optical media’s history of
honest trickery that I am after with conscientious cheating. It commemorates
these turn-of-the-century magicians, like Georges Méliès, who were cinema’s
pioneering inventors and wonder-workers. It embraces the contemporary
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command often heard on film sets to exploit the rules of perception and “cheat”
actors closer together than they physically should be. This cheat is one of marvel
making. It is a cheat of proximity. It is a cheat of gift-giving.

Curative Tricks
Consalvo claims that people often game the system to provide an advantage when
the play is lopsided—a trick to level the odds, to intervene for the sake of
expanded agency.75 This connection between gamesmanship and power
relationships is not an innovative hypothesis. Play theorist Brian Sutton-Smith
finds children simultaneously rational and irrational about the authority invested
in social roles; their gaming is rule-structured but fantastically flexible within
those structures. It allows them to function as a kind of “traveling troupe of
medieval players” which depicts the adult world in order to test it.76
Similar to this trickster-like testing of rules, Mary Flanagan sees ugliness
and subversion as intrinsic modes of play.77 In Flanagan’s examination of doll reskinning she argues that the nature of play is an “unplaying” of existing codes, a
contesting of their simplifying power, and, even more specifically, a questioning of
the technology used to organize these sovereignties.78 Don Handelman and David
Shulman even broaden the tricks of play to suggest a metaphysical challenge, a
cheat of the gods, or fate itself. They classify this rebellious play as “bottom-up”
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gaming as opposed to the “top-down games” in which play is conceived as
keeping order in the cosmos. Bottom-up play, they argue, seeks to negate that
order, or at least, to even out the odds.79
Theories of collage likewise endorse a subversive “bottom-up” version of
play. “Anti-technique” for Vitanza provides a “curative fiction,” a series of “comic
jabs against the dominant tragic, sickly philosophical view of things.”80 Derrida,
likewise, sees bricolage as a way of escaping the top-down play organized by a
“centered structure.” It antagonizes a system that is “based in fundamental
ground...and a reassuring certitude.”81 If that “reassuring certitude or a
“transcendental signified” is affirmed, it empowers a “totalization” of meaning. 82
It is this totalization that is at stake when players defend the “spirit” of a game. If
the center is upheld, rules can be made, boundaries can be drawn, difference can
be organized, and alterities can be excluded. The cheat or trick for Derrida is to
demonstrate the fiction of a center or singular origin.83 Totalizations can then be
played as myths and the gates re-opened to difference and alterity.
Derrida himself has extremely invested in bricolage as a form of teasing
out the center of a structure. I have argued above that this type of subversive
practice is often limited in helping us understand how that center has been made
to cohere. There is often the compulsion to cut before seeing how the form
functions, to game the myths of the system before listening to how they end, to
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imagine that in reconfiguring the system we might somehow escape it. To cheat
or to trick is, therefore, calls attention to the rules. It demands that we listen
more. Rehearse the myths. Feel at the stitches making the system cohere.
Similarly, for Smith, Flanagan, Handelman and Shulman, tricksterism often
inverts the codes of play, applies them novelly, or redirects them, but throughout
the rules remain intact, or at least still visible. The theaters of children, the
“unplaying” of doll re-skinning, and the bottom-up games against the cosmos all
work through a deliberate practice that inverts the rules and tests their
boundaries. Each tactic teases the center out of place, makes the system’s
boundaries porous, but remains contiguous to of the form of the system itself.
This conception of play could justifiably be aligned more with Gadamer
than Derrida. Its fluctuation between rules and subversion coincide with the “toand-fro” movement Gadamer sees in play structures. That movement is
unending, like the “play of light” and the “play of waves,” both of which are not
tied to any goal that would bring them to an end. Back and forth, to and fro, play
in Gadamer is more like its etymological root, spiel, or dance.84 It is a delicate
balance between rules and being ruled. In Gadamer, “all playing is being played.”
It is both performance and script, autograph and notation, contingency and
archive. Yet the rules ultimately seem to overwhelm the players. He himself
claims that “the attraction of the game, the fascination it exerts, consists precisely
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in the fact that the game tends to master the players."85 Play becomes monolithic
in that “it renews itself in constant repetition.” He continues: “The movement
backwards and forwards is obviously so central for the definition of a game that it
is not important who or what performs this movement...It is the game that is
played—it is irrelevant whether or not there is a subject who plays. The play is the
performance of the movement as such.”86 The reorientation play yields is a
“transformation through structure.”87 It does not wholly belong to the game
structure, the player, or the audience. It encompasses them.
Because of statements like this, Gadamer has been criticized for the
“marginalization of difference.”88 Terry Eagleton sees him glazing “struggle,
discontinuity and exclusion” to form a “club of like-minded.”89 Certainly, in his
play structure, any kind of trick would be relegated to a very diminished role. Its
marvel and novelty would be tastefully contextualized into the game’s master
structure. No matter how much we play at the rules, in Gadamer, we are
ultimately swept together by the rhythmic dance. A social assemblage takes over
and we enter a more “fulfilled” time, as a community that shares in the structure
of the play.90
There is much in Gadamer that I have endorsed. His communal play is
like the magician’s gift-giving. Also, the to-and-fro movement of play and beingplayed is helpful when questioning the autographic and notational modes of
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optical media. At the same time, I agree with his critics that Gadamer ultimately
articulates a top-down game. Conscientious cheating resists this. It transforms
not through structure but within and aside structure. The object of both its techne
and its tricks is the repetitious procedures of the system—not to perpetuate them,
but to unpredictably step aside and re-contextualize them.
Hannah Arendt explains this departure within and against a system as a
“natality.” It is a political action that refuses to sacrifice its individuality to the
rules and escape into the “stability, security, and productivity,” which all hangs
over Gadamer’s fulfilled time of play systems.91 Arendt’s action offers a different
kind of “mastery”— “the only alternative to a mastery which relies on domination
of self and rule over others.” It is the mastery present in a promise, in a covenant,
“when people gather together and ‘act in concert’.”92 Rules are not jettisoned;
instead, through a cheat or trick of existing structures those rules can be regrounded. Arendt explains that these new “precepts are the only ones that are not
applied to action from the outside, from some supposedly higher faculty or from
experiences outside action’s own reach. They arise, on the contrary, directly out
of the will to live together with others...and thus they are like control mechanism
built in the very faculty to start new and unending processes.”93 Conscientious
cheating capitalizes on this “capacity of beginning something anew.”94 Like the
optical illusion of a magician or the unexpected tricks of cameras, its action offers
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a way to re-see the world. Arendt calls this nothing less than miraculous. It is a
new, contingent compact that offers hope to others. Its rules and its tricks are not
individual. They invite others to pick up their practices and themselves deviate
from “the automatic processes which seem to determine the course of the
world.”95 It is not a retreat from the world, but the possibility of brining new
processes to light.

Cheating the Camera to Life
Camera media promises opportunities to re-begin. Particularly with networked
technologies, camera media constantly open us to new way of imagining our
world and sharing it with others. In the opening chapter of this text, I offered the
invention of the FotoMan as one of those points of re-orientation. Another event,
following just a few years after the FotoMan, draws us closer to the camera’s
promise of play. Its origin story calls into question our shooting and scripting
with optical media. It tells of a cheat born simultaneously in structure and
subversion.
In January of 1997, Philippe Kahn’s wife, Sonia was in the midst of an
eighteen-hour labor. Philippe had been to Lamaze class with Sonia and offered
her some advice, which, according to him, was not well-received: "The second
time I said, 'Breathe!' Sonia said, 'Shut up!' So I said, 'OK, I'll sit at this desk and
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find something to do.'"96 He turned his attention to keeping friends and family
informed about the delivery. Equipped with his Casio digital camera and laptop,
he was prepared to upload the first photos of his daughter to his personal website.
But for months he had been working on a much faster method of sharing the
images.97
Born in Paris, Kahn majored in musicology and earned a master degree in
mathematics. He attributes his love of flute-playing and programming to his
family of cabinetmakers and musicians. Arriving in Silicone Valley without a
green card with the ambition to become a software engineer, he had succeeded in
creating a number of successful companies, ranging from a smaller startup,
Starfish, to a global database software provider, Borland International. At the
time of his daughter's delivery, he was between startups, playing a lot of flute, and
working on inventing the camera phone. 98
As his wife struggled with labor pains, Kahn left to purchase smoldering
wire at a nearby Radio Shack. With it, he hot-wired his digital camera to his
phone. By the time his daughter was born he had finished the necessary program
to send her picture wirelessly to a network of 2000 email contacts.99
Astonishingly, it worked.
Kahn and his wife would call the technology “Picture-Mail,” and use it to
found yet another startup, LightSurf. Whether or not this marks the first
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transmission of an image over a wireless network is often debated; many other
agencies were working on similar technologies. But Kahn’s story is certainly the
most popular account. His status as a French immigrant, a reformed “bad-boy” of
technological entrepreneurship, a spokesperson for Best Buy, and the benefactor
of the multi-million dollar sale of his nascent Multimedia Messaging Service (the
proceeds of which he used to record a jazz album) are all factors that have made
his do-it-yourself fable all the more bewildering.100
Kahn could serve as a paradigm of conscientious cheating. With a
combination of ingenuity and technical fluency, he is remembered as an alchemist
of optical media, a pioneer of twenty-first century technology. His story tells of
an individual performance that deviates from the corporate anonymity of
technological innovation. Also, the tale underscores his deep understanding of
camera technologies, their boundaries and rulesets. It paints him as a craftsman.
His inventive turn, his cheat in bringing the two technologies together, does not
disregard the coherence of the structures he was working with. His composition
does not perfectly accept the label of bricolage. In fact, Kahn keeps notational
scripts largely intact. He invents a new technological idiom to remount the
procedures of two apparatuses: camera and phone. The play is a curative trick. It
dislodges the center of mass communications by illustrating how narrowly we had
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conformed to its rules. He re-begins with the promise of a new standard,
alternative freedoms, and rebooted communication strategies.
Also, there is Kahn’s photo. It grounds the entire myth of the camera
phone’s origin: the first image taken and shared is of a newborn. Cynically, we
could say this belies a subtle strain of masculine mastery. After his wife pushes
him outside the domain of natural birth, Kahn engineers his own technological
birth. If she won’t let him participate, he’ll do it on my own—the story says—a
male revenge invention.
More charitably, we might focus on the community that gathers in the
sharing of this image. We might call it a mastery for the sake of alterity—a gift for
Kahn’s 2000 contacts, friends, and family members. The gift is shared even with
our own family and friends, for it is Kahn’s composition, by way of extension, that
we will use to tell of our own births and deaths, our own sacred events.
The natality marked by the image of Kahn’s daughter, Sophie, is therefore
both literal and figural. It is captured in the Italian idiom for birth—dare alla luce,
or “to give unto the light.” Literally, the image marks the arrival of Kahn’s
daughter. Figuratively, it bears witness to our own delivery—a new light for visual
communication, borne through a trick of techne. As camera creatures, we reach
out with similar programs and scripts, notations and codes. Our autographs
might change; our shots differ. But with each take there is the possibility of

246

opening our eyes to the rhetorics with which we compose and with which have
been composed.
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